Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Loughlin filed application 624, which issued in 2008, as the 426 patent. In 2007, Ling filed the 404 application, which was granted priority benefit under 35 U.S.C. 120, from application 413, filed in January, 2004. All claim a “multiple function lock.” Ling, seeking to provoke an interference, copied claims from pending application 624. In 2010, the Patent and Trademark Office declared an interference between claim 1 of the 426 patent and claim 31 of Ling’s 404 application. Loughlin asserted that, under 35 U.S.C. 135(b)(2), Ling was barred from provoking an interference because Ling’s attempt to copy the claim from Loughlin’s published application was untimely; Ling’s 404 application is “an application filed” after the publication date of Loughlin’s 624 application and Ling copied Loughlin’s claim more than one year after its publication date. The Board denied Loughlin’s motion, finding that the bar does not apply to an application filed before a published application. Ling’s 404 application, having an effective filing date of January 2004, was not an application filed after Loughlin’s application, published November 2004. The Board cancelled claim 1 of the 426 patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Loughlin v. Ling" on Justia Law

A subsidiary of Marathon hired Preston as a relief pumper in Marathon’s coal bed methane well operation. After beginning work, Preston signed an Employee Agreement containing the assignment at issue. Later, Preston worked with Marathon Engineer Smith on a baffle system to improve machinery used to extract methane gas from water-saturated coal in a coal bed methane gas well. Marathon installed the system on wells. After Preston’s employment ended, both Marathon and Preston pursued patents. The district court declared that Preston is the sole inventor of one patent and that Smith was misjoined as an inventor; ordered the PTO to issue a new certificate reflecting Preston as the sole inventor; declared Marathon the owner of other patents pursuant to the employment agreement and that Preston breached the agreement for failing to assign his rights. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Marathon on its shop right claim, finding that, even if Marathon did not own the patents, it had a shop right to practice the inventions. The Federal Circuit affirmed that Preston assigned his rights in two inventions to Marathon pursuant to his employment agreement. Because that assignment was automatic, there was no breach of that agreement. View "Preston v. Marathon Oil Co." on Justia Law

Nestle’s BEGGIN’ STRIPS registered mark for pet treats has been in continuous use since 1988 and has been registered since 1989. Midwestern manufactures and sells pet treats and filed an intent-to-use application with the Patent and Trademark Office, seeking to register the mark WAGGIN’ STRIPS for pet food and edible pet treats. Nestle opposed registration, arguing likelihood of confusion between the two marks. The district court ruled in favor of Nestle, finding likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly admitted evidence submitted by Nestle. View "Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A." on Justia Law

Alice Corporation owns three patents covering a computerized trading platform for exchanging obligations in which a trusted third party settles obligations between a first and second party so as to eliminate “settlement risk.” Settlement risk is the risk that only one party’s obligation will be paid, leaving the other party without its principal. The trusted third party eliminates this risk by either exchanging both parties’ obligations or exchanging neither obligation. CLS sought a declaration of invalidity; Alice counterclaimed infringement. The district court ruled in favor of CLS, holding that each asserted claim of the four patents is invalid for failure to claim patent eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit reversed. The system, method, and media claims at issue are not drawn to mere “abstract ideas” but are directed to practical applications of invention falling within the categories of patent eligible subject matter defined by 35 U.S.C. 101. View "CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd." on Justia Law

