Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Williams and Winns, former employees of the U.S. Postal Service, were removed from their positions and separately sought review by the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of their cases. Only certain federal employees, as defined by statute, can seek review at the Board; neither individual qualified as an “employee” with appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(B)(ii). The statute states that “‘employee’ means . . . a preference eligible in the excepted service who has completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar positions . . . in the United States Postal Service.” Office of Personnel Management regulations define “current continuous employment” as “a period of employment or service immediately preceding an adverse action without a break in Federal civilian employment of a workday.” The statute is not intended to cover an individual who was employed through a series of temporary appointments; each man took a break of several days between appointments. The court also rejected Williams’s argument that he retained appeal rights from a prior appointment because the Postal Service did not advise him on the loss of appeal rights that would result from his reappointment to a new position. View "Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The Surface and Transportation Board (STB) has regulatory authority over rail carriers, 49 U.S.C. 10501(b). A "discontinuance" allows a rail carrier to preserve a rail corridor for possible reactivation of service; "abandonment" removes the line from the system and terminates the railroad’s common carrier obligation. The 1983 Amendments to the National Trails System Act created an alternative process, “railbanking,” 16 U.S.C. 1241, which maintains STB jurisdiction over the dormant corridor, but allows a third party to assume responsibilities for the right-of-way, preserve the right-of-way for future rail use, and, in the interim, convert the corridor into a recreational trail. The railroad first initiates abandonment proceedings; a party interested in acquiring the corridor then requests an STB Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU). If an agreement is reached, the STB suspends abandonment proceedings, preventing state law reversionary interests in the corridor from vesting. Property owners who believed they had a reversionary interest began claiming that railbanking constituted a taking: the threshold question is whether the claimant has a compensable property interest, which is often answered by analyzing the original deeds that conveyed the property to the railroad. In 2012, BNSF initiated proceedings to abandon a corridor. The Chicago Department of Transportation indicated interest in railbanking. The STB issued an NITU, giving BNSF until April 2014, to negotiate an agreement, after which the corridor would be abandoned. After numerous extensions, BNSF has neither reached an agreement nor abandoned the corridor. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court: the deeds between the predecessors-in-interest to the claimants and the original railroad conveyed the property to the railroad in fee simple rather than only an easement. There was no taking of any reversionary interest. View "Chicago Coating Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Medtronic manufactures surgical systems and tools used in spinal surgeries. Spine surgeon Dr. Barry sued Medtronic for patent infringement. Medtronic then petitioned for, and the Patent Board instituted, inter partes review (IPR) proceedings for all claims in both patents. The Board concluded that Medtronic had not proven that the challenged patent claims are unpatentable. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Substantial evidence supports that the challenged claims would not have been obvious over two references. The court vacated the Board’s conclusion that certain other references, including a video entitled “Thoracic Pedicle Screws for Idiopathic Scoliosis” and slides entitled “Free Hand Thoracic Screw Placement and Clinical Use in Scoliosis and Kyphosis Surgery” were not prior art because the Board did not fully consider all the factors for determining whether they were publicly accessible. The court noted that the Supreme Court recently held that the statute does not permit a partial institution leading to a partial final written decision and that the final written decisions relating to this appeal do not address every ground raised in the petitions, so the Board will consider the previously non-considered grounds on remand. View "Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry" on Justia Law

PGS’s patent describes and claims methods and systems for performing “marine seismic surveying” to determine the structure of earth formations below the seabed. WesternGeco, a competitor of PGS’s, filed three petitions requesting inter partes reviews (IPRs) of claims 1– 38 of the patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted three IPRs, but it specified for review only some of the claims WesternGeco challenged and only some of the grounds for WesternGeco’s challenges. The Board ruled partly for PGS and partly for WesternGeco on the reviewed claims and grounds. The Federal Circuit affirmed that certain claims of the patent are unpatentable for obviousness. Although precedent now makes clear that the Board erred in limiting the scope of the IPRs it instituted and hence the scope of its final written decisions, the court found that it had jurisdiction to address the merits of the Board’s final written decisions without reviving the “non-instituted” claims and grounds. View "PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu" on Justia Law

PGS’s patent describes and claims methods and systems for performing “marine seismic surveying” to determine the structure of earth formations below the seabed. WesternGeco, a competitor of PGS’s, filed three petitions requesting inter partes reviews (IPRs) of claims 1– 38 of the patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted three IPRs, but it specified for review only some of the claims WesternGeco challenged and only some of the grounds for WesternGeco’s challenges. The Board ruled partly for PGS and partly for WesternGeco on the reviewed claims and grounds. The Federal Circuit affirmed that certain claims of the patent are unpatentable for obviousness. Although precedent now makes clear that the Board erred in limiting the scope of the IPRs it instituted and hence the scope of its final written decisions, the court found that it had jurisdiction to address the merits of the Board’s final written decisions without reviving the “non-instituted” claims and grounds. View "PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu" on Justia Law

