Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Morrison’s position as a New London Naval Submarine Base firefighter required a security clearance. The Navy revoked Morrison's clearance, citing concerns regarding his personal finances. Regional Fire Chief Cox signed a letter finalizing Morrison’s removal but it was not immediately formally issued. Instead, District Fire Chief Clapsadle, who was to deliver the letter, offered Morrison the option to retire preemptively. Morrison chose to retire, thinking his retirements benefits were at risk. In fact, Morrison would have received those benefits regardless of whether he retired or was terminated, 5 U.S.C. 8312-8315. After learning that his benefits were not at risk, Morrison appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming that his retirement was involuntary. Based on Morrison’s allegations that an agency manager had told him he would lose his benefits if he were terminated, the Board held that an agency is required to provide employees with adequate information to make an informed retirement decision but that, if the Navy would have removed Morrison, he was not entitled to reinstatement or back pay. The Federal Circuit dismissed Morrison’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Board’s ruling was not a “final decision,” but required the Navy to decide whether and when Morrison would have been terminated if he had not retired. . View "Morrison v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Presidio alleged infringement of its patent, which claims a multilayer capacitor design and teaches a multilayer integrated network of capacitors electrically connected in series and in parallel. While the suit was pending, ATC sought an ex parte reexamination of the patent in light of new prior art. The examiner rejected the claims as anticipated and obvious. Presidio amended the claims. The Patent and Trademark Office issued a reexamination certificate for the patent. Based on the amended claims, a jury found direct infringement and induced infringement of six claims by the accused products and that Presidio had proven by clear and convincing evidence that ATC’s infringement of the asserted claims was willful. The jury awarded Presidio $2,166,654 in lost profit damages and issued an advisory verdict that ATC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that claim 1 was indefinite. The district court upheld the findings, in favor of Presidio, but denied Presidio’s motion for enhanced damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the claims are not indefinite, that enhanced damages were appropriate, and that ATC is entitled to absolute intervening rights because a substantive amendment was made during reexamination but held that the evidence did not support an award of lost profits, vacated an injunction, and remanded for determination of a reasonable royalty. View "Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp." on Justia Law

BASF’s patent describes and claims systems for performing catalytic conversion of nitrogen oxides (NOx) in an exhaust gas stream, with a partly-dual-layer arrangement of coatings on a substrate over which exhaust gas passes—a coat along the full length of the substrate containing “a material composition B effective to catalyze selective catalytic reduction (SCR) of NOx”; and beneath part of that coat, on the outlet end of the gas passage, a partial-substrate undercoat containing “a material composition A effective for catalyzing NH3 oxidation” (ammonia oxidation, or AMOx). BASF sued its competitor for infringement. The district court held that the “effective for catalyzing”/“effective to catalyze” language was indefinite and entered judgment of invalidity. The Federal Circuit reversed. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in “Nautilus,” the question is: would the “composition . . . effective to catalyze” language, understood in light of the rest of the patent and the knowledge of the ordinary skilled artisan, have given a person of ordinary skill in the art a reasonably certain understanding of what compositions are covered? The district court’s reasoning supplied no basis to answer that question in defendant’s favor; the inference of indefiniteness simply from the scope finding is legally incorrect: “breadth is not indefiniteness.” View "BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc." on Justia Law

To receive disability compensation based on service, a veteran must demonstrate that the disability was incurred or aggravated in the line of duty, 38 U.S.C. 101(16). Congress has enacted presumptive service connection laws to protect certain veterans who faced exposure to chemical toxins but would find it difficult to prove a “nexus” between their exposure and their disease. Under the Agent Orange Act, 38 U.S.C. 1116, any veteran who served in Vietnam during the Vietnam era and who suffers from any designated disease “shall be presumed to have been exposed during such service” to herbicides. The VA determines which diseases qualify for presumptive service connection and defines service in Vietnam. Absent on-land service, the VA concluded that the statute did not authorize presumptive service connection for veterans serving in the open waters surrounding Vietnam. The Federal Circuit upheld that position in 2007. In 2016, the VA amended its M21-1 procedures manual to also exclude veterans who served in bays, harbors, and ports of Vietnam. The VA did not implement this additional restriction by way of notice and comment regulation as it did its open waters restriction and has not published its view on this issue in the Federal Register. The Federal Circuit rejected a challenge for lack of jurisdiction. The VA’s revisions are not agency actions reviewable under 38 U.S.C. 502. The M21-1 Manual provisions are only binding on Veterans Benefits Administration employees. View "Gray v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In 2016, Harvard filed a patent-infringement case against Micron, which is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Idaho, alleging that venue in the District of Massachusetts was proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b); 1400. Micron moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but did not object to venue under Rule 12(b)(3). Months later, the Supreme Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. 1400(b) (TC Heartland decision): “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.” Micron then moved to dismiss or to transfer the case. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that, under Rule 12(g)(2) and (h)(1)(A), Micron had waived its venue defense by not objecting to venue in its first motion to dismiss. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded. TC Heartland changed the controlling law: at the time of the initial motion to dismiss, the venue defense now raised by Micron was not “available,” making the waiver rule of Rule 12(g)(2) and (h)(1)(A) inapplicable. That waiver rule, however, is not the only basis on which a district court might reject a venue defense for non-merits reasons, such as by determining that the defense was not timely presented. A less bright-line, more discretionary framework applies even when Rule 12(g)(2) and hence Rule 12(h)(1)(A) does not. View "In re: Micron Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

