Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Department Commerce investigated antidumping duty petitions concerning imports of certain oil country tubular goods from various countries, including Vietnam. Commerce issued quantity and value questionnaires to the eight companies named in the petition but received timely responses from only two—one of which was SeAH. Commerce selected SeAH and the other responsive company as mandatory respondents, 19 U.S.C. 1677f-1(c)(2) Because Commerce considers Vietnam to be a non-market economy country, Commerce selected a surrogate market economy country, India, to provide surrogate values. Commerce calculated a 24.22% dumping margin for SeAH, based on various surrogate values. The Court of International Trade remanded to Commerce twice, for reconsideration and further explanation of its surrogate value determinations. On remand, Commerce calculated a 61.04% dumping margin for SeAH. The Court sustained Commerce’s Final Determination, as amended.The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Commerce’s selection for surrogate financial ratios (Bhushan) is supported by substantial evidence; Bhushan, unlike the other available options, produced identical merchandise to SeAH and Bhushan has financial statements that are publicly available and contemporaneous. Substantial evidence supports commerce’s determination that SeAH’s freight forwarder contract included domestic inland insurance separate from transportation costs. Commerce’s allocation methodology for brokerage and handling was not supported by substantial evidence. View "SeAH Steel VINA Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Serta filed a patent infringement action against Casper, citing the 173, 763, and 935 patents. Those patents cover mattresses that include a channel and methods for forming it. These mattresses can have varying areas of firmness by inserting reinforcement of various types into their channels that can be located at regions where additional support is desired. Casper filed three motions for summary judgment directed to non-infringement of Casper’s accused mattresses, accused methods of manufacturing, and redesigned mattresses. While Casper’s summary judgment motions were pending, the parties executed a settlement agreement and advised the district court of the settlement. The district court nevertheless granted Casper’s summary judgment motions of non-infringement. It later denied Serta’s motions to vacate the summary judgment order and to enforce the settlement agreement. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to enforce the settlement agreement. There is no contention that the settlement or the relief sought by Serta is unlawful or contrary to public policy. There is also no dispute that the parties executed the agreement before the district court issued the summary judgment order; Casper has admitted that the agreement was binding. The settlement agreement mooted the case even though it included terms that required future performance. View "Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC v. Casper Sleep Inc." on Justia Law

SIT sued Google for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Texas. Under 28 U.S.C. 1400(b), “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” Under Supreme Court precedent, “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its state of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute; the Federal Circuit has held that a “regular and established place of business” must be: “a physical place in the district”; “regular and established”; and “the place of the defendant.” Google provides video and advertising services to residents of the Eastern District of Texas through the Internet. Google Global Cache (GGC) servers function as local caches for Google’s data. Google contracts with internet service providers within the district to host Google’s GGC servers. The GGC servers cache only a small portion of content that is popular with nearby users but can serve that content with shorter wait times than Google’s central server infrastructure due to their physical proximity to the ISP’s users. No Google employee installed, performed maintenance on, or physically accessed any of the GGC servers. The district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss. The Federal Circuit ordered that the case be dismissed or transferred. A “regular and established place of business” requires the regular, physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged “place of business.” View "In Re: Google LLC" on Justia Law

Acoustic’s 841 patent relates to communications systems for utility providers to remotely monitor groups of utility meters, e.g., electricity meters. According to Acoustic, the claimed invention was “an improvement upon prior art automated meter reading systems that used expensive and problematic radio frequency (RF) transmitters, or systems that relied on human meter-readers using hand-held or vehicle-mounted short-range wireless devices to obtain meter readings when they were in a customer’s vicinity.” On Network’s petition, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review (IPR). Nine days after institution, Network agreed to merge with Itron, an entity undisputedly time-barred under 35 U.S.C. 315(b). Network and Itron completed the merger during the IPR proceeding. The Board later issued a final written decision and found the challenged claim unpatentable. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Acoustic’s claim that the inter partes review was time-barred due to Network’s and Itron’s merger-related activities. Acoustic waived its time-bar argument because it failed to present that argument before the Board. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s unpatentability findings based on anticipation. View "Acoustic Technology, Inc. v. Itron Networked Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, the Phoenix VA Health Care System where Potter worked was in the midst of a patient care crisis that had resulted in an investigation by the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General (OIG). Potter alleges she engaged in five whistleblowing activities by making four protected disclosures and by cooperating with OIG. In December 2014, during a reorganization of the Phoenix DVA, Potter’s title was changed, which she claimed amounts to a demotion; a position for which Potter had applied was withdrawn in November 2015; and Potter was assigned to “unclassified duties.” Potter alleges that in early 2017, conditions at the Phoenix DVA forced her “involuntary resignation.” constituting the agency’s fourth and final reprisal. Potter accepted an offer for a Staff Nurse position at the VA Northern California Health Care System in 2017, and filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint at the Office of Special Counsel. A Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge found that Potter had shown only one prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal but denied corrective action because the government established that the DVA would have taken the same action even if Potter had not made the protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed as to three alleged reprisals. The court vacated as to the November 2015 failure to hire. View "Potter v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Acetris obtains its pharmaceutical products from Aurolife, which makes them in a New Jersey facility, using an active pharmaceutical ingredient made in India. Acetris had contracts to supply the VA with several pharmaceutical products, including Entecavir (used to treat hepatitis B). The VA requested that Acetris recertify its compliance with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA), which bars the VA from purchasing “products of” certain foreign countries, such as India. Ultimately, the VA requested that Acetris obtain a country-of-origin determination. Customs concluded that the Acetris products were products of India. Acetris agreed to cancel its Entecavir contract. The VA issued a new solicitation seeking proposals for Entecavir, indicating that it would continue to rely on the Customs determination. Acetris filed suit, challenging the VA’s interpretation of the TAA. The VA awarded the Entecavir contract to Golden, consistent with its policy to award contracts to the lowest-price technically acceptable bid. