Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Strand served in the Navy for roughly 19-1/2 years until he was discharged under other than honorable conditions for firing a gun at his estranged wife. Strand was convicted in state court of three felonies. After his release from prison, Strand sought “corrections” to his service records, including a six-month credit so that he would have 20 years of service and be eligible for military retirement benefits. The Board for Correction of Naval Records recommended granting Strand’s request, citing his “overall record … of satisfactory service [including receiving numerous medals,].” The Secretary of the Navy rejected the Board’s recommendation, citing the seriousness of Strand’s convictions, the Navy’s core values, its practice in similar cases, and Strand’s supposed “long-standing history" of domestic violence issues. On remand, the Secretary also noted two early “counseling/warning” entries on Strand’s record and that Strand had already received “appropriate relief” in upgrading his service characterization to “General Under Honorable Conditions.” The Claims Court found the denial arbitrary.The Federal Circuit reinstated the denial. The Secretary reviewed the same record as the Board and drew a different, but supported, conclusion. Where a military officer has not unduly influenced the decision, a service secretary may reject the recommendation of a records correction board, even if supported by the record, if the rejection is not arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to the law. View "Strand v. United States" on Justia Law

The Patents-in-Suit are directed to the recovery of oil from a dry mill ethanol plant’s byproduct, thin stillage, for example, “evaporating the thin stillage to form a concentrate,” or syrup, and then “separating the oil from the concentrate using a disk stack centrifuge.” In an infringement suit, the district court determined that specified claims were invalid because of the on-sale bar, anticipation, obviousness, incorrect inventorship, inadequate written description, lack of enablement, and indefiniteness. The court concluded that, under the UCC, a signed proposal would have constituted a commercial contract and that a reasonable jury would not have concluded that the proposal was an offer to test its claimed invention as the Inventors knew the method could be successfully reduced to practice and had been reduced to practice. After an inequitable conduct bench trial, the court concluded that the patents were ready for patenting when the Inventors provided the 2003 Proposal and that CleanTech committed inequitable conduct: The "Inventors made a mistake” by offering the invention for sale in 2003, and later affirmatively hid that fact from the lawyers and the Patent Office. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that CleanTech and its lawyers made a deliberate decision to withhold material information with the specific intent to deceive the Patent Office. View "GS CleanTech Corp. v. Adkins Energy LLC" on Justia Law

The International Trade Commission (ITC) investigated a complaint under Tariff Act Section 337, alleging that Comcast’s customers directly infringe patents by using Comcast’s X1 system. The patents claim an interactive television program guide system for remote access to television programs. An ALJ found a violation, concluding that the X1 set-top boxes are imported by ARRIS and Technicolor and that Comcast is sufficiently involved with the design, manufacture, and importation of the products, such that it is an importer under Section 337. The ITC affirmed, stating that Comcast induced infringement and that Comcast "instructs, directs, or advises its customers on how to carry out direct infringement.” The ITC affirmed that ARRIS and Technicolor do not directly infringe because they do not provide a “remote access device” as required by the claims and do not contributorily infringe because the set-top boxes have substantial non-infringing uses. The ITC issued a limited exclusion order and cease and desist orders directed to Comcast. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Comcast’s arguments that its conduct is not actionable under Section 337 because Comcast’s inducing conduct “takes place entirely domestically, well after, and unrelated to," the importation and that Comcast does not itself import the articles. The ITC has authority (19 U.S.C. 1337(d)(1)) to issue an exclusion order that blocks the importation of articles manufactured and imported by ARRIS and Technicolor, despite its determination that they did not violate Section 337 and did not infringe the patents. View "Comcast Corp. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

The Small Business Act requires that many federal agencies set aside contracts to be awarded to certain categories of small businesses, including service-disabled-veteran-owned (SDVO) small businesses, 15 U.S.C. 644(g)(1)(B). For a limited liability company (LLC) to qualify as SDVO, one or more SDVs must directly and unconditionally own at least 51% of each class of member interest. For an LLC to be controlled by SDVs, one or more SDVs must control the company’s long-term decision making, conduct its day-to-day management and administration of business operations, hold the highest officer position, serve as managing members, have “control over all decisions” of the LLC and “meet all supermajority voting requirements,”XOtech LLC, previously organized with Marullo (an SDV) as its only manager, became a multiple-manager company with four “Members” as owners. The Army issued a Request for Proposals seeking an SDVO contractor to provide logistics support for Army Reserve facilities. XOtech was awarded the contract. The Director of the SBA’s Office of Government Contracting determined that XOtech did not qualify for SDVO status and sustained a protest, finding that, although Marullo owned XOtech, he lacked sufficient control over XOtech’s operations because he required the vote of at least one non-SDV to make management decisions. The Claims Court and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that service-disabled veterans do not control “all decisions” of XOtech as required by 13 C.F.R. 125.13(d). View "XOTech, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs own land abutting a railroad right-of-way that was long ago granted to, and for decades used by, the Railway in Dade County, Florida. When the Railway abandoned the right-of-way for rail use, full rights to the underlying land, unencumbered by the easement, would have reverted to whoever owned such rights, had there been no overriding governmental action. However, the Railway successfully petitioned the Surface Transportation Board to have the railroad corridor turned into a recreational trail under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).The landowners sued, alleging that the agency’s conversion of the right-of-way into a recreational trail constituted a taking of their rights in the corridor land abutting their properties and that the government must pay just compensation for that taking. To establish their ownership of the corridor land, the plaintiffs relied on Florida's “centerline presumption,” which provides that when a road or other corridor forms the boundary of a landowner’s parcel, that landowner owns the fee interest in the abutting corridor land up to the corridor’s centerline, absent clear evidence to the contrary. The trial court ruled in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit reversed. The centerline presumption applies to railroad rights-of-way and the plats at issue do not clearly express the intent required to avoid application of the centerline presumption. View "Castillo v. United States" on Justia Law

