Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Aseptic packaging involves putting a sterile food product into a sterile package within a sterile environment. Steuben’s 435 patent is generally directed to providing such a sterile environment in a sterilization tunnel. Sterile air, pressurized to a level above atmospheric pressure, flows out of the tunnel, ensuring that contaminants cannot flow into it. The aseptic sterilant used in the apparatus may be hydrogen peroxide. Nestlé challenged claims of the 435 patent in an inter partes review. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted trial on claims directed to the sterilization tunnel and found that several of the challenged claims would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in view of prior art references in the record. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the construction of “sterilant concentration levels” to be the levels measured “at any point within the sterilization tunnel— including the ‘residual’ concentration on bottle surfaces— such that the 5 to 1 ratio is satisfied.” Substantial evidence supports the Board’s obviousness determination based on prior art. View "Steuben Foods, Inc. v. Nestle USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Aseptic packaging involves putting a sterile food product into a sterile package within a sterile environment. Steuben’s patent is generally directed to providing such a sterile environment in a sterilization tunnel. Sterile air, pressurized to a level above atmospheric pressure, flows out of the tunnel, ensuring that contaminants cannot flow into it. The aseptic sterilant may be hydrogen peroxide. Nestlé challenged claims of the patent in an inter partes review. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted trial on claims directed to the sterilization tunnel and found that several of the challenged claims would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in view of prior art references in the record. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to several claims, upholding the construction of “sterilant concentration levels.” With respect to Nestle’s appeal concerning a claim found to be not obvious, the court vacated the Board’s construction of the terms “aseptic” and “aseptically disinfecting.” Collateral estoppel attaches to that issue because Nestlé previously appealed the Board’s construction of “aseptic” in a separate inter partes review of another Steuben patent. In that case, the court relied on binding lexicography in the specification for “aseptic” to construe the term to mean the “FDA level of aseptic.” View "Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

SimpleAir initiated patent infringement lawsuits against Google’s Cloud and Cloud to Device Messaging Services, involving patents from a family of SimpleAir patents directed to push notification technology. The 433 “parent” patent claimed priority from a 1996 provisional application and expired in 2017. The “child” patents share a common specification with the 433 patent and also claim priority from the provisional application. During prosecution, SimpleAir filed terminal disclaimers for each child patent to overcome obviousness-type double patenting rejections. The disclaimers require them to expire with the 433 patent, 35 U.S.C. 253(b), and to be “commonly owned with the application or patent which formed the basis” for the obviousness-type double patenting rejection. Google won judgments of noninfringement in three cases. SimpleAir’s fourth complaint asserted infringement of two additional “child” patents. The court dismissed both complaints as barred by claim preclusion and the Kessler doctrine, which precludes assertions of a patent against post-judgment activity if an earlier judgment held that “essentially the same” accused activity did not infringe. The Federal Circuit reversed. The district court erred by presuming that terminally-disclaimed continuation patents are patentably indistinct variations of their parent patents without analyzing the scope of the patent claims. A terminal disclaimer is a “strong clue” but does not give rise to a presumption that a patent subject to a terminal disclaimer is patentably indistinct from its parent patents. View "SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

In returns for 1995, 1996, and 1997, Stephens a shareholder of SF, a subchapter S corporation, reported "passive activity" passthrough income and passive activity losses (deductible from passive activity income) and passive activity credits (claimed against taxes allocable to passive activities). The IRS audited SF’s returns and Stephens’s individual returns for 1995 and 1996; the 1997 return was audited separately. The IRS concluded that Stephens had materially participated in some SF activities, finalized its audit of the 1995 and 1996 returns, and, in 2009, sent Stephens a notice of deficiency, as proposed in 2003 and 2008. Stephens did not contest the notice but made payment and never filed a formal refund claim, allegedly believing he could carry over the disallowed passive activity losses to 1997. The IRS extended the deadline for a 1997 refund claim to 2008. In 2009, Stephens mailed an amended 1997 return, seeking to carry over the 1995 and 1996 passive activity losses. In 2011, Stephens asserted the mitigation provisions, which, in specified circumstances, “permit a taxpayer who has been required to pay inconsistent taxes to seek a refund” otherwise barred by section 7422(a) (requiring that a “claim for refund or credit has been duly filed”) or section 6511(a), specifying the limitations period for refund claims. The IRS proposed to disallow the Stephenses’ refund claim as untimely and rejected an equitable recoupment argument. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Stephenses suit, concluding that a timely refund claim was a “prerequisite for a refund suit.” View "Stephens v. United States" on Justia Law

In returns for 1995, 1996, and 1997, Stephens a shareholder of SF, a subchapter S corporation, reported "passive activity" passthrough income and passive activity losses (deductible from passive activity income) and passive activity credits (claimed against taxes allocable to passive activities). The IRS audited SF’s returns and Stephens’s individual returns for 1995 and 1996; the 1997 return was audited separately. The IRS concluded that Stephens had materially participated in some SF activities, finalized its audit of the 1995 and 1996 returns, and, in 2009, sent Stephens a notice of deficiency, as proposed in 2003 and 2008. Stephens did not contest the notice but made payment and never filed a formal refund claim, allegedly believing he could carry over the disallowed passive activity losses to 1997. The IRS extended the deadline for a 1997 refund claim to 2008. In 2009, Stephens mailed an amended 1997 return, seeking to carry over the 1995 and 1996 passive activity losses. In 2011, Stephens asserted the mitigation provisions, which, in specified circumstances, “permit a taxpayer who has been required to pay inconsistent taxes to seek a refund” otherwise barred by section 7422(a) (requiring that a “claim for refund or credit has been duly filed”) or section 6511(a), specifying the limitations period for refund claims. The IRS proposed to disallow the Stephenses’ refund claim as untimely and rejected an equitable recoupment argument. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Stephenses suit, concluding that a timely refund claim was a “prerequisite for a refund suit.” View "Stephens v. United States" on Justia Law

