Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bayou Grande Coffee Roasting Company applied to register the trademark KAHWA for use in connection with cafés and coffee shops. The trademark examiner refused registration on the grounds that KAHWA was generic or merely descriptive, relying on two meanings: one, that KAHWA allegedly means “coffee” in Arabic, and two, that it refers to a specific type of Kashmiri green tea. The examiner also invoked the doctrine of foreign equivalents, which tests foreign words for genericness and descriptiveness by translating them into English.After Bayou responded, arguing that KAHWA does not mean coffee in Arabic and that the Kashmiri green tea meaning is not relevant to American cafés and coffee shops, the examiner maintained refusals on both grounds. Bayou requested reconsideration, and the examiner continued to refuse registration, reiterating both rationales. Bayou appealed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the refusal solely on the basis of the Kashmiri green tea meaning, without addressing the Arabic coffee meaning.On further appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Bayou contended that the Board’s findings of genericness and mere descriptiveness were unsupported by substantial evidence, and also challenged reliance on the doctrine of foreign equivalents. The Federal Circuit held that there was no evidence showing any café or coffee shop in the United States has ever sold kahwa, and thus KAHWA cannot be generic or merely descriptive for cafés and coffee shops. The court also concluded that the doctrine of foreign equivalents does not apply because KAHWA has a well-established English meaning as Kashmiri green tea. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, holding that KAHWA is registrable for the identified services. View "In Re BAYOU GRANDE COFFEE ROASTING CO. " on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Coda Development s.r.o., Coda Innovations s.r.o., and Frantisek Hrabal, brought claims against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and Robert Benedict, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets related to self-inflating tire technology and seeking correction of inventorship on a Goodyear patent. Coda claimed that Goodyear misappropriated five specific trade secrets involving technical solutions, testing data, and optimal component placement for this technology. The alleged misappropriation stemmed from communications and interactions between the parties concerning this technology.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the case proceeded to a jury trial on the trade secret claims. The jury found in favor of Coda, concluding that Goodyear misappropriated five trade secrets and awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Following the trial, the district court granted Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, determining that the asserted trade secrets were either not sufficiently definite, not secret, not used by Goodyear, or not adequately conveyed to Goodyear, and thus set aside the jury’s verdict. The court also denied Coda’s claim seeking correction of inventorship on Goodyear’s patent, after considering the parties’ briefing in lieu of a bench trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could have found that all elements required for trade secret misappropriation were met for any of the asserted trade secrets. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the denial of the correction of inventorship claim, concluding that Coda failed to provide evidence that would entitle it to such relief. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O. v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY" on Justia Law

A manufacturer of aircraft engines contracted with both the federal government and commercial clients. The contracts at issue were cost-plus agreements, requiring the government to reimburse the manufacturer for a share of overhead costs, calculated under federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), specifically CAS 418. The manufacturer used unique “collaboration agreements” with suppliers, involving payments tied to program revenues rather than direct part costs. A central dispute arose over whether certain costs, known as “Drag”—representing amounts paid by collaborators to compensate the manufacturer for shared expenses—should be included in the pool of overhead costs to be allocated, and over how to measure the material costs of parts for allocation purposes.After protracted disagreements and administrative decisions dating back to the 1990s, a contracting officer in 2013 determined that the manufacturer’s accounting violated CAS 418 and that Drag amounts should be excluded from the overhead pool. The manufacturer appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The Board held in part for each side: it found the Drag agreement between the parties valid, so Drag need not be excluded, but rejected the manufacturer’s method for calculating material costs, settling on a “net revenue share” approach. The Board remanded to the parties to negotiate quantum (the amount owed), retaining jurisdiction if they failed to agree.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision on the material cost allocation base (CAS 418 Claim) because no final determination of quantum had been made. However, the court found the Board’s decision on the Drag Claim was final and reviewable. The Federal Circuit held that the Drag agreement was unenforceable against the government because it did not comply with required federal regulations for advance agreements, and therefore reversed the Board’s ruling on that point. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PRATT & WHITNEY" on Justia Law