LifeTech sold genetic testing kits to detect the presence of “short tandem repeat” (STR) sequences of DNA. Its “STR kits,” were assembled in the United Kingdom and consisted of five components. At least one component was supplied from the U.S. Promega, the exclusive licensee of the U.S. “Tautz patent,” which expired in 2015 and claimed methods and kits for analyzing DNA to determine the identity and kinship of organisms, sued LifeTech for infringement. In 2014, the Federal Circuit held that a multi-component product assembled overseas could infringe a U.S. patent under 35 U.S.C. 271(f)(1)1 when only a single component is supplied from the U.S. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 271(f)(1) does not cover the supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention. On remand, the Federal Circuit first reaffirmed: that the asserted claims of four Promega patents were invalid for failure to comply with the enablement requirement, 35 U.S.C. 112; that certain of LifeTech’s alleged acts of infringement were not licensed under a license agreement between LifeTech and Promega; and that LifeTech was not required to “actively induce” a third party to combine the components of the accused products to be liable under section 271(f)(1)--that requirement could be met if LifeTech had the specific intent to combine the components itself. The court then reinstated the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law that Promega failed to prove infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(a)3; 271(f)(1). View "Promega Corp v. Life Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Sanofi’s patents describe and claim compositions and uses of the cardiovascular (antiarrhythmic) drug dronedarone. The 800 patent, which expires in 2019, claims pharmaceutical compositions containing dronedarone. The 167 patent, which expires in 2029, claims methods of reducing hospitalization by administering dronedarone to patients having specified characteristics. In 2009, Sanofii received New Drug Application approval for 400 mg tablets of dronedarone, sold as Multaq®. Both patents are listed in the FDA publication Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) as patents claiming either Multaq® or a method of using Multaq®. Defendants, hoping to market generic versions of Multaq®, filed abbreviated new drug applications with the FDA, certifying under 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), their beliefs that both patents were invalid and/or that the manufacture, use, and sale of the proposed generic drugs would not infringe either patent. Sanofi sued for infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A). The district court ruled, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that as to the 167 patent, Sanofi proved that sale of the proposed generic drugs, with the proposed labels, would induce physicians to infringe, and defendants did not prove that any asserted claims were invalid for obviousness. As to the 800 patent, the courts rejected the non-infringement argument. View "Sanofi v. Watson Laboratories Inc." on Justia Law

Simmons contacted counsel in 2011, claiming that he developed Guillain-Barre Syndrome as a result of his 2010 flu vaccination. He provided his vaccination record. Counsel agreed to represent him. Counsel was subsequently unable to contact Simmons and sent a letter in 2013, stating that their attorney-client relationship had terminated. That letter was returned as undeliverable. Nearly two years later, shortly before the limitations period on his Vaccine Act claim would expire, Simmons contacted counsel’ and expressed that he would like to proceed. Counsel spoke with Simmons one additional time. The next day, on October 22, 2013, counsel filed Simmons’s petition, without any medical records or other supporting evidence. In January 2014, the special master ordered counsel to produce medical records. Counsel stated that counsel had again lost contact with Simmons and was unable to acquire those records. The master dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Counsel then filed petitions seeking $8,267.89 in fees and costs. The master noted that because there was no direct evidence of bad faith and counsel had a vaccination receipt, counsel had satisfied the good faith and reasonable basis requirements and awarded fees. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit disagreed. The master erred in finding that counsel had a reasonable basis for Simmons’s claim. The fact that the statute of limitations was about to expire did not excuse counsel’s obligation to show some basis for the claim that Simmons suffered Guillain-Barre beyond their conversations. View "Simmons v. Secretary of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

TRICARE provides current and former members of the military and their dependents' medical and dental care. Hospitals that provide TRICARE services are reimbursed under Department of Defense (DoD) guidelines. TRICARE previously did not require, DoD to use Medicare reimbursement rules. A 2001 amendment, 10 U.S.C. 1079(j)(2), required TRICARE to use those rules to the extent practicable. DoD regulations noted the complexities of the transition process and the lack of comparable cost report data and stated “it is not practicable” to “adopt Medicare OPPS for hospital outpatient services at this time.” A study, conducted after hospitals complained, determined that DoD underpaid for outpatient radiology but correctly reimbursed other outpatient services. TRICARE created a process for review of radiology payments. Each plaintiff-hospital requested a discretionary payment, which required them to release “all claims . . . known or unknown” related to TRICARE payments. Several refused to sign the release and did not receive any payments. Although it discovered calculation errors with respect to hospitals represented by counsel, TRICARE did not recalculate payments for any hospitals that did not contest their discretionary payment offer. The Claims Court dismissed the hospitals’ suit. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, finding that they may bring a claim for breach of contract but may not bring money-mandating claims under 10 U.S.C. 1079(j)(2) and 32 C.F.R. 199.7(h)(2) because the government’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable. View "Ingham Regional Medical Center v. United States" on Justia Law

Freeman's company, RNR located eight mining claims on public lands of the Rogue River Siskiyou National Forest. In 2011, RNR filed a plan of operations with the U.S. Forest Service for commercial mining of ore that “contains commercially recoverable amounts of nickel, chromium[,] and iron” from two deposits over the course of 30 years. RNR proposed the construction of nearly eight miles of new roads, excavation of a pit for water storage, construction of two crossings over a creek, and creation of a processing facility on a 20-acre site, to be located on lands managed by the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Officials concluded that the BLM office had not received a complete plan of operation and requested a proposal for bulk sampling and construction of a pilot-prototype plant. Officials repeatedly asserted they would not process the pending plan without more specific information and a pilot-prototype. RNR did not respond to those requests, but sued, alleging a regulatory taking. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, of the suit finding the claim not ripe. The Forest Service has not reached a final decision and it is not clear compliance with its requests would be futile. View "Freeman v. United States" on Justia Law