Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Takeda owns patents that claim the formulation for the brand-name drug Prevacid® SoluTab,™ which contains the active ingredient lansoprazole, a proton pump inhibitor used to treat acid reflux. It is the only proton pump inhibitor available as an orally disintegrable tablet. A patient allows the tablet to disintegrate in his mouth, leaving behind thousands of granules which the patient swallows. The stated objective of the 994 patent is a formulation with granules small enough to avoid a feeling of roughness in the patient’s mouth upon disintegration. In 2010, Zydus filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the FDA, seeking to manufacture a generic version of Prevacid® SoluTab.™ Takeda filed suit, alleging that the ANDA product infringed claims of several patents. Only claim 1 of the 994 patent remains at issue. Zydus counterclaimed, alleging that claim 1 was invalid for failure to comply with 35 U.S.C. 112. The district court construed the claim term “fine granules having an average particle diameter of 400 μm or less,” accepting Takeda’s argument that the term should be construed to include a deviation of ±10%, based on a “universally accepted” 10% standard of error for particle size measurements. The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of infringement and found no invalidity. View "Takeda Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pharm. USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The patent claims an improved automobile locking differential: the differential is a mechanism that allows wheels to rotate at different speeds relative to each other. When locked, a differential distributes torque so that wheels spin at the same rate. R&P sought declaratory judgment that its Ziplocker product did not infringe the patent. Following claim construction, the parties stipulated that the Ziplocker product literally met every limitation of claim 1 except the “cylinder means formed in” limitation, but that the Ziplocker included an “equivalent” cylinder and that the Ziplocker cylinder would have been foreseeable to a person of ordinary skill in the art when the application was filed. The parties agreed that “should the Court hold ... that foreseeability of an equivalent at the time of application prevents use of the doctrine of equivalents,... the accused differential would not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents” or that should the court hold that foreseeability does not prevent use of the doctrine of equivalents, the accused differential would infringe under that doctrine. The district court held that, while foreseeability did not preclude application of the doctrine of equivalents, a finding of infringement under the doctrine would vitiate the “cylinder means formed in” limitation and granted summary judgment of non-infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the district court improperly applied the doctrine of claim vitiationView "Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp. Ltd" on Justia Law

Butamax owns the 188 patent, which covers a recombinant microbial host cell that uses a particular biosynthetic pathway to produce isobutanol, which is useful as a fuel or fuel additive, and the 889 patent, which issued from a divisional of the 188 patent’ application and focuses on a method of producing isobutanol from a recombinant yeast microorganism that expresses a five-step biosynthetic pathway. The patents’ specifications largely are identical. The district court rejected Butamax’s claim of literal infringement and granted Gevo summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents of the asserted claims and of invalidity of claims 12 and 13 of the 889 patent for lack of written description, and invalidity of claims 12 and 13 of the 889 patent for lack of enablement. The Federal Circuit vacated. The district court erred in its claim construction and determination under the doctrine of equivalents and failed to recognize the existence of genuine issues of material fact. The court reversed summary judgment of invalidity for lack of enablement because that judgment appeared to have been a scrivener’s error. View "Butamax(TM) Advanced Biofuels v. Gevo, Inc." on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank filed its 1999 Form 1120F (U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation), reporting total tax of $105,725,463, total payment of $188,256,721, including credit for taxes withheld at the source ($13,256,721), and a resulting overpayment of $82.5 million. Form 1120F does not itemize withholding credits, which were derived from Forms 8805 (Foreign Partner’s Information Statement of Section 1446 Withholding Tax) and 1042-S (Foreign Person’s U.S. Source Income Subject to Withholding) received from withholding agents. Deutsche Bank did not attach those forms . The IRS returned the filing, unprocessed, requesting documentation of the withholding credit. In its amended return, Deutsche Bank stated that it discovered an overstatement of the withholding credit by $11,240 and that the correct amount was $13,245,481. The IRS processed the resubmitted return without correcting the error and credited the overpayment to the 2000 tax year. Later, Deutsche Bank filed an amended 1999 return claiming an additional refund of $59 million based on a valuation adjustment. The IRS issued the refund and $5 million in overpayment interest for January 1, 2001 to November 14, 2002. The IRS denied its request for additional interest for March 15 to December 31, 2000. The Claims Court agreed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that the return was not filed by the extended return filing due date in processible form to commence the accrual of overpayment interest. View "Deutsche Bank AG v. United States" on Justia Law

