Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Technology Properties Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
The 336 patent discloses a microprocessor with two independent clocks—a variable frequency system clock connected to the central processing unit (CPU) and a fixed-frequency clock connected to the input/output (I/O) interface. The patent teaches improving microprocessor performance by decoupling the CPU and I/O clocks, so that “optimum performance can be achieved by each.” In five separate litigations, the parties stipulated to non-infringement based on the district court’s construction of “an entire oscillator disposed upon said integrated circuit substrate.” The Federal Circuit consolidated the appeals and vacated, holding that the district court erred in a portion of its construction of “entire oscillator.” An ”entire oscillator disposed upon said integrated circuit substrate” is “an oscillator located entirely on the same semiconductor substrate as the central processing unit that does not require a command input to change the clock frequency and whose frequency is not fixed by any external crystal.” View "Technology Properties Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Intellectual Property, Patents
Eli Lilly & Co, v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute
LAB’s 903 patent claims a method of “arresting or regressing” penile fibrosis, which can result in erectile dysfunction and penile deformation, by the long-term, daily administration of type 5 phosphodiesterase (PDE5) inhibitors. At Eli Lilly’s request, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board conducted inter partes review. The patent claimed priority from a 2002 Provisional Application. The Board first rejected LAB’s argument for the earlier priority date, construed three terms, and concluded that the claim limitation requiring the delivery of a dosage of up to 1.5 mg/kg/day for at least 45 days “would meet the claim requirement of a continuous, long-term regimen,” and that the combination of three prior references rendered the claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding two claim constructions erroneous and that the Board did not make factual findings as to whether there was an apparent reason to combine the references to treat penile fibrosis and whether a person of skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success from such a combination. In a separate opinion, the court specifically addressed one prior reference, Whitaker, stating that it may “suggest” long-term daily treatment by noting the beneficial effects of daily treatment (better erectile response and decreased side effects), but that is not enough. Whitaker does not disclose the claimed treatment regimen with sufficient clarity to satisfy the demanding standard for anticipation. View "Eli Lilly & Co, v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Drugs & Biotech, Patents
Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute v. Eli Lilly & Co.
LAB’s 903 patent claims a method of “arresting or regressing” penile fibrosis, which can result in erectile dysfunction and penile deformation, by the long-term, daily administration of type 5 phosphodiesterase (PDE5) inhibitors. At Eli Lilly’s request, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board conducted inter partes review. The patent claimed priority from a 2002 Provisional Application. The Board first rejected LAB’s argument for the earlier priority date, finding that the specification of the provisional application did not disclose the dosage limitation, then construed: “an individual with at least one of penile tunical fibrosis and corporal tissue fibrosis”; “arresting or regressing the at least one of the penile tunical fibrosis and corporal tissue fibrosis”; and “continuous long-term regimen.” The Board concluded that the claim limitation requiring the delivery of a dosage of up to 1.5 mg/kg/day for at least 45 days “would meet the claim requirement of a continuous, long-term regimen,” and that the combination of three prior references rendered the claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding two claim constructions erroneous and that the Board did not make factual findings as to whether there was an apparent reason to combine the references to treat penile fibrosis and whether a person of skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success from such a combination. View "Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute v. Eli Lilly & Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Drugs & Biotech, Patents
Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc.
Strava sought inter partes reexamination of several claims of Icon’s 800 patent, entitled “Methods and Systems for Controlling an Exercise Apparatus Using a USB Compatible Portable Remote Device,” and disclosing “[a] portable system [that] retrieves one or more exercise programs from a remote communication system that provides motivational content for a user exercising upon an exercise mechanism.” During the reexamination, certain claims were cancelled, and others were added. An examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office found certain claims obvious over various prior art references. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of all the pending claims as obvious, 35 U.S.C. 103(a). The Federal Circuit vacated in part, finding that the Board never made factual findings with a basis in the record or provided the requisite explanation to support its findings with respect to certain claims. View "Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Patents
Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank National Association
The Axcess patent, entitled “System and Method for Authenticating a Web Page,” relates to "systems and methods for authenticating a web page.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board determined that it was a covered business method (CBM) patent under the America Invents Act (AIA), 125 Stat. 284, and that certain claims were unpatentable as obvious under prior art. The Board rejected a claim by Axcess that the patent was ineligible for CBM review because it was not directed to a financial product or service and can be used by institutions other than financial institutions. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the Board’s characterization of a CBM was inconsistent with the statutory definition: a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service. If a CBM patent is to be usefully distinguished from all other patents, the distinction will not lie based on non-statutory phrases like “incidental to” or “complementary to” financial activity. Necessarily, the statutory definition of a CBM patent requires that the patent have a claim that contains, however phrased, a financial activity element. View "Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank National Association" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Intellectual Property, Patents
Fedora v. Merit Systems Protection Board
Fedora began working for the Postal Service in 1980 and retired in 2012, then filed an appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging that his retirement was involuntary and amounted to constructive discharge. He claimed that he was forced to perform work in violation of his medical restrictions, was harassed, and was threatened with loss of his pension. An administrative judge found that Fedora had failed to make a non-frivolous allegation and dismissed. The Board issued a final order affirming the AJ’s decision, stating that the Federal Circuit “must receive [his] request for review no later than 60 calendar days after the date of [the Board’s] order.” . He filed a petition for review on October 20, 2014, within 60 days of his receipt of the order (August 19), but not within 60 days of issuance of the notice (August 15). Fedora argued that the Board’s final order directed him to the court's “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which incorrectly instructed that a petitioner “may file a petition for review in this court within 60 days of receipt of the Board’s decision.” The Federal Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(A), stating that it lacks authority to equitably toll the filing requirements. View "Fedora v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law
Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro Co.