Arctic’s patents, directed to personal watercraft (PWC) steering systems, issued in 2004 and 2003, after Arctic stopped selling PWCs. In 2002, Arctic entered into a license agreement with Honda that expressly stated that Honda had no marking obligations. Honda began making and selling unmarked PWCs. Arctic asserted that Honda stopped selling unmarked products in 2013. Bombardier claimed that Honda continued to sell PWCs under the Arctic license until 2018. In 2014, Arctic sued Bombardier for infringement. The court held that Bombardier bore the burden of proving that Honda’s PWCs practiced the asserted claims and denied Bombardier’s motion to limit potential damages because of Honda’s sales of unmarked products. A jury awarded Arctic a royalty to begin in 2008 and found that Bombardier had willfully infringed the asserted claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed as to willfulness but vacated in part. Once an alleged infringer identifies products that it believes are unmarked patented articles subject to the 35 U.S.C. 287 notice requirements, the patentee bears the burden of proving that the products do not practice the claimed invention. On remand, Arctic conceded that it could not show that the Honda PWCs do not practice the asserted claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Bombardier. Section 287 continues to limit damages after a patentee or licensee ceases sales of unmarked products; willful infringement does not establish actual notice under section 287. View "Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Fourstar, a federal prisoner, filed a Tucker Act Complaint with a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. He claimed that the government is mismanaging certain Indian properties and resources. The Claims Court denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), which provides: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal ... under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury,” Prison Litigation Reform Act, 110 Stat. 1321. Fourstar did not pay the filing fee. The court dismissed his complaint. Fourstar was released from prison and later filed a Notice of Appeal. He later filed a statement that he was subsequently arrested and detained and unsuccessfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Because Fourstar was not a prisoner at the time of filing his appeal, section 1915 is not applicable. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the three-strikes rule was met by Fourstar’s litigation history and that Fourstar was not subject to the “imminent danger” exception. View "Fourstar v. United States" on Justia Law

The Department Commerce investigated antidumping duty petitions concerning imports of certain oil country tubular goods from various countries, including Vietnam. Commerce issued quantity and value questionnaires to the eight companies named in the petition but received timely responses from only two—one of which was SeAH. Commerce selected SeAH and the other responsive company as mandatory respondents, 19 U.S.C. 1677f-1(c)(2) Because Commerce considers Vietnam to be a non-market economy country, Commerce selected a surrogate market economy country, India, to provide surrogate values. Commerce calculated a 24.22% dumping margin for SeAH, based on various surrogate values. The Court of International Trade remanded to Commerce twice, for reconsideration and further explanation of its surrogate value determinations. On remand, Commerce calculated a 61.04% dumping margin for SeAH. The Court sustained Commerce’s Final Determination, as amended.The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Commerce’s selection for surrogate financial ratios (Bhushan) is supported by substantial evidence; Bhushan, unlike the other available options, produced identical merchandise to SeAH and Bhushan has financial statements that are publicly available and contemporaneous. Substantial evidence supports commerce’s determination that SeAH’s freight forwarder contract included domestic inland insurance separate from transportation costs. Commerce’s allocation methodology for brokerage and handling was not supported by substantial evidence. View "SeAH Steel VINA Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Serta filed a patent infringement action against Casper, citing the 173, 763, and 935 patents. Those patents cover mattresses that include a channel and methods for forming it. These mattresses can have varying areas of firmness by inserting reinforcement of various types into their channels that can be located at regions where additional support is desired. Casper filed three motions for summary judgment directed to non-infringement of Casper’s accused mattresses, accused methods of manufacturing, and redesigned mattresses. While Casper’s summary judgment motions were pending, the parties executed a settlement agreement and advised the district court of the settlement. The district court nevertheless granted Casper’s summary judgment motions of non-infringement. It later denied Serta’s motions to vacate the summary judgment order and to enforce the settlement agreement. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to enforce the settlement agreement. There is no contention that the settlement or the relief sought by Serta is unlawful or contrary to public policy. There is also no dispute that the parties executed the agreement before the district court issued the summary judgment order; Casper has admitted that the agreement was binding. The settlement agreement mooted the case even though it included terms that required future performance. View "Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC v. Casper Sleep Inc." on Justia Law

SIT sued Google for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Texas. Under 28 U.S.C. 1400(b), “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” Under Supreme Court precedent, “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its state of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute; the Federal Circuit has held that a “regular and established place of business” must be: “a physical place in the district”; “regular and established”; and “the place of the defendant.” Google provides video and advertising services to residents of the Eastern District of Texas through the Internet. Google Global Cache (GGC) servers function as local caches for Google’s data. Google contracts with internet service providers within the district to host Google’s GGC servers. The GGC servers cache only a small portion of content that is popular with nearby users but can serve that content with shorter wait times than Google’s central server infrastructure due to their physical proximity to the ISP’s users. No Google employee installed, performed maintenance on, or physically accessed any of the GGC servers. The district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss. The Federal Circuit ordered that the case be dismissed or transferred. A “regular and established place of business” requires the regular, physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged “place of business.” View "In Re: Google LLC" on Justia Law