Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act did not change the statutory meaning of “on sale” under 35 U.S.C. 102, in a case involving patents that were ready for patenting and subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002. Teva had invoked the provision as a defense in a suit charging infringement based on Teva’s filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). The district court upheld, as valid, Helsinn’s patents, directed to intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting, and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. In reversing, the Federal Circuit noted that the invention worked for its intended purpose, that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting was “overwhelming,” and that there was no tenable argument that, before the critical date, Helsinn was unable to file a patent application that met the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112. The district court clearly erred by applying too demanding a standard. The completion of Phase III studies and final FDA approval are not pre-requisites for the invention here to be ready for patenting. View "Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Comments that the Court of Federal Claims made during a hearing, before the government’s corrective action materially altered the relationship between the parties, were not sufficient to qualify the contractor as a “prevailing party” under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(a), (d)(1)(A). The Federal Circuit remanded the case, which involved Dellew’s post-award bid protest, alleging that the Army improperly awarded TSI a contract because TSI did not accept a material term of the request for proposals when it refused to cap its proposed general and administrative rate, and the contract awarded varied materially from TSI’s proposal. During oral argument, the Claims Court provided “hint[s]” about its views favorable to Dellew on the merits, and repeatedly expressed its belief that corrective action would be appropriate. The Army subsequently terminated the TSI contract. The Claims Court dismissed Dellew’s action, determined that it retained jurisdiction despited mootness, and awarded Dellew $79,456.76 in fees and costs, stating that it made “numerous substantive comments during oral argument regarding the merits,” that “carried a sufficient judicial imprimatur to materially alter the relationship between [Dellew] and [the Government] such that [Dellew] qualifies as a prevailing party under the EAJA.” View "Dellew Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the United States in Northwest Title Agency’s (NWTA) suit based on contracts, under which NWTA provided closing services for homes owned by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The courts concluded that the contracts unambiguously preclude NWTA from charging additional closing fees and declined to consider the affidavit of industry practice submitted by NWTA. The fee prohibition does not conflict with the buyers’ rights, as stated in the contracts, to retain a title company of their own choosing. View "Northwest Title Agency, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to enter a permanent injunction against Everlight after finding that Everlight had infringed three of Nichia’s patents and that the patents were not invalid. The patents disclose package designs and methods of manufacturing LED devices. The court upheld the constructions of “lead” as “the portion of the device that conducts electricity,” and of “planar” as “in a substantially same plane,” and rejected claims of obviousness. Nichia failed to show that it had suffered irreparable harm to justify a permanent injunction. View "Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Americas, Inc." on Justia Law

The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings, finding claims in RecogniCorp’s 303 Patent, entitled “Method and Apparatus for Encoding/Decoding Image Data,” patent-ineligible. The patent teaches a method and apparatus for building a composite facial image using constituent parts. Before the invention disclosed in the 303 patent, composite facial images typically were stored in file formats such as “bitmap,” “gif,” or “jpeg,” which required significant memory; compressing the images often resulted in decreased image quality. Digital transmission of these images could be difficult. The 303 patent sought to solve this problem by encoding the image at one end through a variety of image classes that required less memory and bandwidth and, at the other end, decoding the images. The courts concluded that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of encoding and decoding image data and do not contain an inventive concept sufficient to render the patent eligible under 36 U.S.C. 101. View "RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of a claim against the U.S. government, finding that the government had no contractual obligation to reimburse plaintiff’s pension withdrawal liability costs, incurred under the Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendment Act (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. 1381. Plaintiff had a contract with NASA to provide services, which was subject to the McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA), 41 U.S.C. 6701, under which service contracts specify a “wage determination,” setting wage rates and fringe benefits. The SCA insures that service employees who were protected by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with one contractor are not deprived of that CBA’s wages and benefits when the contract they work on is competitively awarded to a new contractor. Otherwise, if an incumbent contractor agreed to a CBA that provided for wages and benefits greater than the prevailing rate, a challenger could underbid the incumbent for the follow-on contract by providing its employees with less. The government is willing to increase contract prices when contractors incur increased costs as a result of an increase in the wage determination. The courts concluded that this plaintiff independently chose to negotiate a CBA with the Teamsters and join the Teamsters’ pension plan and independently assumed the risk of MPPAA withdrawal liability. NASA did not require plaintiff to do so and had no contractual recourse if plaintiff failed to satisfy its MPPAA obligations, so the SCA does not allocate the risk of MPPAA liability to the government. View "Call Henry, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

