Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Before enactment of the 2008 Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act, if a veteran seeking DVA benefits died while his claim was pending, the veteran’s survivor could not take the place of the veteran and continue prosecuting the claim. The survivor had to file a claim for accrued benefits, 38 U.S.C. 5121, proceeding from the beginning of the process, regardless of how far the veteran’s claim had progressed. The Act, 38 U.S.C. 5121A, authorizes eligible survivors to be “substituted as the claimant for the purposes of processing the claim to completion.” The Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to regulations intended to implement the Act, which require that a request to substitute be filed with the agency of original jurisdiction (DVA regional office) within one year of the claimant’s death; the prospective substitute is required to submit evidence of his eligibility to substitute; and, if the claimant died while his appeal was pending before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Board must dismiss the appeal without prejudice so that the agency of original jurisdiction can address the substitution request. If the agency of original jurisdiction grants the request to substitute, then the case returns to the same place on the Board’s docket that it held at the time of the veteran’s death. View "Nat'l Org. of Veterans Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Reddick was employed as an FDIC “Investigation Specialist” by an initial two-year term appointment, set to expire in September 2012. In April 2012, the FDIC offered him an extension of the initial term for an additional two years. The offer stated that the “extended employment” would be “effective [September], 2012” and that the “extended appointment is subject to the conditions of employment [included in the initial appointment offer] and subject to your continued successful performance.” Reddick accepted the offer days after receipt. The FDIC revoked the extension offer in August 2012. Reddick filed a grievance on the theory that the revocation of the offer was an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. 7512 and that he was entitled to procedural protections that the FDIC did not provide him. The matter was referred to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found the extension offer to be conditioned on Reddick’s “satisfactory work performance” and that the revocation was supported by sufficient justification. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The extension offer was still revocable by the FDIC even after acceptance by Reddick; it never matured into an effective extension, so Reddick was not “removed.” View "Reddick v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Wi-LAN’s 802 patent concerns a wireless data communication technique called “MultiCode Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum” (MC-DSSS). WiLAN asserts that the patented technique is embodied in several modern wireless communications standards. In 2011, Wi-LAN sued Apple and other technology companies for infringing two claims of the 802 patent by manufacturing and selling products complying with various wide-area communication standards. A jury found that Apple did not infringe and that the claims are invalid. The district court denied Wi-LAN’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial with respect to infringement, but it granted Wi-LAN’s motion for JMOL of no invalidity. The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict of non-infringement as supported by substantial evidence, but reversed the finding of no invalidity. The JMOL determination of no invalidity was based on a post-verdict reconstruction of the claims that went far beyond clarifying a meaning inherent in the construction or making plain what should have been obvious to the jury. The post-verdict reconstruction altered the scope of the original construction and undermined Apple’s invalidity case post-verdict. View "Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

Landowners filed a class action suit challenging the federal Surface Transportation Board’s approval of King County using a Burlington Northern Railroad corridor as a public trail, pursuant the National Trails Systems Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The Claims Court approved a $110 million settlement agreement and an award to class counsel of approximately $35 million in attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. Two class members challenged the approval and award. The Federal Circuit vacated, noting that the government also challenged the approval, claiming that class counsel failed to disclose information necessary to allow class members to assess the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed settlement. The government had standing to raise its challenge under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act (URA), 42 U.S.C. 4654(c) and its arguments were not barred by waiver or estoppel.The Claims Court erred in approving a settlement agreement where class counsel withheld critical information not provided in the mailed notice to class members, but which had been produced and was readily available. Although a “common fund” exists in this case, the URA attorney fee provision provides for reasonable fees and preempts application of the common fund doctrine. View "Haggart v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Urbanski filed the 614 application, entitled “Protein and Fiber Hydrolysates” and is directed to a method of enzymatic hydrolysis of soy fiber, such that the product has a reduced water holding capacity suitable for use as food additives. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of certain claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the determination that the claims would have been obvious over cited references relating to enzymatic hydrolysis of dietary fibers, which are readily combinable. View "In re: Urbanski" on Justia Law