Frederick, previously married to World War II veteran Hill, upon Hill's death became entitled to Dependency and Indemnity Compensation as surviving spouse of a veteran whose death resulted from service-related injury or disease, 38 U.S.C. 1310-1318. In 1986 she remarried at age 57. Until January 1, 2004, the law provided that a surviving spouse receiving DIC benefits lost entitlement to those benefits upon remarriage. The Veterans Benefits, Act of 2003, amending 38 U.S.C. 103(d)(2)(B), added language that “remarriage after age 57 of the surviving spouse of a veteran shall not bar the furnishing of DIC.” Congress also provided new DIC eligibility for surviving spouses who remarried after the age of 57, but before the date of enactment of the Act. The Regional VA Office denied Mrs. Frederick’s 2007 application for reinstatement as untimely. The Board of Appeals rejected her notice argument. The Veterans Court held that she was entitled to benefits. The Federal Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that she is simply not covered by one-year limitation in subsection (e). View "Frederick v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Lupin submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the Food and Drug Administration seeking approval to market a generic version of Fortamet, an extended-release tablet of metaformin hydrochloride. Shionogi, which markets Fortamet, sued Lupin for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A) asserting, among others, the 866 patent), which is listed in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) entry for Fortamet. Lupin attempted to launch its generic Fortamet “at risk,”( without a final judgment on the merits in the litigation). Shionogi obtained a preliminary injunction. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court incorrectly concluded that Lupin failed to raise a substantial question of validity regarding the asserted claims of the 866 patent, an abused its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction. View "Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin, Ltd." on Justia Law

Heino, a veteran, is prescribed a daily dose of 12.5 milligrams of Atenolol. The lowest strength available for the prescription is a 25 milligram tablet, so his physician instructed him to split each tablet in half. Heino paid a $7 copayment for a 30-day supply of 15 tablets, which he claimed was excessive in light of the fact that some veterans paid the same co-payment for twice the medication. The VA refused his request for adjustment. The Veterans Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the regulation the VA uses to calculate his copayment amount, 38 C.F.R. 17.110, conflicts with 38 U.S.C. 1722A(a)(2), which prohibits the VA from charging a copayment “in excess of the cost to the Secretary for medication,” because the actual cost of his Atenolol prescription was well below $7.3, and that his copayment was excessive. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Heino v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 2006 the inventor submitted a utility patent application entitled “Crossbar Arithmetic Processor,” disclosing a computing device for processes such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division using nanoscale materials in a crossbar array. The examiner rejected all claims. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the claimed invention would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art. View "In re: Mouttet" on Justia Law

Thompson served in the Navy from October 1973 to January 1975. During active service, he was treated for psychiatric symptoms, attributed to immature personality disorder. Over the following years, he was hospitalized sporadically based upon complaints of a nervous disorder and an inability to get along with others. In 1984 he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. He was hospitalized for schizophrenia several times between 1984 and 1991. In 2006, a VA Regional Office issued a rating decision finding no service connection with respect to any acquired psychiatric disorder. Before the Veterans Court reached the merits of an appeal, the parties filed a joint motion for partial remand citing a 2009 intervening decision. The motion was granted. Thompson then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Veterans Court denied the motion, holding that he was not a prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Thompson v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Wrigley and Cadbury compete in selling chewing gum that provides a cooling sensation. Historically, gum makers have achieved that sensation with menthol. Menthol has disadvantages, including a strong peppermint flavor and bitterness in high concentrations. WS-3 and WS-23 are alternative coolants: Cadbury owns the 893 patent, claiming a combination of menthol with WS-3. Wrigley owns the 233 patent, claiming menthol with WS-23. After Cadbury introduced its WS-3/menthol gum, Wrigley introduced a gum with menthol and WS-23. Cadbury then reformulated its products. Cadbury’s reformulated gum contained both WS-23 and menthol. Wrigley sued, accusing Cadbury of infringing the 233 patent. Cadbury counterclaimed, accusing Wrigley of infringing the 893 patent. The district court granted Wrigley summary judgment of noninfringement. Addressing Cadbury’s summary judgment motion, the district court concluded that claim 34 of the 233 patent was invalid for anticipation and obviousness. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The inventors were on notice of potential interchangeability of WS-23 and WS-3, but drafted claims of the 893 patent narrowly to recite certain N-substituted-p-menthane carboxamides, not a broader category of carboxamides that would include WS-23. The trial court properly held that Cadbury could not expand the coverage of its patent to include WS-23 through the doctrine of equivalents. View "Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA, LLC" on Justia Law