Holton supervised a Portsmouth Naval Shipyard crane team that was moving submarine covers. Each unit weighed roughly 60,000 pounds. Holton briefed the crew and gave control over the crane to the authorized rigger, then left the crane to supervise preparation of the landing area. From this position, Holton could not see the crane’s boom. Holton’s crew had previously performed the operation, which involved a tight curve, without incident. The crane traveled too far on the inside of the curve; its boom struck Building 343, causing $30,000 in damage. Shipyard Instructions allow drug testing of employees after an accident causing damage in excess of $10,000, when “their actions are reasonably suspected of having caused or contributed to an accident.” The executive director authorized drug testing of the entire team. Holton took the test, certifying that the drug-testing contractor took the proper steps. Holton’s sample tested positive for marijuana twice. The Executive Director removed him. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, finding that the Navy’s failure to provide Holton with advance written notice of why he was being tested, as required by regulation, was harmless because it did not change the outcome. The Federal Circuit affirmed. There was reasonable suspicion that Holton, who briefed the crew, caused or contributed to the accident; the drug test was properly administered and did not violate Holton’s constitutional rights or the regulation's standard. View "Holton v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Holton supervised a Portsmouth Naval Shipyard crane team that was moving submarine covers. Each unit weighed roughly 60,000 pounds. Holton briefed the crew and gave control over the crane to the authorized rigger, then left the crane to supervise preparation of the landing area. From this position, Holton could not see the crane’s boom. Holton’s crew had previously performed the operation, which involved a tight curve, without incident. The crane traveled too far on the inside of the curve; its boom struck Building 343, causing $30,000 in damage. Shipyard Instructions allow drug testing of employees after an accident causing damage in excess of $10,000, when “their actions are reasonably suspected of having caused or contributed to an accident.” The executive director authorized drug testing of the entire team. Holton took the test, certifying that the drug-testing contractor took the proper steps. Holton’s sample tested positive for marijuana twice. The Executive Director removed him. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, finding that the Navy’s failure to provide Holton with advance written notice of why he was being tested, as required by regulation, was harmless because it did not change the outcome. The Federal Circuit affirmed. There was reasonable suspicion that Holton, who briefed the crew, caused or contributed to the accident; the drug test was properly administered and did not violate Holton’s constitutional rights or the regulation's standard. View "Holton v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Ottah’s Patent, entitled “Book Holder,” describes “a removable book holder assembly for use by a person in a protective or mobile structure such as a car seat, wheelchair, walker, or stroller” “having an adjustable, releasable clipping means and a support arm configured for . . . adjustment of the book supporting surface of the book holder to hold a book in a readable position in front of the user.” The patent recites that it may also be used to support such items as audio/video equipment, PDAs, or mobile phones, cameras, computers, musical instruments, toys, puzzles and games and cites disadvantages associated with prior art book holders, relating to “the ease of application” without tools. The patent refers to a writing board and a removable attachment. The district court rejected, on summary judgment, Ottah’s infringement suit against automobile companies relating to camera holders. The Federal Circuit affirmed. No reasonable fact-finder could find that the accused cameras meet the “removably attached” limitation of claim The district court correctly found that the “book holder” cannot plausibly be construed to include or be the equivalent of a camera holder, in view of the specification and the prosecution history. View "Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler" on Justia Law

The FBI is the sole tenant in a building under a lease between Cleveland Assets and the General Services Administration (GSA) that began in 2002 and was to expire in 2012. The lease has been extended multiple times. GSA has paid a penalty rate of $44.72 per rentable square foot (PSF) since its expiration. GSA must seek the approval of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure before obligating funds on the lease, by sending a prospectus of the proposed facility, including “an estimate of the maximum cost.” GSA prepared a prospectus for the Cleveland FBI office and considered a range of rental values, finally approving a maximum proposed rate of $26.00 PSF and an escalation clause for inflation. Both congressional committees approved the rate. GSA’s 2016 Request for Lease Proposals cited the "Congressionally-imposed rent limitation” of $26.00 PSF. Cleveland Assets sued, claiming that the Request exceeded GSA’s authority to solicit offers and that the rental cap was unreasonably low, imposed an undue restriction on competition, and shifted all risk to the contractor. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal by the Claims Court. The authorization statute, 40 U.S.C. 3307, is an appropriation, not a procurement, statute, so the challenge is not subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction. GSA’s choice of the maximum rental rate was not arbitrary or lacking a rational basis. View "Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In November 2014, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Bly’s request for service connection for bilateral hearing loss. Bly appealed to the Veterans Court. After his opening brief was filed, Bly and the government filed a joint motion for partial remand. The Veterans Court granted the motion, citing to Rule 41(b) of the Veterans Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, and noting that “this order is the mandate of the Court.” Bly applied for attorneys’ fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, 31 days later. Remand orders from the Veterans Court may entitle veterans to EAJA fees and expenses. Under 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), such EAJA applications must be made “within thirty days of final judgment in the action.” The Veterans Court reasoned that its judgment became final immediately because the order remanded the case on consent and stated that it was the mandate of the court. The Federal Circuit vacated the denial of his application, reasoning that the consent judgment at issue became “not appealable” 60 days after the entry of the remand order under 38 U.S.C. 7292(a). View "Bly v. Shulkin" on Justia Law