Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Grover worked for many years for the Customs and Border Protection service and participated in the Civil Service Retirement System, 5 U.S.C. 8331–8351. He retired in 2008 and applied for a retirement annuity. By statute, the annuity must reflect the highest average annual pay based on three consecutive years of specified service, and for a customs officer like Grover in the years in question, the calculation must include overtime pay up to $17,500. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in calculating Grover’s pay, did not include anything close to $17,500 in overtime pay, although Grover asserted that he received more than $17,500 in overtime pay in those years. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld OPM’s calculation, which relied on a particular official record. The Federal Circuit vacated. Neither OPM nor the Board recognized that the record is internally contradictory about what overtime pay Grover received, so neither sought further information, such as pay stubs, that might definitively resolve the uncertainty. The regulation does not permit the Board to affirm OPM’s calculation without resolving the amount-of-overtime-pay factual issue. View "Grover v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

SkyHawke sued Deca for infringement of the 498 patent. Deca requested inter partes reexamination. The court stayed the litigation pending the outcome. The Patent Office granted reexamination, finding substantial new questions of patentability for claims 5-8. The examiner initially rejected all claims based on several grounds of obviousness, but subsequently reversed, confirming the patentability of all of the claims. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed, with a lengthy analysis of the meaning of the phrase “means . . . for determining a distance” recited in claim 5. The Board identified particular algorithms in the 498 patent as providing the corresponding structure for that claim element, as required for a means-plus-function claim, 35 U.S.C. 112, and concluded that none of the prior art references disclosed the algorithmic structure corresponding to that of claim 5. Skyhawke appealed, arguing that the Board decision should be affirmed but that the claim construction should be corrected. The Federal Circuit dismissed, citing the prudential rule that the prevailing party in a lower tribunal cannot ordinarily seek relief in the appellate court. SkyHawke will have the opportunity to argue its preferred claim construction to the district court, and can appeal an unfavorable claim construction if necessary. View "Skyhawke Techs., LLC v. Deca Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

In 2003, the government awarded Laguna a contract for Worldwide Environmental Remediation and Construction (WERC). Under the contract, Laguna received 16 cost-reimbursable task orders to perform work in Iraq, and awarded subcontracts to several subcontractors. The physical work under the contract was completed by 2010. Laguna sought reimbursement of past costs, a portion of which the government refused to pay after an audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the government alleged that it was not liable because Laguna had committed a prior material breach by accepting subcontractor kickbacks (18 U.S.C. 371, 41 U.S.C. 53), excusing the government’s nonperformance. Three of Laguna’s officers were ultimately indicted for kickbacks. The Board granted the government summary judgment on that ground, The Federal Circuit affirmed. Laguna committed the first material breach by violating the contract’s Allowable Cost and Payment clause because its vouchers were improperly inflated to include the payment, Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.216-7. View "Laguna Constr. Co. v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Department of Education contracts with private collection agencies for services related to resolving defaulted student loans through the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), which provides federal agencies with a simplified process for obtaining supplies and services. FSS contractors are pre-approved. Orders placed against GSA Schedule contracts are “considered to be issued using full and open competition.” In 2008, Education issued a Request for Quotations for debt collection services, seeking to issue Task Orders under an existing GSA Schedule contract. Pioneer, Enterprise, and others were awarded identical Task Orders, containing a base term and an Option permitting the government to unilaterally extend the term up to 24 months; the contractor could earn extensions beyond the base period and options, based upon the quality of performance during evaluation periods. In 2014, Education began secretly auditing the contractors, counting violations of consumer protection laws. Based on their error rates, Education decided not to issue Pioneer or Enterprise award-term Task Orders, although they scored “excellent or better” under the contract-based evaluation system. The companies filed suit, challenging Education’s proposed issuance of extensions to their competitors. The Claims Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(b)(1)). The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that issuance of a new Task Order constituted the award of a contract, an action over which that court has jurisdiction. There is no exception for new Task Orders arising from an award-term extension. View "Coast Prof'l, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Crooker, who has a lengthy criminal history, pled guilty to charges of mailing a threatening communication and possession of a toxin without registration. He is serving a sentence of 15 years, having received credit toward that sentence for 2,273 days he spent imprisoned on a prior conviction for transportation of a firearm in interstate commerce by a convicted felon, which was overturned on appeal. Crooker filed suit under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act, 28 U.S.C. 1495, 2513, seeking damages for the time he spent in prison on overturned conviction, despite the sentencing credit. The Court of Federal Claims awarded him the statutory maximum for the first 1,259 days, $172,465.75. The Federal Circuit reversed: the entirety of Crooker’s “unjust” imprisonment has been applied to a “just” conviction and, as a result, he will spend no more time in prison than he is legally required. Crooker is not entitled to any damages under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act. View "Crooker v. United States" on Justia Law

