Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Acoustic’s 841 patent relates to communications systems for utility providers to remotely monitor groups of utility meters, e.g., electricity meters. According to Acoustic, the claimed invention was “an improvement upon prior art automated meter reading systems that used expensive and problematic radio frequency (RF) transmitters, or systems that relied on human meter-readers using hand-held or vehicle-mounted short-range wireless devices to obtain meter readings when they were in a customer’s vicinity.” On Network’s petition, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review (IPR). Nine days after institution, Network agreed to merge with Itron, an entity undisputedly time-barred under 35 U.S.C. 315(b). Network and Itron completed the merger during the IPR proceeding. The Board later issued a final written decision and found the challenged claim unpatentable. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Acoustic’s claim that the inter partes review was time-barred due to Network’s and Itron’s merger-related activities. Acoustic waived its time-bar argument because it failed to present that argument before the Board. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s unpatentability findings based on anticipation. View "Acoustic Technology, Inc. v. Itron Networked Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, the Phoenix VA Health Care System where Potter worked was in the midst of a patient care crisis that had resulted in an investigation by the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General (OIG). Potter alleges she engaged in five whistleblowing activities by making four protected disclosures and by cooperating with OIG. In December 2014, during a reorganization of the Phoenix DVA, Potter’s title was changed, which she claimed amounts to a demotion; a position for which Potter had applied was withdrawn in November 2015; and Potter was assigned to “unclassified duties.” Potter alleges that in early 2017, conditions at the Phoenix DVA forced her “involuntary resignation.” constituting the agency’s fourth and final reprisal. Potter accepted an offer for a Staff Nurse position at the VA Northern California Health Care System in 2017, and filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint at the Office of Special Counsel. A Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge found that Potter had shown only one prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal but denied corrective action because the government established that the DVA would have taken the same action even if Potter had not made the protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed as to three alleged reprisals. The court vacated as to the November 2015 failure to hire. View "Potter v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Acetris obtains its pharmaceutical products from Aurolife, which makes them in a New Jersey facility, using an active pharmaceutical ingredient made in India. Acetris had contracts to supply the VA with several pharmaceutical products, including Entecavir (used to treat hepatitis B). The VA requested that Acetris recertify its compliance with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA), which bars the VA from purchasing “products of” certain foreign countries, such as India. Ultimately, the VA requested that Acetris obtain a country-of-origin determination. Customs concluded that the Acetris products were products of India. Acetris agreed to cancel its Entecavir contract. The VA issued a new solicitation seeking proposals for Entecavir, indicating that it would continue to rely on the Customs determination. Acetris filed suit, challenging the VA’s interpretation of the TAA. The VA awarded the Entecavir contract to Golden, consistent with its policy to award contracts to the lowest-price technically acceptable bid. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that Acetris lacked standing because Acetris would not have won the contract regardless of the interpretation of the TAA and that Acetris’ earlier-filed Court of International Trade suits divested the Claims Court of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1500.The Claims Court denied the government’s motions and rejected the government’s interpretation of the TAA. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the suit is justiciable and agreeing with the Claims Court. The court remanded for the entry of a declaratory judgment and injunction. View "Acetris Health, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, while working at the San Juan VA Medical Center, Dr. Sanchez, a urologist, reported to his superiors what he believed to be improper practices. In 2000, Sánchez received a proficiency report prepared by his supervisor, indicating that his performance “ha[d] shown a significant [negative] change since his last evaluation.” Sánchez was reassigned to the Ambulatory Care Service Line, where he believed that he would not perform surgery, care for patients, or supervise other staff members. He concluded that these actions were retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Sánchez and the VA entered into a settlement agreement under which Sanchez was to be reassigned to the Ponce Outpatient Clinic with a compressed work schedule of 10 hours per day for four days per week, to include three hours of travel per day. The parties adhered to the Agreement for 16 years. In 2017, Sánchez received a letter, informing him that he was required to be at the Ponce clinic from “7:30 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. from Monday through Friday.” An AJ rejected his petition for enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The background of the Agreement supports the conclusion that 16 years was a reasonable duration. As the party claiming a breach, Sánchez had the burden of proof but did not offer evidence that the claimed animosity persisted after that 16-year time period. View "Sanchez v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping duty investigation and determined that xanthan gum imported from China was sold in the U.S. at less than fair value. Commerce considers China to be a non-market economy country and must “determine the normal value of the subject merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise . . . . based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market economy country,” 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1). Commerce values factors of production by utilizing “prices or costs of factors of production” from a market economy country.” Commerce chose Thailand as the primary surrogate country for the investigation. In determining Fufeng's duty, Commerce did not value X. Campestris as a factor of production or a direct material input because Fufeng’s costs associated with the maintenance and use of X. Campestris bacteria are similar to those of Thai Ajinomoto’s costs associated with maintaining the bacteria used to produce comparable merchandise (MSG and l-lysine). Commerce found that Fufeng acquired an X. Campestris strain for payment-in-full before the period of investigation, including the right to further grow and exploit the resulting bacteria for the production of xanthan gum. The Trade Court and Federal Circuit upheld the treatment of Xanthomonas as an asset rather than a direct material input. View "CP Kelco US, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, the International Trade Commission issued a final affirmative determination that a U.S. domestic industry was materially injured by virtue of imported steel goods (carbon and alloy steel cut-to-length plate ) sold at less than fair value. Hitachi, a Japanese producer and U.S. importer of the product appealed, challenging the Commission’s “domestic like product” determination, 19 U.S.C. 1677(10). The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s “domestic like product” determination as supported by substantial evidence and otherwise not contrary to law. The Commission satisfied its obligation to conduct “investigative activities” under 19 CFR 207.20(b). In response to the supplemental questionnaires it issued at Hitachi’s request, the Commission received data from four domestic tool steel producers. The Commission also sought out non-responding manufacturers via telephone and email and successfully collected data from several of those parties. Contrary to Hitachi’s argument that the Commission “disregarded” information from tool steel producers, the record shows that several entities Hitachi named as tool steel producers reported that they do not produce tool steel. View "Hitachi Metals, Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Andrea sued Apple for infringement of Andrea’s 345 patent, relating to certain aspects of digital audio processing. Apple filed two inter partes review (IPR) petitions. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted review. In its 626 IPR Final Written Decision, the Board concluded that, in light of prior art, several challenged claims were unpatentable. The Board declined to consider certain arguments in Apple’s reply brief because Apple was raising new arguments in its reply brief. In its 627 Decision, the Board concluded that, in light of other cited art, several challenged claims are unpatentable. The Board construed the term “periodically” in favor of Andrea. Between the two IPRs, the Board held that all challenged claims except claims 6–9 are unpatentable.The Federal Circuit vacated with respect to the 626 IPR; the Board erred in refusing to consider Apple’s reply arguments. Apple’s reply does not cite any new evidence or “unidentified portions” of the reference at issue but merely demonstrates another example of the same algorithm to further explain why the reference discloses the “current minimum” and “future minimum” limitations of claims 6–9. Apple’s reply arguments are responsive to arguments raised in Andrea’s Patent Owner Response. The petitioner in an IPR may introduce new evidence after the petition stage if the evidence is a legitimate reply to evidence introduced by the patent owner. The court affirmed with respect to the 627 IPR, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. View "Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp." on Justia Law

