Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff's patent recites a method for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction over the Internet; the specification explains that prior systems, which generally rely on billing addresses and personal identification information, work well for face-to-face transactions and transactions where the merchant ships a package. For online sales where the product is downloadable, address and identity information do not verify that the purchaser is actually the credit card owner. The patent purports to solve this problem by determining whether an Internet address relating to a transaction is consistent with other Internet addresses that have been used with the same credit card. The district court granted summary judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. 101 for failure to recite patent-eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the disputed claims attempt to capture unpatentable abstract ideas. One could mentally perform the fraud detection method that underlies the patent, as the method consists of only the general approach of obtaining information about credit card transactions utilizing an Internet address and then using that information in some undefined manner to determine if the credit card transaction is valid.

In 2003, Sunline imported frozen crawfish from China and procured security for required entry bonds from Hartford. The entries were subject to an antidumping order, but, after review by the International Trade Administration, were liquidated and a higher antidumping duty rate was levied. When Sunline did not pay, Customs sought payment from Hartford. Hartford learned that Sunline personnel had been arrested for using false invoices and claimed Customs' failure to disclose its investigation prior to issuance of the Sunline bonds was a material misrepresentation, making the bonds voidable. Under 19 U.S.C. 1514, Hartford had 90 days to file an administrative protest—which it did not do. Instead, Hartford filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i). The Court of International Trade held that Hartford should have reasonably known of its claims within the statutory time period and that the claims were within the scope of 19 U.S.C. 1514(c)(3), so that suit was unavailable; in effect, that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. Hartford’s bonds did not cover the same shipments as those investigated, so it would be unlikely for Hartford to follow that action; the indictment was against two individuals, not against the company by name.

The company imports mellorine, a frozen dessert similar to ice cream, with vegetable or animal fat substituted for some of the butterfat. Mellorine is classified under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. Chapter 21, "Miscellaneous Edible Preparations," Heading 2105, "Ice cream and other edible ice, whether or not containing cocoa," (19 U.S.C. 1202). Customs liquidated the mellorine under Subheading 2105.00.40, which applies to "dairy products described in additional U.S. note 1 to Chapter 4" for amounts above a certain import quota. This note describes three categories of dairy products. The Court of International Trade entered summary judgment in favor of the company. The court determined that mellorine was prima facie classifiable only under Heading 2105 as edible ice, that milk is not the essential ingredient, the ingredient of chief value, nor the preponderant ingredient, and that the mellorine is not an article of milk.The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that that the mellorine does not have the essential character of an article of milk.

The owner of patents relating to methods and systems for charging a fee for sending unsolicited and unwanted e-mail (spam) and claimed infringement. The district court construed the claim as containing a drafting error and granted summary judgment of invalidity, holding that the claim indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The claim is not indefinite, but has an obvious and correctable error, construction of which is not subject to reasonable debate by those skilled in the art. The district court had authority to correct the supposed error. The claim reads: "the computer being programmed to detect analyze the electronic mail communication sent by the sending party to determine whether or not the sending party is an authorized sending party or an unauthorized sending party." The addition of the word "and" between "detect" and "analyze" corrects an obvious error.

The company filed suit against numerous automobile manufacturers for infringement of three patents relating to tire pressure monitoring systems. The patent applications were filed in the 1990s and, in 2007, the inventors signed documents purporting to assign the patents to the company. The district court entered summary judgment of non-infringement of one claim and dismissed the others for lack of standing, based on a prior assignment. The court concluded that the claims at issue were not subject to an exclusion under an earlier assignment by the inventors. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the company lacked standing with respect to all of the patents.

A veteran of the Vietnam War, who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and schizophrenia, applied for disability benefits in 1981 but his claim was rejected. Years later, the Veterans Court concluded that he was entitled to benefits stemming from the initial claim. The veteran challenged the procedures of the Board of Veterans Appeals in retrospectively assessing his level of disability during the years 1980 to 2007. The Federal Circuit upheld the determination, stating that the legal process was sufficient to satisfy Fifth Amendment rights. The veteran has had his day in court concerning the staged rating assessment, which included a total disability period exceeding five years and reduction of the rating during subsequent periods.

Petitioner served in active military duty from 1972 to 1979, and in the National Guard before and after active service. He also worked as a laborer in a supply company and in coal mines and as a carpenter. In 1997, he claimed entitlement to TDIU, which provides a veteran with a total disability rating when his disability rating is below 100% if the veteran is at least 60% disabled, meets other disability rating criteria, and is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities. 1 C.F.R. 4.16(a). The VA rejected the claim and, on three remands, petitioner underwent a total of five VA medical examinations. In 2007, the Board denied the claim. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. The VA was not obligated to obtain an industrial survey from a vocational expert in order to evaluate whether petitioner was employable in a job other than his former occupation (i.e., a job that did not involve heavy manual labor).

Plaintiff is a physician, disabled by multiple sclerosis, and had no significant medical issues prior to exhibiting symptoms of MS. She received three Hepatitis B immunizations in 1996-1997 and began to experience symptoms. Although she was under medical care, she was not given a provisional diagnosis until 2003. In 2004, she was awarded Social Security disability benefits. Plaintiff first became aware of an association between MS and the Hep-B vaccine in 2004. The Court of Claims affirmed denial of compensation under the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program established by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, as time-barred. The Federal Circuit reverse, holding that the limitations period does not begin running when the claimant first experiences symptoms in cases where the medical community at large does not recognize that the symptom is related to a vaccine and the claimant has not received medical information suggesting a connection.

A contractor, renovating military housing, obtained a performance bond under the Miller Act (40 U.S.C. 3131 (b)) and abandoned the project after completing 12 percent of the work. The government had paid 40 percent of the contract price. The surety contracted for completion, but the second contractor discovered code violations and incurred penalties for late completion. Costs were reimbursed by the surety, which filed suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491. The Federal Circuit held that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction. The court previously held that the Claims Court has jurisdiction under the Act over sureties' claims based on a theory of equitable subrogation; this case does not involve equitable subrogation because the government made payments at issue before receiving notice of the contractor's default. The waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act does not extend to impairment of suretyship claims apart from the theory of equitable subrogation. The Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601, applies to a surety's claim against the government arising from a takeover agreement between the government and surety for completion of a bonded contract following the principal obligor’s default; the surety failed to satisfy CDA jurisdictional prerequisites.

The rejected patent claim is one of several that describe a system for sending information (electronic mail) from an originating processor (personal computer) to a destination processor (mobile computer) using an intermediary (radio frequency receiver). Prior art systems required connection to a public switched phone line and were limited by difficulty in locating a phone jack. The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the rejection, construing the term "destination processor," to mean the "particular end node device to which the intended user recipient of electronic mail has immediate and direct physical access when accessing and viewing electronic mail;" determining that the applicant was not entitled to claim priority; and finding that the claim was anticipated by prior art. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board properly relied on the written description in construing "destination processor." Nothing in 35 U.S.C. 301 prohibits an examiner from determining, on re-examination, whether a priority date was properly claimed during the original examination; such a determination was proper in this case because the examiner did not consider priority during the original prosecution.