The VA denied the veterans’ claims for service-connected disability benefits. Based on delays in their cases, they sought writs of mandamus in the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit vacated that court’s denial of relief, finding that the court did not apply the proper standard. The court noted the significant delays that occur in most cases and that the government has not explained the cause of the delays; the petitions alleged that a veteran whose disability benefits are denied waits, on average, 1448 days after the denial for a ruling on an appeal.” Whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus under the “TRAC” standard requires consideration of six factors: the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”; where Congress has provided an indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority and the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and the court need not find “any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude” in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. View "Martin v. O'Rourke" on Justia Law

Four veterans appealed the VA's denial of their claims for service-connected disability benefits. Based on delays in their cases, they unsuccessfully sought writs of mandamus from the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit remanded two cases, citing its 2018 decision, Martin v. O’Rourke, so that the mandamus petitions may be considered under the TRAC standard: “whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” The TRAC standard involves six factors: the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”; where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; the court should also consider the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and the court need not find “any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude” to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. One veteran had died, rendering his appeal moot and another had his claim for benefits granted. View "Rose v. O'Rourke" on Justia Law

Acree served on active duty in the Navy from 1985-1989 and 2007-2008. He was deployed to Iraq and received Seabee Combat Warfare Medals. Acree was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) while serving in Iraq. After leaving the service, Acree filed several claims for service-connected disability benefits and appealed 11 claims to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. A representative from the Disabled American Veterans (DAV) organization was present with Acree at the board hearing. Acree said “yes” when asked to withdraw seven issues. The board listed the four issues that would be discussed and would “continue to be in appellate status” and asked the DAV representative whether it had “correctly identified the issues.” The representative responded: “Yes.” The board remanded four and dismissed seven claims. Acree appealed, arguing that a veteran’s withdrawal of a claim “is not effective unless the withdrawal ‘is explicit, unambiguous, and done with a full understanding of the consequences’” and that since he “ha[d] a long history of taking psychotropic medications,” the hearing officer should have inquired as to his capacity to appreciate the consequences of dismissing the claims. The Veterans Court affirmed, citing the hearing transcript. The Federal Circuit vacated. Precedent (DeLisio) explicitly states that a withdrawal is effective only if undertaken with “a full understanding of the consequences of such action on the part of the [veteran].” The Veterans Court was required to make that determination even though a DAV representative was present. View "Acree v. O'Rourke" on Justia Law

During the savings-and-loan crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, many “thrift” institutions failed. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, as insurer and regulator, encouraged healthy thrifts to take over failing ones in “supervisory mergers.” FSLIC provided incentives, including allowing acquiring thrifts to operate branches in states other than their home states and “RAP” rights. Regulations mandated that each thrift maintain a minimum capital of at least 3% of its liabilities, an obstacle for healthy thrifts acquiring failing ones. RAP permitted acquiring thrifts to use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to treat failing thrifts’ excess liabilities as “supervisory goodwill,” which could be counted toward the acquiring thrifts’ minimum regulatory capital requirement and amortized over 40 years. Home Savings entered into supervisory mergers. Branching and RAP rights are considered intangible assets for tax purposes and are generally subject to abandonment loss and amortization deductions. In 2008, Home’s successor, WMI, sought a refund for tax years 1990, 1992, and 1993 based on the amortization of RAP rights and the abandonment of Missouri branching rights, proffering valuation testimony from its expert, Grabowski, about fair market value. The Ninth Circuit found WMI did “not prove[], to a reasonable degree of certainty, Home’s cost basis in the Branching and RAP rights.” WMI also filed suit in the Claims Court, seeking a refund for tax years 1991, 1994, 1995, and 1998, based on the amortization of RAP rights and the abandonment of Florida, Illinois, New York, and Ohio branching rights, with a valuation report from Grabowski. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court's rejection of the claims; Grabowski’s assumptions about the nature of RAP rights were inconsistent with market realities and, at times, unsupported. View "WMI Holdings Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Zeroclick patents relate to modifications to the graphical user interfaces of devices such as computers and mobile phones, modifications that allow the interfaces to be controlled using pre-defined pointer or touch movements instead of mouse clicks. The claimed invention contemplates updating existing user interface programs by using a two-step method recited in claims 2 and 52 of the 691 patent, or by making two configuration changes to the user interface code as recited in claim 19 of the 443 patent. In Zeroclick’s suit against Apple, the district court found the asserted claims invalid for indefiniteness. The Federal Circuit vacated. The district court failed to undertake the relevant inquiry and make related factual findings to support its conclusion that the asserted claims recited means-plus-function terms, 35 U.S.C. 112. Given that “[t]he basic concept behind both of the patents-in-suit is relatively simple,” a person of ordinary skill in the art could reasonably discern from the claim language that the words “program” and “user interface code” are used not as generic terms or black box recitations of structure or abstractions, but rather as specific references to conventional graphical user interface programs or code, existing in prior art at the time of the inventions. View "Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law