Cheetah’s 836 patent is directed to optical communication networks. AT&T uses hardware and software components in its fiber-optic communication networks. Cheetah asserted that AT&T infringes the 836 patent by making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing its fiber equipment and services. Ciena was allowed to intervene in the suit because it manufactures and supplies components for AT&T’s fiber-optic systems; those components formed the basis of some of Cheetah’s infringement allegations. Ciena and AT&T then moved for summary judgment that Cheetah’s infringement claim was barred by agreements settling previous litigation. Cheetah had sued Ciena and Fujitsu and executed two license agreements—one with Ciena and one with Fujitsu. Ciena and AT&T argued that the licenses included implicit licenses to the 836 patent covering all of the accused products. The district court dismissed the suit. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Cheetah’s argument that the parties did not intend that the licenses extend to the 836 patent. The court noted the presumption that a license to a patent includes a license to its continuation. The naming of certain patents expressly does not evince a clear mutual intent to exclude other patents falling within the general definitions in an agreement. That is especially true here where the licenses list broad categories of patents without reciting their numbers individually. View "Cheetah Omni LLC v. AT&T Services, Inc." on Justia Law

HVO’s 941 and 488 patents share a specification and are directed to methods and devices for controlling an oxygen generating system, which is used to sustain and manage airflow for torch glass artists who use surface mix glass torches. HVO sued Oxygen Frog for infringement. A jury concluded that claims 1 and 7 of both patents, the only claims tried, would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103. The Federal Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion by admitting lay witness testimony regarding obviousness. That testimony, which was directed to the conclusion of obviousness and its underlying technical questions, is the province of qualified experts, not lay witnesses. Admission of that testimony substantially prejudiced the outcome of the case. View "HVLPO2, LLC v. Oxygen Frog, LLC" on Justia Law

Prisua’s patent, entitled “Video Enabled Digital Devices for Embedding User Data in Interactive Applications,” is directed to “generating an edited video data stream from an original video stream” by “substituting at least one object . . . in said original video stream by at least a different object.” The claims at issue are directed to methods and apparatuses for “generating a displayable edited video data stream from an original video data stream.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review (IPR) and held that claim 11 was unpatentable for obviousness but declined to analyze whether other challenged claims were unpatentable as anticipated or obvious, finding those claims indefinite.The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The IPR statute does not authorize the Board to cancel challenged claims for indefiniteness. The scope of IPR is found in section 311(b), Chapter 31 of Title 35. The scope of post-grant review is in section 321(b), Chapter 32. The use of the word “patentability” in the final written decision provision of each chapter refers to the previously defined scope of the particular review in question. Patentability under section 318(a) refers to the limited grounds of unpatentability described in section 311(b); patentability under section 328(a) refers to the broader grounds of unpatentability described in section 321(b). Reversing in part, the court rejected the Board’s conclusion that the term “digital processing unit” invoked means-plus-function claiming, and that for that reason the remaining claims could not be analyzed for anticipation or obviousness. View "Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Prisua Engineering Corp." on Justia Law