Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, the Patent and Trademark Office issued JobDiva’s 917 registration for the service mark JOBDIVA for “personnel placement and recruitment” services. In 2005, it issued JobDiva’s 235 registration for a service mark for “personnel placement and recruitment services; computer services, namely, providing databases featuring recruitment and employment, employment advertising, career information and resources, resume creation, resume transmittals and communication of responses thereto via a global computer network.” JobDiva’s software provides a database of employment applications and employs automated “harvesters” to find potential job candidates. It analyzes resumes and helps hiring managers directly communicate with job candidates; it also recommends openings to job candidates and provides automated resume feedback. JobDiva’s software-as-a-service is delivered over the Internet without downloading software. Users pay for the computing as a service rather than owning the machines and software. The Board cancelled JobDiva’s marks in a proceeding that JobDiva initiated, challenging a registration owned by Jobvite. The Board granted Jobvite’s counterclaim stating, “[a] mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . [w]hen its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use,” 15 U.S.C. 1125, and that JobDiva provided software, not “personnel placement and recruitment” services. The Federal Circuit vacated. The question is whether JobDiva, through its software, performed personnel placement and recruitment services and whether consumers would associate JobDiva’s registered marks with personnel placement and recruitment services, regardless of whether the steps of the service were performed by software. View "In re: JobDiva, Inc." on Justia Law

Wilson was a civilian Resource Analyst at the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate at the Naval Sea Systems Command, which required a Department of Energy security clearance. The DOE revoked Wilson’s security clearance, stating that Wilson: knowingly brought a personal firearm onto a Navy facility in violation of regulations; armed himself with a personal weapon while acting as a Metropolitan Police Department reserve officer, contrary to regulations; and made false statements and false time and attendance entries to his civilian employer, the Naval Reserve Unit and the MPD. Wilson maintains that he brought his firearm to the facility in response to the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shooting, in perceived compliance with his duty as a Navy Reservist, and requested reinstatement under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. The Navy removed Wilson from federal service. A Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge determined that the Board lacked authority to consider claims of discrimination or reprisal in the context of a removal based on security clearance revocation; that the Navy provided him the procedural protections of 5 U.S.C. 7513(b); and that the Navy did not have a policy to reassign employees to alternate positions that do not require a security clearance. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that it lacked the authority to consider Wilson’s USERRA claim. View "Wilson v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

NuVasive’s patent generally relates to “[a] system and method for spinal fusion comprising a spinal fusion implant of non-bone construction releasably coupled to an insertion instrument dimensioned to introduce the spinal fusion implant into any of a variety of spinal target sites.” On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found certain claims invalid as obvious. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board did not adequately explain how a claim would have been obvious over prior art, 35 U.S.C. 103(a) and did not articulate a motivation to combine prior art references. View "In re: Nuvasive, Inc." on Justia Law

Asetek’s patents cover systems and methods for cooling the “central processing unit (CPU) or other processing unit of a computer system” using cooling liquid. According to the patents, liquid-cooling systems in prior art consisted of “many components,” which were “coupled together,” increasing “total installation time” and causing “leakage.” Asetek’s patents describe systems that combine multiple components—a “heat-exchanging interface,” a “reservoir,” and a “pump”—into a single “integrate element.” Asetek asserted infringement by products branded “Cooler Master.” Asetek obtained a judgment of infringement, and of no invalidity, plus a damages award against CMI of $404,941. The court entered an injunction covering the specific “Cooler Master” products found to infringe, running not only against CMI but also against Cooler Master—which was not then a party (though it later intervened and became one) and which was not adjudicated liable for infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to infringement, invalidity, and damages, but remanded for development of the record as to part of the injunction that reaches conduct by Cooler Master and goes beyond abetting a new violation by CMI. The standards for reaching such conduct by persons not adjudicated liable for the underlying wrong, (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)), are highly fact-specific. View "Asetek Danmark A/S v. CMI USA Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, Abbas sued the federal government, alleging taking of his property rights in certain pre-World War II German bonds that were underwritten and payable in the U.S. After the war, Germany was reluctant to pay off the bonds, some of which were in unauthorized hands. Several post-World War II treaties between the U.S. and Germany established procedures for determining the validity of the bonds and the rights of the holders. It appears that Germany finished paying settling holders of validated German pre-war bonds in 2010. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claim, finding it barred by the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2501, which requires that claims brought in the Court of Federal Claims be filed within six years of accrual of the cause of action. Abbas’s claim is that the U.S. caused a regulatory taking of his right to sue Germany for payment of his bonds when the U.S. entered into a 1953 Treaty. View "Abbas v. United States" on Justia Law