TMC owns patents relating to bivalirudin, a synthetic peptide anti-coagulant. TMC sells the drug for injection under the Angiomax® brand and, from 1997 to 2006, purchased pharmaceutical batches from BV. In 2005, BV created batches of bivalirudin with levels of impurity above the FDA-approved maximum. TMC’s consultant discovered that certain methods of adding a pH-adjusting solution during compounding minimize the impurity. In 2008, TMC filed patent applications, describing this discovery. A year earlier, TMC had hired BV to prepare batches using the patented method. Each was released for commercial packaging. In 2010, TMC sued, alleging infringement by Hospira’s ANDA filings. The district court found the patents not infringed and not invalid as obvious, indefinite, or under the on-sale bar (35 U.S.C. 102(b)), which applies when, before the critical date, the claimed invention was the subject of a commercial offer for sale and was ready for patenting. The court found that the claimed invention was ready for patenting but not commercially offered for sale. The Federal Circuit initially reversed, but affirmed on reconsideration. To be “on sale” a product must be the subject of a commercial sale or offer for sale; a commercial sale bears the general hallmarks of a sale pursuant to Section 2-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code. No such invalidating commercial sale occurred in this case. View "Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Hutchison imported furniture from China through Orient International. The Commerce Department assigned Orient an antidumping duty margin of 216.01%. The Court of International Trade (CIT) entered an injunction and directed that the entries be liquidated “in accordance with the final court decision ... including all appeals.” In February 2013, CIT sustained Commerce’s remand redetermination, including a rate of 83.55%. Orient did not appeal; in June CIT ordered that Orient’s entries be liquidated in accordance with the February Final Judgment. In September, Customs liquidated the entries at 83.55%. Hutchison filed an unsuccessful protest with Customs under 19 U.S.C. 1514. In October 2014, Hutchison sought review under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(4), asserting that the entries should have been deemed liquidated at 7.24%, citing 19 U.S.C. 1504(d): “[w]hen a suspension required by statute or court order is removed, [Customs] shall liquidate the entry . . . within [six] months after receiving notice of the removal,” and, if the entry is not so liquidated, it shall be deemed "liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted by the importer” at the time of entry. Hutchison argued that Commerce’s liquidation instructions misidentified the date on which suspension of liquidation was lifted and that the suspension expired with the Final Judgment. CIT dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the “claim involves a protestable [Customs] decision,” which Hutchison could have appealed under 28 U.S.C. 1581(a) if its protest was denied. The Federal Circuit affirmed; regardless of whether the Final Judgment constituted a final court decision or constituted notice to Customs, starting the six-month period in 1504(d), a party may not invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i) when jurisdiction under another subsection could have been invoked. View "Hutchison Quality Furniture, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Hepatocytes, a type of liver cell, are useful for testing, diagnostic, and treatment purposes. Fresh hepatocytes can only be obtained from liver resections or non-transplantable livers of organ donors; their lifespan is short. Supply is erratic. Before the 929 patent, scientists developed “cryopreservation” techniques, but the process could damage the hepatocytes and was unsuitable for multi-donor hepatocyte pools. Prevailing wisdom was that hepatocytes could be frozen only once before being used or discarded. The 929 parent's inventors discovered that some hepatocytes can survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles and developed an improved process: subjecting thawed cells to density gradient fractionation to separate viable from non-viable cells; recovering the viable cells; and refreezing the viable cells. After refreezing only the viable cells, the preserved hepatocyte preparations can be thawed and used later without unacceptable loss of viability. Hepatocyte samples from single donors can be pooled into a composite preparation that can be refrozen for later use. In an infringement suit, the court found the patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. 101, as directed to a patent-ineligible law of nature—that hepatocytes can survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles—and that the patented process lacks the requisite inventive concept. The Federal Circuit vacated. That each of the individual steps (freezing, thawing, and separating) were known independently in the art does not make the claim unpatentable; patent-eligibility does not turn on ease of execution or obviousness of application. View "Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. Cellzdirect, Inc." on Justia Law

Apotex applied to the FDA, under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, for permission to begin marketing a product allegedly “biosimilar” to Amgen’s FDA-approved Neulasta®. Apotex and Amgen proceeded under the Act’s process for exchanging information and channeling litigation about patents relevant to the application. In this suit, Amgen alleged that Apotex’s proposed marketing would infringe an Amgen patent. On Amgen’s motion, the district court preliminarily enjoined Apotex from entering the market unless it has given Amgen notice after receiving the requested FDA license and then waited 180 days, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 262(l)(8)(A). The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Act’s commercial-marketing provision is mandatory, with the 180-day period beginning only upon post-licensure notice, and an injunction was proper to enforce the provision against even a biosimilar product​ applicant that did engage in the statutory process for exchanging patent information and channeling patent litigation. View "Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc." on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service denied Wells Fargo’s claims for refunds based on interest-netting under 26 U.S.C. 6621(d) between interest on tax underpayments and interest on tax overpayments. Section 6621(d) reads: To the extent that, for any period, interest is payable under subchapter A and allowable under subchapter B on equivalent underpayments and overpayments by the same taxpayer of tax imposed by this title, the net rate of interest under this section on such amounts shall be zero for such period. Absent an interest-netting provision , a taxpayer might make equivalent underpayments and overpayments yet owe the IRS interest because corporate taxpayers pay underpayment interest at a higher rate than the IRS pays overpayment interest. The Claims Court granted Wells Fargo partial summary judgment, finding that it satisfied the “same taxpayer” requirement, although the current embodiment of the company is the result of seven mergers. The companies involved in these mergers made tax underpayments and overpayments. The Federal Circuit identified three merger “situations” and concluded that two qualified for interest netting and one did not. The situations involved consideration of the whether the entities had separate identities at the time of the payments at issue and the amount of change in the entity’s identity as a result of the merger. View "Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States" on Justia Law