Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

KBR, an Army contractor, subcontracted with KCPC/Morris to implement work release orders for construction of dining facilities and provision of food services in Iraq. KBR terminated the subcontract based on performance. KCPC/Morris disputed the termination and continued performance until transition to a new subcontractor in September 2003. In January 2005, the parties signed an agreement, converting the default termination into a termination for convenience. A $17,400,000 settlement was paid, but the parties disputed costs. In August 2006, KCPC/Morris submitted a certified claim, which KBR forwarded to the Army, stating that it would not certify validity and lacked supporting documentation. The Army responded in May 2007, that it was KBR’s responsibility to negotiate with its subcontractors, and refused to consider the submission. In October 2007, KBR “sponsored” the claim, followed by certification dated January 2008. In September 2010, KBR withdrew the claim. In August 2011, KCPC/Morris filed suit, which was withdrawn after the parties entered reached agreement dated February 2012. In May 2012, KBR filed a certified claim for the agreed amount. The contracting officer did not act, placing the claim in “deemed denied” status. The Board of Contract Appeals dismissed KBR’s appeal, holding that the limitations period had run before May 2012. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the KBR claim had not accrued, for limitation purposes, before May 2006. The Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7103(a)(4)(A), does not require the filing of protective claims related to subcontractors while those claims are being resolved between the prime and sub. View "Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Hudgens injured his right knee while serving on active duty in the U.S. Army. In 2003, Hudgens had partial knee replacement surgery; in 2006, he sought VA benefits. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied him a disability rating of greater than 10 percent for degenerative joint disease in the right knee and denied him entitlement to a compensable disability rating for instability in the right knee for a prior time period. The Veterans Court vacated those decisions; held that Hudgens was not entitled to compensation for his prosthetic knee replacement under 38 C.F.R. 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5055; and remanded for determination of whether his knee replacement could be rated by analogy to that code. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Hudgens may be compensated under DC 5055 based on his partial knee replacement. Hudgens’s interpretation of DC 5055 is consistent with the beneficence inherent in the veterans’ benefits scheme and with the majority of Board decisions that have interpreted the regulation. View "Hudgens v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Diamond sued the auto companies, alleging infringement of its patents. The district court dismissed the actions finding that agreements between Diamond and Sanyo, the original assignee of the patents-in-suit, did not confer patentee status on Diamond, allowing Diamond to sue without joining Sanyo. The court later held that nunc pro tunc agreements executed by Diamond and Sanyo after its decision in Diamond did not affect its determination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The original agreements did not convey all of the substantial rights in the patents to Diamond. Precedent bars consideration of the subsequent agreements. View "Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am." on Justia Law

TLI filed suits, alleging that the defendants infringed its 295 patent by making, selling, and/or using products and services that allow uploading of digital photos from a mobile device, such as a cell phone. The 295 patent “relates generally to an apparatus for recording of a digital image, communicating the digital image from the recording device to a storage device, and to administering the digital image in the storage device.” The specification notes that a “wide variety of data types” can be transmitted, including audio and image stills. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the cases for pre-trial purposes in the Eastern District of Virginia. That court dismissed, concluding that the patent fails to claim patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101, and that, in the alternative, certain claims are invalid for failing to recite sufficient structure as required by 35 U.S.C. 112. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that limiting the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner to a particular environment—a mobile telephone system—does not make the claims any less abstract. View "TLI Commc'ns LLC v. AV Auto., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Finacea® Gel contains azelaic acid as the therapeutically active ingredient in a concentration of 15% by weight and is indicated for the topical treatment of rosacea. Finacea® is manufactured as a “hydrogel,” which the court construed to mean “a semisolid dosage form that contains water and a gelling agent to form a gel, which may contain dispersed particles and/or insoluble liquids.” The FDA Orange Book lists the 070 patent as covering Finacea® Gel. The 070 patent, entitled “Composition with Azelaic Acid,” issued in 2003 and claims priority to a 1998 provisional application. Glenmark submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application to the FDA seeking to market a generic version of Finacea®, including a paragraph IV certification (21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)) that the patent was invalid and not infringed. Unlike Finacea®, the proposed generic product substituted isopropyl myristate for the claimed triglyceride and lecithin. The court held that certain claims were infringed under the doctrine of equivalents and not invalid. The court concluded that the isopropyl myristate in Glenmark’s generic product met the claim elements triglyceride and lecithin under the doctrine of equivalents, relying on the function-way-result test. The court rejected arguments that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents would encompass the prior art and was barred by prosecution history estoppel. The Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the asserted claims would not have been obvious. View "Intendis GMBH v. Glenmark Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Merck and Weider considered jointly introducing, into the U.S., dietary supplements with Merck ingredients, including crystalline calcium salt of a tetrahydrofolic acid (MTHF), agreeing that, until a definitive agreement was signed, neither party was under any legal obligation. Weider later notified Merck that it was no longer interested in a joint venture, but would like to purchase two kilograms of MTHF. Merck quoted a price of $25,000 per kg. After extensive correspondence, in October 1998, Merck sent confirmation of the “first order.” Merck then met with a Weider competitor. Merck contacted Weider in January 1999, asking whether its purchase order was still “active.” Weider sent confirmation that the parties had mutually cancelled Weider’s “existing order for [MTHF].” Merck filed its 168 patent application, including claim 4 (MTHF), in 2000; the patent issued in 2002. In a 2013 infringement suit concerning Abbreviated New Drug Applications, the court held that claim 4 was not anticipated, obvious, or invalid for lack of adequate written description and was not invalid under the on-sale bar. Although the court determined that MTHF was ready for patenting by September 1998, it concluded that there had been no invalidating commercial offer for sale or sale, because Merck’s fax did not include “important safety and liability terms.” The Federal Circuit reversed. Merck’s September 1998, offer to sell MTHF was a premature commercial exploitation of its invention. View "Merck & Cie v. Watson Labs., Inc." on Justia Law

