Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

ThyssenKrupp imports corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products (CORE) from Germany. In 1993, the Department of Commerce imposed an antidumping duty on such imports. Between February 14-July 2012, ThyssenKrupp made eight such entries. Customs assessed ThyssenKrupp’s antidumping duties at the prevailing rate: 10.02%. Meanwhile, in January 2012, the International Trade Commission instituted its required sunset review of the 1993 order; in 2013, the ITC informed Commerce that revocation of that order would not likely lead to material injury to a domestic industry. Days later, under 19 U.S.C. 1675(d)(2), Commerce published notice of the revocation of the order for CORE, effective February 14, 2012. In April 2013, Commerce instructed Customs that “all unliquidated entries” should be liquidated without regard to antidumping duties. ThyssenKrupp filed administrative protests, asserting that its CORE entries occurred after the February 14 effective date, and sought refunds of the duties. Customs denied ThyssenKrupp’s protests, interpreting the April instructions’ “unliquidated entries” phrase as not covering the eight entries. The Trade Court dismissed ThyssenKrupp’s suit as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 1581(a), leaving the entries subject to the antidumping duty, even though the entries were made when duties were no longer legally warranted. The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claim; the entries were “unliquidated” within the meaning of the April instructions implementing the results of the sunset review. View "ThyssenKrupp Steel North America, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

From 1968-1991, Lledo was employed at the Subic Bay, Philippines U.S. Navy Public Works Center, initially as an Apprentice (electrician) “excepted service – indefinite appointment.” Lledo resigned with the designated severance pay in 1991, having worked in various positions, finally as a Telephone Installation and Repair Foreman. In 2014, Lledo applied for deferred retirement benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and requested to make a post-employment deposit into the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF). The Office of Personnel Management denied the requests. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, stating that all of Lledo’s appointments, including his final position, were either not-to-exceed appointments or indefinite appointments in the excepted service; “[w]hile [Lledo] has shown that he had sufficient creditable federal service, he has failed to show that any of that service was performed in a position covered under the [Act].” The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under 5 U.S.C. 8333(a)–(b), to qualify for a CSRS retirement annuity, an employee must have performed at least five years of creditable civilian service, and must have served at least one of his last two years of federal service in a covered position, subject to the Act. Temporary, intermittent, term, and excepted indefinite appointments are not covered positions; substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Lledo’s service was excluded from CSRDF coverage. View "Lledo v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed an examiner’s obviousness rejection of patent application claims related to “high density polyurethane or polyisocyanurate construction boards, as well as their use in flat or low-slope roofing systems.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual findings and the Board did not err in its conclusion of obviousness, 35 U.S.C. 103(a). The Board did not apply a per se rule but grounded a prima facie obviousness conclusion on the facts before it and specifically agreed with the examiner’s factual finding that the difference between the claimed range of density and prior art range was “virtually negligible.” The applicants failed to support a “teaching away" argument that there is some criticality to having a coverboard density of greater than 6 pounds per cubic foot. View "In re: Brandt" on Justia Law

Oracle’s Java platform for computer programming allows programmers to write programs that “run on different types of computer hardware without having to rewrite them for each different type.” Java Application Programming Interface (API) is a collection of “pre-written Java source code programs for common and more advanced computer functions.” To include a particular function in a program, the programmer invokes the Java “declaring code,” and “implementing code,” which takes the input(s) and gives the computer step-by-step instructions to carry out the declared function. Oracle sued, alleging that Google’s unauthorized use of Oracle Java API packages in its Android operating system infringed Oracle’s copyrights, 17 U.S.C. 107(1). The Federal Circuit held that declaring code and the API packages' structure, sequence, and organization are entitled to copyright protection. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. At the second trial, Google prevailed on its fair use defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Google’s use of the Java API packages was not fair as a matter of law, and remanded for a trial on damages. Google’s commercial use of the API packages weighs against a finding of fair use. Google merely copied the material and moved it from one platform to another without alteration, not a transformative use. Given the evidence of actual and potential harm, “unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by” Google would result in “a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original” and its derivatives. View "Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

The 290 patent, which issued in 2000 and is assigned to DSS, is directed to a wireless communication network for a single host device and multiple peripheral devices. It discloses a data network for bidirectional wireless data communications between a host or server microcomputer—described in the specification as a personal digital assistant or “PDA”—and a plurality of peripheral devices that the specification refers to as personal electronic accessories or “PEAs” and provides “highly reliable” communication, “requires extremely low power consumption, particularly for the peripheral units,” “avoids interference from nearby similar systems,” and “is of relatively simple and inexpensive construction.” On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found several claims unpatentable as obvious, 35 U.S.C. 103(a). The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board’s finding that it would have been obvious to modify the base station transmitter in a prior reference to be “energized in low duty cycle RF bursts,” as required by the claims of the 290 patent was not supported by a sufficient explanation. View "DSS Technology Management, Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