Russian producers of phosphate fertilizers were investigated by the U.S. Department of Commerce after a domestic company alleged that the Russian government was providing subsidies, specifically through the provision of natural gas at prices below market value. Commerce’s investigation focused on whether these subsidies were both “specific” to an industry or enterprise and constituted a financial benefit through the sale of gas at less than adequate remuneration. During the investigation, Commerce requested and reviewed data from Russian authorities and Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas supplier, about the volume and pricing of natural gas provided to various Russian industries. The evidence showed that the agrochemical industry, which includes fertilizer producers, was the largest industrial consumer of natural gas, though some non-industrial sectors consumed more in total.Commerce determined that the subsidy was “de facto specific” because the agrochemical industry was a predominant industrial user of natural gas. It also found that natural gas was provided at less than adequate remuneration, using a third-tier benchmark analysis that relied on international energy price data, after concluding that Russian market prices were distorted by government intervention and not set by market principles. Commerce’s final determination imposed countervailing duties on Russian phosphate fertilizer imports.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s decisions and upheld both the specificity and pricing determinations, remanding only on unrelated issues. Upon remand, Commerce reaffirmed its conclusions, and the Trade Court entered final judgment in support of the agency’s findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s judgment. The court held that Commerce has reasonable flexibility in determining the appropriate comparator group for the “predominant user” analysis and that its approach in this case was reasonable. The court also upheld Commerce’s less-than-adequate-remuneration analysis and rejected arguments that further adjustments were required by statute. The judgment sustaining the countervailing duties was affirmed. View "MOSAIC COMPANY v. US " on Justia Law

Adnexus, Inc. owns a patent for a system and method of online advertising that aims to deliver targeted advertisements to users without overwhelming them with irrelevant content. Adnexus alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc.'s Lead Ads product infringed at least one claim of this patent. Specifically, Adnexus argued that Lead Ads retrieves a user profile containing delivery method preferences and other information, which matches the patent’s claim requirement. Adnexus attached detailed claim charts and a preliminary infringement analysis to its amended complaint to show how Lead Ads purportedly meets each element of the asserted claim.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Meta moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Adnexus failed to plausibly allege that Lead Ads met the claim limitation requiring retrieval of a user profile containing delivery method preferences. The district court agreed with Meta, finding that “contact information” was distinct from “delivery method preferences” and that Adnexus’s allegations were insufficient. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, as Adnexus had already amended its pleading once. The court also dismissed indirect and willful infringement claims, and found Adnexus estopped from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in implicitly construing the claim term “delivery method preferences” against Adnexus, the non-moving party, without providing Adnexus an opportunity to address claim construction. The Federal Circuit found that Adnexus’s amended complaint, when taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Adnexus, plausibly alleged infringement of the relevant claim limitation. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ADNEXUS INC. v. META PLATFORMS, INC. " on Justia Law

Blue Sky The Color of Imagination, LLC imported a spiral-bound paper product that combines monthly calendars, weekly planning pages, note sections, and additional pages for goals and contacts. Blue Sky labeled this item a “weekly/monthly planning calendar,” while the government referred to it as a “planner.” The product was designed for users to schedule future appointments and events.Initially, Customs and Border Protection classified this product under subheading 4820.10.40.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), as “[o]ther” stationery items. Blue Sky protested, seeking classification under heading 4910 as a “calendar,” but Customs denied the protest. Blue Sky then filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade. The Trade Court granted summary judgment, rejecting both parties’ proposed classifications and instead classified the product as a “diary” under subheading 4820.10.20.10. The Trade Court reasoned that “diary” covers both retrospective journals and prospective scheduling devices, and found Blue Sky’s product fit this category.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Trade Court’s summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit found that the Trade Court’s definition of “diary” conflicted with the controlling precedent set in Mead Corp. v. United States, which held that a “diary” is retrospective, not prospective. Because Blue Sky’s product is used to note future appointments, the Federal Circuit concluded that it cannot be classified as a “diary.” The court reversed the Trade Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the Trade Court to reconsider the proper classification under the HTSUS. View "BLUE SKY THE COLOR OF IMAGINATION, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

