Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

From 2003-2008, Cahill did information-technology work for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as an independent contractor. In 2011, the agency hired him as an employee, “to support Data Management activities,” including studies for which field workers use hand-held devices called “Pocket PCs” to collect data. In 2014, Cahill filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel, 5 U.S.C. 1214(a)(1)(A), alleging that agency officials had violated the whistleblower protections of 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A) by retaliating for his 2012 disclosures about agency practices, including that the Pocket PCs were outdated, had bad batteries, lost data, and presented data-entry problems. Cahill contended that he was treated differently after that meeting; that he was not invited to BCSB meetings, was discouraged from participating in projects to which he was assigned, was eventually placed on a Performance Action Plan; and that various supervisors treated him and evaluated him poorly. The Merit Systems Protection Board concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Cahill had not presented nonfrivolous allegations that his March 2012 disclosure was known to at least one of the agency officials he charged with taking the challenged personnel actions. The Federal Circuit​ reversed, finding that Cahill adequately alleged that at least one supervisor knew of his statement. View "Cahill v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

Illumina’s patent is directed to a method of labeling nucleotides in a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) strand. At the request of IBS, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8 of the patent, on the basis that they were invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103. The Board found that IBS failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating the obviousness of the challenged claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Board’s judgment was supported by substantial evidence. View "Intelligent Bio-Sys, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd." on Justia Law

Nguyen, a U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Supervisory Examiner, received a Notice of Proposed Reduction in Grade to Patent Examiner, alleging that she had violated rules prohibiting nepotism in attempting to prevent her son, a probationary examiner, from being fired. Nguyen received her yearly performance review, which reflected a reduced rating. Nguyen discussed with her supervisor, Banks, the possibility of resigning. Believing that Nguyen had resigned, Banks ordered that technicians collect Nguyen’s government-supplied laptop. Nguyen objected and sent an email to Banks, stating that she felt “forced . . . to resign.” Banks and another supervisor stopped by Nguyen’s office and assured her that “[a]s we stated multiple times today, the decision of whether to resign or stay is completely up to you.” Banks ordered that Nguyen’s access to computer supervisory functions be revoked, pending her grade reduction. Nguyen went to human resources to pick up retirement papers and sent Wallace emails offering to drop all appeal rights in exchange for a suspension instead of the grade reduction. Wallace was out of the office until the following Monday, one day after the reduction would be effective. Nguyen filed retirement papers that Friday, effective the next day, one day before her reduction would have gone into effect.. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal by the Merit Systems Protection Board. Nguyen failed to articulate a nonfrivolous argument that her retirement was involuntary. View "Nguyen v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

The Navy's Diego Garcia facility, a 10.5-square-acre Indian Ocean atoll, 1,800 miles east of Africa and 1,200 miles south of India, had no commercial or civilian infrastructure. In 2005, the Navy sought bids on a firm fixed-price contract for Diego Garcia support services, ranging from information technology to refuse collection. For contractor vehicles and equipment, “contractor-furnished fuel,” was to be provided by the Navy at the prevailing Department of Defense rate. DG21 submitted a bid and, for contractor-furnished fuel, arrived at “a significantly lower number of gallons than” reflected in the solicitation. DG21 indicated that if fuel rates varied from historical rates by 10% or more, it would request an equitable adjustment. The Navy clarified that the solicitation was fixed-price, “DG21 assumes the full risk of consumption and/or rate changes. Please price ... accordingly.” The Navy questioned the lack of an escalation clause. DG21 did not change its estimate or pricing, but removed the equitable adjustment reference. DG21’s $455,292,490 proposal was accepted. During the contract term, fuel prices rose dramatically, reaching a maximum of more than double the historical rate indicated in the solicitation. In 2011, DG21 requested an equitable adjustment, characterizing the fuel cost as a $1,171,475.90 contract “change” under FAR 52.243-4. The contracting officer and the Board of Contract Appeals rejected the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The cost increase was not a change to the contract triggering FAR 52.243-4; the contract allocated that risk to DG21. View "DG21, LLC v. Mabus" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Department of Commerce investigated imports of “certain activated carbon” from China by the largest volume exporters, Jacobi and CCT. Commerce determined that Huahui and Cherishmet and Shanxi were entitled to separate rates. In its third and final review in 2011, Commerce individually examined Jacobi and CCT. Cherishmet, Shanxi, and Huahui were assigned a separate rate. Huahui unsuccessfully requested individual examination as a voluntary respondent. Commerce determined that Jacobi and CCT, the individually examined respondents, were not dumping, and assigned them de minimis margins. Under 19 U.S.C. 1673d(c)(5), when all individually examined exporters are assigned de minimis margins, the “expected method” is to calculate the separate rate by taking the average of the de minimis margins assigned to the individually examined respondents. If following the expected method would not be feasible or would result in margins that would “not be reasonably reflective of potential dumping margins” for the separate respondents, Commerce may use “other reasonable methods.” Commerce determined that the expected method would result in margins that would not be "reasonably reflective" and calculated separate rates for Huahui, Cherishmet, and Shanxi, continuing to apply previously-assigned margins. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court in part, holding that Commerce’s use of prior margins was impermissible. Commerce failed to justify using the rate from the prior administrative review. View "Albemarle Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Heartland, an LLC organized and existing under Indiana law is headquartered in Indiana. Kraft, organized and existing under Delaware law, has its principal place of business in Illinois. Kraft filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware alleging that Heartland’s liquid water enhancer products infringe Kraft’s patents. Heartland moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or to transfer venue to the Southern District of Indiana. Heartland alleged that it is not registered to do business in Delaware, has no local presence there, has not entered into any supply contracts in Delaware or called on any accounts there to solicit sales, but admitted it ships orders of the accused products into Delaware. In 2013, these shipments, 44,707 cases of the product, generated at least $331,000 in revenue, and were about 2% of Heartland’s total sales of the accused products. The Magistrate Judge determined that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Heartland for claims involving the accused products and rejected Heartland’s arguments that 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. 1391 negated precedent governing venue for infringement suits. The district court denied Heartland’s motions. The Federal Circuit denied Heartland’s petition for mandamus to either dismiss or transfer the suit. View "In re: TC Heartland LLC" on Justia Law

