Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

MPHJ’s 381 patent, entitled “Distributed Computer Architecture and Process for Virtual Copying,” issued in 2004 and discloses a method and system that “extend[] the notion of copying . . . to a process that involves paper being scanned from a device at one location and copied to a device at another location.” “What makes Virtual Copier as simple as its physical counterpart . . . is the fact that it replicates the identical motions that a user who is making a copy using a physical photocopier goes through.” On inter partes review initiated by HP, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found certain claims not patentable as anticipated and one claim (13) not unpatentable as anticipated. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting HP’s argument that the PTO should have reviewed claim 13 to determine whether it was unpatentable as obvious. The court stated that it cannot review the decision not to institute. View "HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC" on Justia Law

Cardpool sued for infringement of its patent entitled “System and Method for Brand Name Gift Card Exchange.” Plastic Jungle’s defenses were obviousness, 35 U.S.C. 103, and that the claimed subject matter was patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101. The court agreed as to ineligibility and dismissed. Before an appeal was decided, Cardpool sought ex parte reexamination, 35 U.S.C. 304. Before reexamination was completed, the Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion the judgment of ineligibility under section 101. The PTO issued a Reexamination Certificate in 2014, finding amended claims and new claims patentable under section 103. The Federal Circuit then granted rehearing, vacated its summary affirmance of section 101 invalidity, and remanded to the district court, but declined to vacate the invalidity judgment. The district court declined the parties’ joint request for vacatur of its invalidity determination, stating that no Article III court had reviewed the Cardpool reexamined claims. The Federal CIrcuit affirmed: the denial was within the district court’s discretion and the premise of the motion was both speculative and inaccurate. The district court’s final judgment as to an original group of claims does not automatically render that judgment res judicata as to new claims granted upon reexamination. View "Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc." on Justia Law

In the 1990s, AT&T obtained patents covering the transfer of packetized voice traffic between cellular base stations and switching centers. In 1996, AT&T assigned the patents to Lucent, which later assigned them to Avaya. In 2008, Avaya sold the patents for $2 million to High Point, reserving an interest in any proceeds obtained through litigation. High Point is based in Luxembourg and does not practice the patents. Within three days, High Point began sending demand letters asserting infringement, including to Sprint. Beginning in 1995, Sprint had built a network based on Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), which allows multiple cellphone users to share the same radio frequency. CDMA is now standard. AT&T (later Lucent) supplied equipment for the CDMA network. As that network grew, Sprint used unlicensed equipment from several vendors. In 2004, Sprint began upgrading the Lucent equipment with Motorola equipment. Motorola was not a party to the Lucent-Sprint licensing agreement. In 2006, Alcatel purchased Lucent. High Point claims that act terminated any license for Sprint’s use of Lucent equipment. Nortel began selling equipment to Sprint. Nortel was no longer a licensee to the patents. No infringement concerns were raised until 2008, when High Point sued, asserting violation of the licensing agreements and that the Sprint network operated through the combination of licensed and unlicensed equipment to facilitate the transmission of voice call traffic in an infringing manner. The Federal CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment, based on equitable estoppel. View "High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp." on Justia Law

In 2001, U.S. producers filed an antidumping petition against imports of steel wire rod of at least 5.00 mm diameter,stating “[m]ost of the industrial quality wire rod is produced and sold in 7/32 inch (5.5 mm) diameter, which is also the smallest cross-sectional diameter that is hot-rolled in significant commercial quantities.” The ITC issued a “material injury” determination for product “of approximately round cross section, 5.00 mm or more, but less than 19.00 mm.” The Department of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on imports from six countries, covering product with a diameter of “5.00 mm or more, but less than 19.00 mm.” After the order issued, Mexican companies manufactured and imported into the U.S. steel wire rod within a diameter of 4.75 mm. U.S. producers requested that Commerce investigate under 19 U.S.C. 1677. Commerce determined that 4.75 to 5.00 mm steel wire rod was a minor alteration of the subject merchandise and that its import constituted an affirmative circumvention of the order. The Trade Court remanded based on the literal scope of the order, finding the product was “commercially available” at the time of the original investigation. On remand, Commerce issued a redetermination of negative circumvention. The Trade Court remanded again, instructing Commerce to consider revisiting whether small-diameter rod was commercially available before issuance of the order. Commerce declined to do so. The Trade Court affirmed the negative circumvention determination. The Federal Circuit reversed: Commerce’s initial minor alteration determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Deacero S.A. DE C.V. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 authorized the Department of Energy (DOE) to contract with power utilities for a planned national nuclear waste disposal system, 42 U.S.C. 10222. Utilities were to pay into a Nuclear Waste Fund; the government was to dispose of their spent nuclear fuel beginning by January 31, 1998.. Under the Standard Contract, utilities must provide “preparation, packaging, required inspections, and loading activities necessary for the transportation … to the DOE facility.” DOE is responsible for “arrang[ing] for, and provid[ing], a cask(s) and all necessary transportation … to the DOE facility.” In 1983, System Fuels entered Standard Contracts concerning the Grand Gulf and Arkansas Nuclear One power stations. The government has yet to begin accepting spent nuclear fuel. System Fuels obtained damages for costs incurred through August 31, 2005 (Grand) and June 30, 2006 (Arkansas), including costs to construct Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) and later successfully sought damages for continued breach. The Claims Court denied costs incurred to load spent fuel into storage casks at the ISFSIs by first loading it into canisters, then loading those canisters into dry fuel storage casks and welding the casks closed. The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that under the Standard Contracts, DOE cannot accept any of the canistered fuel as is, so System Fuels will incur costs to unload the casks and canisters and to reload fuel into transportation casks if and when DOE performs. View "System Fuels, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