Meridian contracted to construct the Chula Vista Project flood control project, including construction of concrete channels, relocation of a sewer line, and dewatering and water diversion. After commencing work, Meridian encountered problems relating to “a layer of dripping saturated dark clay material under which a clean layer of sand is producing water” with “the potential for serious structural damage.” The government issued contract modifications, including an increase in funds for larger pipe, addition of a reinforced concrete access ramp, investigation of soil properties, remediation of saturated soils, and additional sheet piling. The government directed Meridian to suspend work following structural failures and terminated the project following a final inspection. Meridian sued for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 601−613. The government conceded liability for certain costs relating to suspension of work, channel fill, and interim protection. With respect to other claims, the Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Meridian’s interpretation of the contract was not reasonable; the existence of subsurface saturated soil conditions was “reasonably foreseeable.” The Trade Court did not impose an improper requirement for investigation of site conditions beyond what a reasonable contractor would undertake. The court remanded for consideration of whether the parties reached a meeting of the minds on flood event claims and held that the Trade Court erred dismissing Meridian’s unpaid contract quantities claim, in light of conflicting information. View "Meridian Engineering Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

GRK imported into the U.S. three types of screw fasteners, used to mate dissimilar materials and made with corrosion-resistant, case-hardened steel. Customs classified the screws as “other wood screws” under subheading 7318.12.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), subject to an import duty of 12.5%. GRK claimed that the screws should be classified under subheading 7318.14.10 as “self-tapping screws,” with a 6.2% duty. The Court of International Trade granted GRK summary judgment. The Federal Circuit remanded, instructing the court to consider use in interpreting the HTSUS terms. On remand, the Trade Court ordered pretrial discovery limited to the issues of “intended use,” “principal use,” and “actual use” and found that the screws are “self-tapping screws” because they are capable of cutting a mating thread in non-fibrous materials, are made of case-hardened carbon steel or stainless steel, and meet minimal torsional strength requirements. The Federal Circuit affirmed the application of classification subheading 7318.14.10 for “self-tapping screws,” and summary judgment in favor of GRK. View "GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Acceleron’s 021 patent is directed to a computer network appliance containing a number of hot-swappable components that can be removed and replaced without turning off or resetting the computer system as a whole. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review of the patent based on Dell’s petition under 35 U.S.C. 311, citing a prior art reference, Hipp, that is directed to a high-density server network in which a large number of web server processing cards are installed within a single chassis. The Federal Circuit remanded to allow Acceleron to respond to Dell’s evidence, which had been first presented at oral argument. On remand, the Board declined to consider both Dell’s new argument and Acceleron’s proposed response. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board was not required to consider Dell’s new evidence presented during oral argument and did not abuse its discretion by not considering Dell’s new evidence on remand. The Board’s determination that Hipp does not anticipate claim 3 of the patent was supported by substantial evidence. View "Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC" on Justia Law

Power’s 876 patent, “Frequency Jittering Control for Varying the Switching Frequency of a Power Supply,” describes a technique for reducing electromagnetic interference noise “by jittering the switching frequency of a switched mode power supply.” Power sued Fairchild, alleging willful infringement, arguing that the term “coupled” in claim 1, in light of the specification and surrounding claim language, required two circuits to be connected in a manner “such that voltage, current or control signals pass from one to another” and that the “recited coupling” between the counter and the digital to analog converter must be “present for the purposes of control.” The court agreed, emphasizing that the term “coupled” did not “require a direct connection or . . . preclude the use of intermediate circuit elements.” The Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment of nonobviousness. The Patent and Trademark Office commenced ex parte reexamination. The board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as anticipated. The Federal Circuit vacated, stating that the board is not generally bound by a prior judicial claim construction and, in reexamination applies a different claim construction standard but that because Power's principal argument was tied to the court’s claim construction, the board was obligated to evaluate that construction and determine whether it was consistent with the broadest reasonable construction. On remand, the board again affirmed the examiner’s rejections. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the board’s rejections were based on an unreasonably broad claim construction. View "In re: Power Integrations, Inc." on Justia Law

Smith & Nephew’s patent relates to an endoscope and method to remove uterine tissue; it claims priority to an earlier-filed PCT application by the same inventor with a nearly identical specification. On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found that S&N’s earlier-filed PCT application has sufficient written description to make it a priority document instead of an invalidating obviousness reference. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Substantial evidence supported the finding that the PCT application reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill that the inventor had possession of the “first channel having a light guide permanently affixed therein.” The court also upheld the Board’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as a “degreed engineer having at least 5 years of experience designing and developing devices used in minimally invasive surgery (endoscopes, resectoscopes, shavers, tissue removal devices, etc.).” View "Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc." on Justia Law