The claimant served in the U.S. Navy and, upon his voluntary separation in 1992, received a lump sum Special Separation Benefit (SSB) under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a. Many years later, in 2017, he was awarded VA disability compensation with entitlement to a total disability rating, effective from late 2016. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) notified him that it would withhold a portion of his monthly disability benefits to recoup the SSB payment, which the claimant contested, arguing that SSB payments are not subject to recoupment and that the relevant statutory authority did not apply to his situation.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that the VA acted properly in withholding his disability compensation to recoup the SSB payment. The claimant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision. He sought reconsideration, asserting that the court had relied upon the wrong statutory provision. The Veterans Court granted reconsideration, but in its new decision, it again held that the relevant statute required recoupment of his SSB payment from his VA disability compensation, and affirmed the Board’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that 10 U.S.C. § 1174(h)(2) applies to SSB payments received under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a, requiring such payments to be deducted from VA disability compensation. The court rejected the claimant’s alternative statutory interpretation, finding it inconsistent with the statutory text and structure. The court also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction arguments that were not addressed by the Veterans Court. The judgment was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "COLAGE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a patent for a type of cancer treatment called an antibody-drug conjugate (ADC), which combines an antibody, a cytotoxic drug, and a linker protein. The patent at issue claimed a particular kind of linker, a tetrapeptide consisting only of glycine and phenylalanine amino acids. Seagen, the patent holder, sued Daichii Sankyo and AstraZeneca, alleging that their ADC product, Enhertu, infringed claims of this patent. Notably, Enhertu contains the specific tetrapeptide sequence described in the patent. The patent’s priority was claimed from a 2004 application, though the sequence in question had not been expressly disclosed in that earlier filing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial. The jury found the asserted patent claims valid, not invalid for lack of written description or enablement, and determined that the defendants had willfully infringed. Damages exceeding $41 million were awarded to Seagen. The district court denied the defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), upholding the jury’s verdict and entering final judgment for Seagen.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in denying JMOL because the original 2004 application did not provide adequate written description support for the claimed subgenus of Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides. The Federal Circuit found that the patent specification failed to demonstrate that the inventors possessed the claimed invention as of the 2004 filing date, and that the patent was not enabled because a skilled artisan would need to engage in undue experimentation to make and use the full scope of the claimed ADCs. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, found the patent invalid, and vacated the jury’s findings of infringement and damages. View "SEAGEN INC. v. DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY, LTD. " on Justia Law

The case involves Gesture Technology Partners, LLC, which owns U.S. Patent No. 7,933,431 related to methods and apparatus for rapid TV camera and computer-based sensing of objects and human input, usable in devices such as handhelds, cars, and video games. After Samsung Electronics requested an ex parte reexamination of the patent, the United States Patent and Trademark Office initiated proceedings. Concurrently, two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings were filed against the same patent by Unified Patents LLC and other entities, resulting in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board invalidating most claims of the patent.After the Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued final written decisions in both IPRs, Gesture Technology Partners petitioned the Patent Office to terminate the ex parte reexamination, arguing that Samsung, as a party to the IPR, was estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) from maintaining further proceedings on grounds that could have been raised in the IPRs. The Patent Office denied the petition, holding that the estoppel provision did not apply to ongoing ex parte reexaminations. Subsequently, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claims 11 and 13 as anticipated by a prior patent, Liebermann. Gesture appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) does not apply to ongoing ex parte reexamination proceedings, as the requester does not “maintain” the proceeding—the Patent Office does. The court also affirmed the Board’s finding that the Liebermann patent anticipates claims 11 and 13. Furthermore, it rejected the argument that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the patent had expired, citing continued rights to past damages. The court affirmed the Board’s decision as to claims 11 and 13 and dismissed the appeal as to the previously invalidated claims. View "In Re GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC " on Justia Law

Akamai Technologies, Inc. filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement regarding two patents owned by AMHC, Inc. and its subsidiary, MediaPointe, Inc. These patents describe systems and methods for efficiently routing streamed media content over the Internet using an “intelligent distribution network.” After Akamai initiated litigation, MediaPointe counterclaimed for infringement, and Akamai further sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity.During claim construction, the district court issued an order finding that certain claims containing the terms “optimal” and “best” were invalid for indefiniteness. For the remaining asserted claims, the district court granted Akamai summary judgment of noninfringement. The court excluded key portions of MediaPointe’s expert testimony as untimely, and also found that, even considering that testimony, MediaPointe’s evidence did not create a genuine dispute regarding infringement. Specifically, the court determined that the accused Akamai system did not meet the required limitation of “receiving an initial request for media content” as understood in the context of the patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed both the invalidity and noninfringement judgments. The court held that the “optimal” and “best” claim terms were indefinite because the intrinsic record failed to provide objective boundaries for determining what is “optimal” or “best.” The court also concluded that, even with the excluded expert testimony included, MediaPointe had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. MEDIAPOINTE, INC. " on Justia Law