Solvay’s 817 patent claims an improvement to a method of making a hydrofluorocarbon (HFC-245fa), which does not deplete the ozone layer as legislatively mandated to replace ozone-depleting alternatives. HFC-245fa is especially useful in preparing polymeric materials used for insulation in refrigeration and heat systems. The patent has a 1995 priority date. In 1994, Honeywell and RSCAC entered into a contract, under which RSCAC engineers, in Russia, studied commercial production of HFC-245fa. RSCAC sent Honeywell a report documenting a continuous process capable of producing high yields of HFC-245fa. Honeywell used the report to run the same process in the U.S., before the 817 patent’s priority date. Solvay sued Honeywell, alleging infringement. Honeywell argued that the Russian inventors made the invention in this country by sending instructions to Honeywell personnel who reduced the invention to practice in the U.S. The district court held that the RSCAC engineers should be treated as inventors who made the invention in the U.S. under 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(2), that RSCAC disclosed claim1 in a 1994 Russian patent application such that they did not abandon, suppress, or conceal it. The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment for Honeywell. It is not required that the inventor be the one to reduce the invention to practice if reduction to practice was done on his behalf in the U.S., so Honeywell’s invention qualified as prior art.View "Solvay, S.A. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2002, the Navy awarded Metcalf a contract to design and build 212 housing units in Hawaii by October, 2006, for $50 million. Problems arose involving soil conditions. The request for proposals stated that the “soil reconnaissance report” was “for preliminary information only” and required that the contractor conduct independent soil investigation, incorporating 48 C.F.R. 52.236-2, concerning site conditions that differ materially from those disclosed. Discussions delayed construction for a year. Metcalf implemented its preferred changes by over-excavating and using non-expansive fill, without a contract modification. The Navy denied that there was any material difference between pre-bid and post-award soil assessments, but approved some modifications. Metcalf was about 200 days behind schedule and began using “post-tension” concrete, which was more expensive but avoided the additional time and cost of over-excavation. The Navy amended the contract to approve use of post-tension concrete slabs. Metcalf claims additional delays resulting from the presence of more of a chemical contaminant than was expected. With respect to contamination, the Navy granted a 286-day extension and reimbursed $1,493,103. The Navy accepted the buildings in March, 2007. Metcalf alleged that its final cost was $76 million. The government paid less than $50 million. The Claims Court ruled in favor of the government, under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7104. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the court misconstrued what Metcalf needed to show to prove that the government breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing and misinterpreted certain contractual provisions.View "Metcalf Const. Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Roberts asserts that he is owed living quarters allowance (LQA) for his current civilian position as Deputy Camp Commander for a Marine Corps base in Okinawa, Japan. LQA is authorized for particular classes of employees by the Overseas Differentials and Allowance Act, 5 U.S.C. 5921, and regulations issued by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and Marine Corps Bases Japan Order P12000.2A. In deciding whether to offer LQA for Roberts’s position, the deputy commanding general considered prior experience that there were qualified, locally-available candidates for DCC positions for whom LQA was not needed as a recruitment incentive. Many active-duty Marines like Roberts wished to remain in Okinawa in civilian positions after retirement. The deputy commanding general also determined that there were insufficient funds to support LQA for DCC positions in Okinawa without reallocating funds from other programs. Response to the 2008 job announcement, which noted that LQA was not offered, confirmed the lack of recruitment need; 14 qualified, locally-available candidates applied. When he was offered the position, Roberts was informed that his salary would be include no LQA.” The Claims Court rejected Roberts’s subsequent appeal of denial of his request for LQA. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Roberts v. United States" on Justia Law

Stallworth served in the U.S. Army, 1974-1975, during which time he experienced a psychotic episode that was attributed to his illicit use of the drug LSD. He recovered with hospitalization, but relapsed following return to active duty and was diagnosed with acute paranoid schizophrenia. A treating physician noted that it was not clear whether Stallworth’s illness was caused by his drug use or by independent psychosis. An Army medical board found him unfit for further military duty. Weeks later, a VA Regional Office awarded Stallworth service connection for schizophrenia at a 50% disability rating. Thereafter, Stallworth was often admitted to inpatient psychiatric facilities where medical professionals repeatedly opined that he had “no mental disorder” and that Stallworth’s service connection diagnosis was in error. The VA severed Stallworth’s service connection on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) and declined to reopen his claim because of a lack of new evidence. In 1981, the Appeals Board affirmed. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Stallworth v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Tivoli owns the 446 patent, which relates to a stair-step lighting apparatus that uses a reflective strip of material to alert users to the edge of a step in darkened or low-light environments. Tivoli sued Tempo for patent infringement in 2004. Tempo later requested inter partes reexamination by the Patent and Trademark Office, which granted the request and issued the first Office Action in 2005, rejecting all the claims. The district court stayed the litigation pending the outcome of the reexamination, which progressed slowly. The examiner closed prosecution in 2009, maintaining the rejections and the construction of “inert to light.” The appeals board reversed the rejection of certain claims. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the decision lacked the support of substantial evidence and that the board erred in concluding that Tempo waived certain View "Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC" on Justia Law

Crewzers was awarded blanket purchase agreements (BPAs) with the Forest Service to provide buses that transport fire crews to wildfires and other disaster areas in regional and national wilderness zones and to provide flame retardant tents to disaster areas. Both BPAs established dispatch priority lists within geographic zones. When an emergency arose, the Service would to submit an order for the highest-ranked (lowest-priced) resource available on the priority. BPAs are frameworks for future contracts and state that “If a Contractor cannot be reached or is not able to meet the time and date needed, the dispatcher may proceed with contacting the next resource on the dispatch priority list.” The Service has discretion to deviate from priority lists as needed and did not make any guarantee that it would actually place orders under the BPAs. The BPAs required Crewzers to accept orders only if “willing and able.” The Service terminated the Crewzers BPA for buses after Crewzers allegedly responded with unauthorized vehicles and attempted to bill at a higher-than-authorized rate and later terminated its BPA for tents after Crewzers allegedly provided tents that did not meet specifications or failed to deliver on time. Crewzers sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to damages or to reinstatement of the BPAs. The Claims Court dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the BPAs were not binding contracts for purposes of invoking Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491(a)) jurisdiction. View "Crewzers Fire Crew Transp., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law