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that Acetris lacked standing because Acetris would not have won the contract regardless of the interpretation of the TAA and that Acetris’ earlier-filed Court of International Trade suits divested the Claims Court of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1500.The Claims Court denied the government’s motions and rejected the government’s interpretation of the TAA. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the suit is justiciable and agreeing with the Claims Court. The court remanded for the entry of a declaratory judgment and injunction. View "Acetris Health, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, while working at the San Juan VA Medical Center, Dr. Sanchez, a urologist, reported to his superiors what he believed to be improper practices. In 2000, Sánchez received a proficiency report prepared by his supervisor, indicating that his performance “ha[d] shown a significant [negative] change since his last evaluation.” Sánchez was reassigned to the Ambulatory Care Service Line, where he believed that he would not perform surgery, care for patients, or supervise other staff members. He concluded that these actions were retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Sánchez and the VA entered into a settlement agreement under which Sanchez was to be reassigned to the Ponce Outpatient Clinic with a compressed work schedule of 10 hours per day for four days per week, to include three hours of travel per day. The parties adhered to the Agreement for 16 years. In 2017, Sánchez received a letter, informing him that he was required to be at the Ponce clinic from “7:30 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. from Monday through Friday.” An AJ rejected his petition for enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The background of the Agreement supports the conclusion that 16 years was a reasonable duration. As the party claiming a breach, Sánchez had the burden of proof but did not offer evidence that the claimed animosity persisted after that 16-year time period. View "Sanchez v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping duty investigation and determined that xanthan gum imported from China was sold in the U.S. at less than fair value. Commerce considers China to be a non-market economy country and must “determine the normal value of the subject merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise . . . . based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market economy country,” 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1). Commerce values factors of production by utilizing “prices or costs of factors of production” from a market economy country.” Commerce chose Thailand as the primary surrogate country for the investigation. In determining Fufeng's duty, Commerce did not value X. Campestris as a factor of production or a direct material input because Fufeng’s costs associated with the maintenance and use of X. Campestris bacteria are similar to those of Thai Ajinomoto’s costs associated with maintaining the bacteria used to produce comparable merchandise (MSG and l-lysine). Commerce found that Fufeng acquired an X. Campestris strain for payment-in-full before the period of investigation, including the right to further grow and exploit the resulting bacteria for the production of xanthan gum. The Trade Court and Federal Circuit upheld the treatment of Xanthomonas as an asset rather than a direct material input. View "CP Kelco US, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, the International Trade Commission issued a final affirmative determination that a U.S. domestic industry was materially injured by virtue of imported steel goods (carbon and alloy steel cut-to-length plate ) sold at less than fair value. Hitachi, a Japanese producer and U.S. importer of the product appealed, challenging the Commission’s “domestic like product” determination, 19 U.S.C. 1677(10). The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s “domestic like product” determination as supported by substantial evidence and otherwise not contrary to law. The Commission satisfied its obligation to conduct “investigative activities” under 19 CFR 207.20(b). In response to the supplemental questionnaires it issued at Hitachi’s request, the Commission received data from four domestic tool steel producers. The Commission also sought out non-responding manufacturers via telephone and email and successfully collected data from several of those parties. Contrary to Hitachi’s argument that the Commission “disregarded” information from tool steel producers, the record shows that several entities Hitachi named as tool steel producers reported that they do not produce tool steel. View "Hitachi Metals, Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Andrea sued Apple for infringement of Andrea’s 345 patent, relating to certain aspects of digital audio processing. Apple filed two inter partes review (IPR) petitions. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted review. In its 626 IPR Final Written Decision, the Board concluded that, in light of prior art, several challenged claims were unpatentable. The Board declined to consider certain arguments in Apple’s reply brief because Apple was raising new arguments in its reply brief. In its 627 Decision, the Board concluded that, in light of other cited art, several challenged claims are unpatentable. The Board construed the term “periodically” in favor of Andrea. Between the two IPRs, the Board held that all challenged claims except claims 6–9 are unpatentable.The Federal Circuit vacated with respect to the 626 IPR; the Board erred in refusing to consider Apple’s reply arguments. Apple’s reply does not cite any new evidence or “unidentified portions” of the reference at issue but merely demonstrates another example of the same algorithm to further explain why the reference discloses the “current minimum” and “future minimum” limitations of claims 6–9. Apple’s reply arguments are responsive to arguments raised in Andrea’s Patent Owner Response. The petitioner in an IPR may introduce new evidence after the petition stage if the evidence is a legitimate reply to evidence introduced by the patent owner. The court affirmed with respect to the 627 IPR, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. View "Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp." on Justia Law