Under the 1887 General Allotment Act and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, the U.S. is the trustee of Indian allotment land. A 1996 class action, filed on behalf of 300,000 Native Americans, alleged that the government had mismanaged their Individual Indian Money accounts by failing to account for billions of dollars from leases for oil extractions and logging. The litigation’s 2011 settlement provided for “historical accounting claims,” tied to that mismanagement, and “land administration claims” for individuals that held, on September 30, 2009, an ownership interest in land held in trust or restricted status, claiming breach of trust and fiduciary mismanagement of land, oil, natural gas, mineral, timber, grazing, water and other resources. Members of the land administration class who failed to opt out were deemed to have waived any claims within the scope of the settlement. The Claims Resolution Act of 2010 ratified the settlement and funded it with $3.4 billion, The court provided notice, including of the opt-out right. Challenges to the opt-out and notice provisions were rejected. Indian allotees with interests in the North Dakota Fort Berthold Reservation, located on the Bakken Oil Shale (contiguous deposits of oil and natural gas), cannot lease their oil-and-gas interests unless the Secretary approves the lease as “in the best interest of the Indian owners,” 122 Stat. 620 (1998). In 2013, allotees sued, alleging that, in 2006-2009, a company obtained Fort Berthold allotment leases at below-market rates, then resold them for a profit of $900 million. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government, holding that the allotees had forfeited their claims by failing to opt out of the earlier settlement. View "Two Shields v. United States" on Justia Law

Sneed, who served on active duty 1964-1968, suffered service-connected disabilities. In 2001, Sneed suffered a spinal cord contusion from a fall, leaving him quadriplegic. In 2003, he died of smoke inhalation while living in a home for paralyzed veterans. His widow sought dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, alleging that Sneed’s service-connected spondylosis and spinal stenosis contributed to quadriplegia and that his service-connected PTSD and hearing loss prevented him from exiting during the fire. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed denial,mailing notice on April 5. Sneed’s notice of appeal was due 120 days after that mailing. On April 13, Sneed contacted attorney Eagle, requesting representation. According to Sneed, at the request of Eagle’s secretary, she transmitted case materials to and had oral communications with that office. On August 2, Sneed received a letter from Eagle, stating that the claim “does not meet the criteria,” declining representation, and stating that notice of appeal was due "no later than August 5.” The correct deadline was August 3. Several lawyers declined her case. Sneed filed notice on September 1, explaining her circumstances. The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. On remand, Sneed argued attorney abandonment, warranting equitable tolling. The Veterans Court held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that equitable tolling was not warranted absent an agreement between Eagle and Sneed and that Sneed did not act diligently. View "Sneed v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Mankes’s patent claims methods for managing a reservation system that divides inventory between a local server and a remote Internet server. Mankes sued Vivid Seats and Fandango, alleging infringement by their Internet-based reservation systems, in conjunction with the operation of local systems by movie theaters and other entertainment venues. No one person performs all of the steps of the claims, so Mankes’s case depended on establishing “divided infringement.” At the time, the law relating to divided infringement was under reconsideration. In 2014, the Supreme Court held that divided-infringement liability requires some person to be liable for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(a). In 2015, the district court concluded that Mankes’s allegations were insufficient to establish direct infringement and granted defendants judgments on the pleadings. Vivid Seats sought attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 285. The court denied the request, finding the case not exceptional. The Federal Circuit vacated in light of developments since the Court’s Akamai decision, broadening the circumstances in which others’ acts may be attributed to an accused infringer to support direct-infringement liability for divided infringement. Attribution is proper in a joint-enterprise setting. The district court’s rulings were based on the earlier, narrower standard. Mankes made reasonable arguments for adjustment of legal standards that the Federal Circuit had already granted en banc review to consider; his pursuit of the case was not unreasonable. View "Mankes v. Vivid Seats Ltd." on Justia Law

In antidumping proceedings involving nonmarket economy countries, such as China, the Tariff Act requires the Department of Commerce to calculate normal value of the subject merchandise based on surrogate values offered in a comparable market economy, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)(1). Commerce calculates the surrogate values by valuing certain “factors of production” used in producing the merchandise in a comparable market economy, essentially creating a hypothetical normal value for the merchandise that is uninfluenced by the nonmarket economy. In review of an anti-dumping duty order on certain steel threaded rod from China, Commerce selected Thailand as the surrogate country for China to value certain factors of production in calculating normal value for the subject merchandise. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the decision in accordance with law, not arbitrary or capricious, and supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected an argument that Commerce was bound by its past practice of using India as a surrogate. View "Jiaxing Bros. Fastener Co. v. United States" on Justia Law