Cordua owns and operates five restaurants branded as “Churrascos,” the first of which opened in 1988. The restaurants serve South American dishes, including grilled meats; the menu describes chargrilled “Churrasco Steak” as “our signature.”.Cordua obtained the 321 registration for the service mark CHURRASCOS (in standard character format) in 2008, for use in connection with “restaurant and bar services; catering.” In 2011, Cordua filed a trademark application, seeking protection of the stylized form of CHURRASCOS for use in connection with “Bar and restaurant services; Catering.” The trademark examiner rejected the application as merely descriptive and on the basis that “the applied-for mark is generic for applicant’s services,” barring registration under Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1).. The examiner concluded that the term “churrascos” “refer[s] to beef or grilled meat more generally” and that the term “identifies a key characteristic or feature of the restaurant services, namely, the type of restaurant.” The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board agreed and held that Cordua’s underlying 321 Registration had no bearing on whether the stylized form of CHURRASCOS was generic. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the stylized form of CHURRASCOS generic as applied to restaurant services and, therefore, trademark-ineligible View "In re: Cordua Restaurants, Inc." on Justia Law

Stryker’s 243 patent concerns a socket assembly used in prosthetic hip implants. The patent addresses three major components involved: a shell member and a bearing member, which together replace the socket (technically the acetabulum) part of the pelvis bone, and the femoral component, the ball-shaped end of the thigh bone that marries with the socket. The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement following claim construction. The Federal Circuit upheld the construction of “relative location” claim language to require that “the recess is essentially midway along the taper such that the effectiveness of each is not compromised” and to require that “the internal taper of the shell mates with the external taper of a metallic securing member (i.e. sleeve) secured to and separate from the bearing member,” essentially requiring the presence of a sleeve in between the shell and the bearing, for the taper type of securement. The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying its local rules to preclude Stryker from arguing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. View "Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc." on Justia Law

Enfish’s 604 and 775 patents are directed to an innovative logical model for a computer database. A logical model is a model of data for a computer database explaining how the various elements of information are related to one another. A logical model generally results in the creation of particular tables of data, but it does not describe how the bits and bytes of those tables are arranged in physical memory devices. Contrary to conventional logical models, the patented logical model includes all data entities in a single table, with column definitions provided by rows in that same table. In Enfrish’s suit against Microsoft, alleging infringement, the district court found all claims invalid as ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101, some claims invalid as anticipated under section 102, and one claim not infringed. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect to section 101, finding that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, and vacated as to section 102, finding that the “pivot table” feature of the prior art Excel product does not contain the “self-referential” feature of the claims. The court affirmed the finding of non-infringement. View "Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

Lal was appointed as a distinguished consultant at the Centers for Disease Control, a component of the Department of Health and Human Services, in the excepted service under 42 U.S.C. 209(f), which provides that consultants “may be appointed without regard to the civil-service laws.” The agency understood this to mean that Lal was not subject to the statutory due process requirements of the civil-service laws under title 5 of the United States Code, and terminated her employment without providing notice of the termination or a right to respond, as would ordinarily be required by the civil-service laws. The Merit Systems Protection Board concluded that section 209(f) deprived it of jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit reversed. While section 209(f) placed Lal into the excepted service, it did not exempt her from the Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 1990, which provide appeal rights to certain excepted service employees, 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(C). View "Lal v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law