Cogburn served in the Army, 1968-1971, including 12 months in Vietnam. In 1974, Cogburn sought VA disability compensation and pension benefits based on a severe nervous condition. A 1975 denial of his pension claim did not address the disability claim. He did not appeal. In 1983, Cogburn again sought disability compensation and pension benefits. He was diagnosed with Post-PTSD after a VA examination that failed to connect Cogburn’s PTSD to stressors from military service; the VA granted a non-service connection pension but denied service connection. In 1985, the Board of Veterans’ Appeal concluded that the record did not identify any in-service traumatic events, noting that Cogburn repeatedly failed to attend VA examinations to determine if service-connected stressors caused his PTSD. The Board determined that “the preponderance of the medical evidence suggests that the veteran’s post service emotional and adjustment difficulties are manifestations of schizophrenia.” There was no opportunity for further review. In 2002, Cogburn claimed that his 1974 disability compensation claim was never adjudicated. The RO determined that the claim was adjudicated as a claim for PTSD and had been implicitly denied in the 1985 decision. In 2012, on remand, the Board affirmed the finding of implicit denial. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed; the implicit denial rule applies to both formal and informal claims. Its use does not violate the VA due process regulation's notice provision.. View "Cogburn v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Ford imported automotive goods and paid duties. Ford later claimed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) preference on those imports and sought a refund of duties under 19 U.S.C. 1520(d). The parties relied on a June 1997 entry as a test case. Ford was required to file certificates of origin within one year of importation, but did not file the certificate until November 1998 and was unable to secure a written waiver. Customs denied Ford’s claim, then denied Ford’s protest. The Federal Circuit rejected Ford’s argument that Customs had an affirmative obligation under its regulations to accept Ford’s untimely filing, but remanded for determination of whether traditional refund claims, not processed through the electronic “reconciliation” program, should enjoy the same waiver benefit available through that program. On remand, Customs explained that the reconciliation program (19 U.S.C. 1484(b)) is a procedural means for processing import entries, including an ability to claim the substantive duty refund benefit under section 1520(d), and has statutory safeguards that permit Customs to remedy mistakes and misconduct in awarding NAFTA duty free treatment. Many reconciliation program safeguards are not available in the traditional post-entry duty refund process. The reconciliation program provides added confidence in the legitimacy of the importer’s claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed that Customs’ interpretation of the statutory scheme was reasonable. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

STAR owns a patent that describes methods for generating smoke that “enables the presence and location of leaks in a fluid system (e.g. the evaporative or brake system of a motor vehicle) to be accurately and visually detected depending upon rate of the air flow through the fluid system under test and whether smoke escapes from the system.” Redline sought inter partes review. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board denied Redline’s motion to submit supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. 42.123(a) and found Redline failed to show that claims of the patent would have been obvious. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board properly found that prior art, taken together, generate smoke via differing methods and thus, could not be combined to achieve the claimed invention recited in claims of STAR’s patent. View "Redline Detection, LLC v. STAR Envirotech, Inc." on Justia Law

In a wireless system, devices communicate with fixed “base stations” according to “protocols,” which are standardized procedures that govern how data exchanged between devices is formatted, ordered, maintained, and transmitted. Effective wireless communication requires that the transmitting device and the receiving device follow the same protocol. Commil’s patent covers a method of providing faster, more reliable handoffs of mobile devices from one base station to another as a mobile device moves throughout a network area. Cisco is a major supplier of WiFi access points and controllers. A jury found that Cisco infringed the patent and that the specified claims were not invalid as indefinite, for lack of enablement, or as lacking adequate written description. The Federal Circuit held that the district court gave the jury a legally erroneous instruction concerning indirect infringement and that Cisco’s evidence of a good-faith belief of invalidity could negate the requisite intent for induced infringement. The Supreme Court vacated. On remand, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding that Cisco’s devices, when used, perform the “running” step of the asserted claims, precluding liability under either of Commil’s direct or inducement theories, View "Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc." on Justia Law