8x8 provides telephone services via Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Customers use a digital terminal adapter, containing 8x8’s proprietary firmware and software. Customers’ calls are switched to traditional lines and circuits when necessary; 8x8 did not pay Federal Communications Excise Tax (FCET) to the traditional carriers, based on an “exemption certificate,” (I.R.C. 4253). Consistent with its subscription plan, 8x8 collected FCET from its customers and remitted FCET to the IRS. In 2005, courts held that section 4251 did not permit the IRS to tax telephone services that billed at a fixed per-minute, non-distance-sensitive rate. The IRS ceased collecting FCET on “amounts paid for time-only service,” stated that VoIP services were non-taxable, and established a process seeking a refund of FCET that had been exacted on nontaxable services, stating stated that a “collector” can request a refund if the collector either “establishes that it repaid the amount of the tax to the person from whom the tax was collected”; or “obtains the written consent of such person to the allowance of such credit or refund.” The IRS denied 8x8’s refund claim. The Claims Court concluded that 8x8 lacked standing and granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed; 8x8 did not bear the economic burden of FCET, but sought to recover costs borne by its customers, contrary to the Code. The court rejected an argument that FCET was “treated as paid” during the transfer of services to traditional carriers. View "8x8, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The 2013 Department of Defense (DOD) budget was cut by $37 billion halfway through Fiscal Year 2013. The Secretary of Defense directed DOD managers to prepare to furlough most civilian employees for up to 11 workdays, with exceptions for employees deployed to a combat zone, those whose jobs are necessary to protect safety of life and property, Navy Shipyard employees, National Intelligence Program employees, Foreign Military Sales employees, political appointees, non-appropriated fund instrumentality employees, foreign national employees, and various employees not paid directly by DOD Military accounts. Snyder, a civilian engineer at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren) received a Notice of Proposed Furlough. Snyder worked on an Advanced Shipboard Weapons Control project, governed by a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between Dahlgren and Lockheed. Lockheed was solely responsible for funding and paid $2.6 million in 2012 to the U.S. Treasurer. Unused funds were to be remitted to Lockheed. Lockheed and Snyder requested that Dahlgren employees supporting the CRADA be exempt from furlough. The Navy denied the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Merit System Protection Board in upholding Snyder’s furlough. An agency may furlough an employee for lack of work or funds or other non-disciplinary reasons, 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(5), 7512(5) if the furlough “will promote the efficiency of the service.” The court found the furlough decision to “be a reasonable management solution to the financial restrictions placed on the agency.” View "Snyder v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Monk served in the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. In 2012, Monk sought VA disability benefits, alleging service-connected PTSD, diabetes, hypertension, and strokes. The VA denied the claim, finding that his discharge was “other than honorable.” Monk filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) and separately applied to the Board of Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) to upgrade his discharge status. In 2015, the VA informed Monk that it could not process his appeal until it received BCNR records. Monk sought a writ of mandamus with Veterans Court and requested that the court certify a class of all veterans who had applied for VA benefits, had timely filed an NOD, had not received a decision within 12 months, and had demonstrated medical or financial hardship (38 U.S.C. 7107(a)(2)(B)–(C)). The Veterans Court denied the request for class certification, denied another veteran’s request to join the action, and ordered the VA to respond to Monk’s petition regarding the denial of disability benefits. BCNR then granted Monk an upgraded discharge status. The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of class certification, finding that the Veterans Court has authority to certify a class for a class action and to maintain similar aggregate resolution procedures with respect to benefit denials. View "Monk v. Shulkin" on Justia Law

In 2008, Fairchild charged Power Integrations with infringement of patents, including the 972 patent. The jury rejected an argument that the 972 patent claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. 103 in view of prior art and found that the claims had been infringed. The Federal Circuit upheld the obviousness determination but reversed as to infringement, and remanded for proceedings unrelated to the 972 patent claims. In 2012, Power Integrations requested inter partes reexamination of the 972 patent. The examiner rejected all of the claims in the reexamination, including claims raised in the litigation, under section 103(a). The Federal Circuit remanded to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board with instructions to vacate portions of its final decision in the inter partes reexamination. Under 35 U.S.C. 317(b), no inter partes reexamination proceeding can be “maintained” on “issues” that a party “raised or could have raised” in a civil action arising under 28 U.S.C. 1338 once “a final decision has been entered” in the civil action that “the party has not sustained its burden of proving the invalidity” of the patent claim. There is a final judgment against Power Integrations, holding that it failed to prove four claims were obvious. View "Fairchild (Taiwan) Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc." on Justia Law