SimpleAir filed suit against Google in 2011, alleging that Google’s Cloud Messenger and Cloud to Device Messenger services its 914 patent. A jury determined none of the asserted claims were invalid, and that Google’s Cloud Messenger Services infringed each of the asserted claims. A jury awarded $85 million to SimpleAir. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the lower court erred in construing the claim term “a data channel” and “whether said devices are online or offline from a data channel associated with each device,” and that no reasonable jury could find infringement under the correct constructions. View "SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc'ns, AB" on Justia Law

GeoTag’s patent claims systems and methods of searching online information within a geographically and topically organized database. It describes a preferred embodiment that organizes websites and files within a directory-like structure of folders categorized by geography and topic. In that embodiment, an Internet user may navigate to a folder labeled for a particular geographic area and then conduct a topical search within that area, such as for “information about specific goods and services in the geographic location.” Google sought a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid and not infringed by Google’s AdWords platform. The court held that AdWords does not practice the “dynamically replicated” limitation of the patent because it does not search a narrow geographic area and automatically add results from a broader area; AdWords conducts a broad search for “all responsive ads” and then “consecutively filters” results. Before the court entered summary judgment, GeoTag unsuccessfully moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the complaint did not establish a substantial controversy “of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant" declaratory judgment. The Federal Circuit upheld the claim construction and held that the court retained subject matter jurisdiction over GeoTag’s infringement counterclaims under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a), regardless of any flaw in Google’s complaint. View "Microsoft Corp. v. GeoTag, Inc." on Justia Law

Romag sells patented magnetic snap fasteners under its registered trademark. Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including small leather goods, manufactured by independent businesses. In 2002, the companies entered into an agreement for use of ROMAG fasteners in Fossil products. Fossil instructed its authorized manufacturers to purchase ROMAG fasteners from Romag licensee Wing Yip. Fossil’s authorized manufacturer, Superior, purchased tens of thousands of ROMAG fasteners from Wing Yip from 2002-2008. In 2008-2010, Superior purchased substantially fewer fasteners. In 2010, Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags contained counterfeit fasteners. Romag sued, alleging patent infringement, trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and violation of Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act. Romag sought a preliminary injunction on November 23, three days before “Black Friday,” the highest-volume U.S. shopping day. The motion was granted on November 30. In 2014, a jury found Fossil liable; awarded a reasonable royalty of $51,052.14 for patent infringement; and, for trademark infringement, made an advisory award of $90,759.36 of Fossil’s profits under an unjust enrichment theory, and $6,704,046.00 of profits under a deterrence theory. Despite its deterrence award, the jury found that infringement was not willful. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Romag’s delay in bringing suit until just before “Black Friday” constituted laches, its reduction of the reasonable royalty award by 18%, and its holding that Romag was not entitled to an award of profits because the infringement was not willful. View "Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc." on Justia Law

Clare sued Chrysler for infringement, based on Chrysler’s RamBox pickup truck storage system. RamBox is plainly visible and is stamped ‘RAMBOX’ in large lettering. Clare’s patents purport to add storage “without altering the external appearance of the bed and without significant reduction in the carrying capacity.” Storage area is in the side of the bed “adjacent [to] the wheel well area, and along the length of the bed.” The external side panel is used to access the storage. The only visible modifications to the external side panel are two vertical lines where the side panel is cut. The hinge is out-of-sight on the inside of the side panel; the latch and lock are out-of-sight on the interior side of the bed, so that “one would not readily recognize the modification to the bed ... those with intent to steal tools, etc. would not recognize the hidden storage.” The Federal Circuit affirmed construction of the “external appearance limitations,” agreeing that no reasonable juror could find that RamBox, with its numerous and obvious visible distinctions, is not obvious from the outward appearance of the truck, and summary judgment of invalidity on the remaining claims, for failure under the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112. View "Clare v. Chrysler Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

SUFI invested money to build and operate telephone systems at Air Force bases and was to earn returns for 15 years from per-call charges, to be shared with the Air Force. The Air Force breached the contract by allowing contractually prohibited diversions of calls from the SUFI phones. SUFI brought claims to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), which awarded $2.8 million (plus interest) on one group of claims and $4.6 million (plus interest) on another. SUFI appealed the award on the second group of claims, invoking the standards of review set by the Wunderlich Act 41 U.S.C. 321 (repealed 2011). The Claims Court granted SUFI relief. The Federal Circuit remanded, holding that the Claims Court had not properly applied that standard. ASBCA conducted remand proceedings and awarded roughly $113 million (plus interest). SUFI promptly accepted the decision. The Claims Court declined the government’s request for review, stating, “[u]nder the Wunderlich Act, only the contractor has the right to appeal from a Board decision.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating: “The new decision is no less the position of the United States just because it is not the initial decision.” View "SUFI Network Servs., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law