Scag, which manufactures commercial riding lawnmowers, developed a suspended operator platform for a ride-on lawnmower or other riding light utility vehicle connected to a rigid chassis by a suspension system. The operator platform supports the entire body of the operator. The suspension system suspends the operator platform from the chassis in a manner that isolates an operator from vibrations, or shock loads, generated by the mower during use or when driven over uneven terrain. The operator platform can suspend or isolate some controls from the rigid chassis. Scag commercialized the system, which is disclosed in the 475 patent, in its Cheetah line of lawnmowers. In 2015, Toro introduced riding lawnmowers with suspended operator platforms to compete with Scag’s Cheetah line. The steering controls in Toro’s riding lawnmowers are connected to the chassis, not the operator platform. Scag filed an infringement action and obtained a preliminary injunction. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that Scag established a likelihood of success that the accused products infringe claim 21 of the 475 patent and that there is not a substantial question of validity as to claim 21. View "Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Intellectual Property, Patents
Organik Kimya v. International Trade Commission
Organik and Dow both manufacture opaque polymers, hollow spheres used as additives to increase paint’s opacity. Dow has maintained its worldwide market-leader position through a combination of patent and trade-secret protections. Dow filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission requesting an investigation into whether Organik’s opaque polymer products infringed four Dow patents. The Commission granted Dow’s request, and the parties began discovery. During the proceedings, Dow amended its complaint to add allegations of trade secret misappropriation when it discovered that Organik may have coordinated the production of its opaque polymers with the assistance of former Dow employees. As Dow attempted to obtain discovery relating to the activities of those employees, Dow discovered spoliation of evidence “on a staggering scale.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s imposition of default judgment and entry of a limited exclusion order against Organik as sanctions for the spoliation of evidence. Organik’s “willful, bad faith misconduct” deprived Dow of its ability to pursue its trade secret misappropriation claim effectively. The record supports the limited exclusion order of 25 years with the opportunity for Organik to bypass that order at any time if it can show that it has developed its opaque polymers without using Dow’s misappropriated trade secrets. View "Organik Kimya v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law
Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG
Xilinx a Delaware corporation headquartered in California, develops and markets programmable logic devices for electronics systems. Papst, organized and having its principal place of business in Germany, is a nonpracticing entity that does not manufacture or sell products. Papst’s website describes “a global patent licensing and monetization firm specialized in enforcing infringed patents with the goal to conclude a license agreement with the infringer.” Papst has repeatedly filed patent infringement suits in California federal courts. Before acquiring the patents-in-suit, Papst investigated potential infringers and targets for licensing, including 28 companies based, or having significant presence, in California. Papst sent a patent-infringement notice letter and a follow-up letter to Xilinx. Papst’s managing director, its senior counsel, and its Texas-based outside counsel, traveled to California to meet with Xilinx. No agreement was reached. Xilinx sought a declaratory judgment, in the Northern District of California, that Xilinx’s products do not infringe the patents-in-suit and that the patents are invalid. Papst filed an infringement suit against Xilinx in the District of Delaware asserting the same patents. The California court dismissed the declaratory judgment action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit reversed; the court has specific personal jurisdiction over Papst. Considering the totality of circumstances, the court found “sufficient minimum contacts” and that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable. View "Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Patents
Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States
In 2010, the Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping-duty investigation of multilayered wood flooring from China (19 U.S.C. 1673a(b)) and sent questionnaires to Chinese exporters and producers, selecting the three largest exporters as mandatory respondents. Commerce deems China to be a nonmarket economy and presumes that each Chinese exporter and producer is state-controlled, and covered by a single China-wide antidumping-duty rate, but a firm may rebut the presumption. Commerce determined that 74 firms established their independence from the Chinese government (not individually investigated, but not covered by the China-wide rate) and calculated a “separate rate.” Commerce did not individually investigate the appellants to determine firm-specific dumping margins. It assigned them a rate that, though not specified numerically, was declared to be more than de minimis, even though it found zero or de minimis dumping margins for all three of the Chinese firms that were individually investigated. The Trade Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit subsequently held that the “separate rate” method used in this case was a departure from the congressionally-approved “expected method” applicable when all of the individually investigated firms have a zero or de minimis rate, and that certain findings are necessary to justify such a departure. Under the “expected method,” appellants would be entitled to a de minimis rate. Because Commerce did not make the necessary findings, the Federal Circuit vacated. View "Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
International Trade