Miller worked as the Superintendent of Industries at the Beaumont, Texas Federal Correctional Complex, overseeing a prison factory that produced ballistic helmets primarily for military use. Miller occasionally served associate warden and was described by Warden Upton as “a fantastic employee.” In 2009, Miller disclosed to the government-owned corporation that ran the prison and to Upton what he perceived to be mismanagement of factory funds. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an inspection. Upton asked Miller to not report to the factory that day. The next day, Miller reported that there had been “sabotage” at the factory, and urged that it be closed pending investigation. Hours later, Upton informed Miller that he was being reassigned. Upton later testified that OIG was concerned that Miller might compromise its investigation. Over the next four and a half years, Miller was assigned to low-level positions. Upton attributed his reassignments to unidentified OIG staff. Eventually, Upton reassigned Miller to sit on a couch in the lobby for eight months. Miller appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). The Administrative Judge found that the government had rebutted his case. The Federal Circuit reversed. The government did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned Miller absent his protected disclosures. View "Miller v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

In 2012, the FTC announced the “Robocall Challenge,” under 15 U.S.C. 3719(b). The public was invited to create “innovative solutions to block illegal robocalls.” for a $50,000 prize. Contestants granted the FTC non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty free and worldwide license and agreed to release the FTC from all liability. The FTC received about 800 submissions. The judges, with little guidance from the contest rules, decided that the frontrunners would be those entries that proposed using filtering as a service (FaaS) to block robocalls. Frankel’s submission proposed a “traceback” solution rather than FaaS. When his submission was not chosen, Frankel sued under the bid protest provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1491(b) and alleging breach of contract. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s rejection of both theories. His contract with the FTC was not a procurement contract, so Frankel did not have standing to register an objection to the award under section 1491(b). Frankel is unable to show “fraud, irregularity, intentional misconduct, gross mistake, or lack of good faith.” Any other breach of contract claim based on the judging process is barred by the limitation of liability clause. View "Frankel v. United States" on Justia Law

Ameranth’s patents disclose computer systems with hardware and software and describe a preferred embodiment of the invention for use in the restaurant industry. The specifications note that “ordering prepared foods has historically been done verbally, either directly to a waiter or over the telephone, whereupon the placed order is recorded on paper by the recipient or instantly filled” and explain that the “unavailability of any simple technique for creating restaurant menus and the like for use in a limited display area wireless handheld device or that is compatible with ordering over the internet ha[d] prevented widespread adoption of computerization in the hospitality industry.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board conducted three Covered Business Method reviews and found certain claims unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 101. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, upholding the construction of “menu” features, determinations that the patents are not patents for technological inventions, a determination that the preamble recitations of “synchronous communications system” are not limiting, the construction of “central processing unit,” and a conclusion that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. The court reversed with respect to certain independent claims. View "Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc." on Justia Law

The 752 patent, entitled “Method and System for Managing Location Information for Wireless Communications Devices,” describes a system of “privacy preferences” that determine whether “client applications” are allowed to access a wireless device’s location information, based on the time of day, the device’s location at the time of the request, the accuracy of the provided information or the party who is seeking the information. Google petitioned for covered business method (CBM) review of certain claims, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31. The Board found the patent to be a CBM patent, reasoning that its disclosure indicates the “client application” may be associated with a service or goods provider, such as a hotel, restaurant, or store, that wants to know a wireless device’s location so relevant advertising may be transmitted to the device; the subject matter recited in claim 25 is incidental or complementary to the financial activity of service or product sales and is directed to a method for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service. The Board then held that the challenged claims were directed to unpatentable subject matter, 35 U.S.C. 101. The Federal Circuit vacated; the Board’s reliance on whether the patent claims activities “incidental to” or “complementary to” a financial activity to determine whether a patent is a CBM patent was not in accordance with law. View "Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Graviss has worked in education since 1978. In 2008, she became a pre-school special needs teacher at Kingsolver Elementary, part of Fort Knox Schools. Kingsolver’s principal, McClain, issued Graviss a reprimand based on an “inappropriate interaction with a student” and “failure to follow directives,” asserting that Graviss and her aide had physically carried a misbehaving pre-school student and Graviss had emailed concerns to the director of special education, although McClain had directed Graviss to “bring all issues directly to [her].” The union filed a grievance. Subsequently, one of Graviss’s students had an episode, repeatedly flailing his arms, kicking, and screaming. While the other students were out at recess, Graviss employed physical restraint to subdue the child. After an investigation, McClain submitted a Family Advocacy Program Department of Defense Education Activity Serious Incident Report and Alleged Child Abuse Report to the Family Advocacy Program (child protective services for the military). McClain forwarded the Report to her direct supervisor, who was later the decision-maker in Graviss’s termination. An arbitrator concluded that that Graviss's termination promoted the efficiency of the service and was reasonable. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Graviss’s due process rights were violated by improper ex parte communication between a supervisor and the deciding official. That communication contained new information that the supervisor wanted Graviss terminated for insubordination. View "Federal Education Association v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law