Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kevin Steele, a Marine veteran, filed an original claim in 1991 for a head injury sustained during service, which he attributed to a 1980 training incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) examiner noted that Steele experienced occasional headaches as a residual of the head injury but deemed them non-disabling. The VA Regional Office (RO) granted service connection for the scar on Steele's scalp but did not explicitly address the headaches in its decision. Steele did not appeal this decision.In 2013, Steele filed a new claim for various conditions, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), and was awarded a 50% disability rating effective from March 6, 2013. In 2016, he filed a claim for service connection for headaches, which the RO granted with an effective date of October 14, 2015. The Board of Veterans Appeals later adjusted the effective date to March 6, 2013. Steele appealed, arguing that his 1991 claim for headaches remained open and should entitle him to an earlier effective date.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, holding that Steele's 1991 claim for headaches was implicitly denied and thus finally adjudicated in 1991. The court applied the implicit denial rule, which provides that a claim can be deemed denied if the VA's decision provides sufficient notice that the claim was considered and rejected. The court found that the 1991 RO decision and notice letter provided Steele with reasonable notice that his claim for headaches was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, agreeing that the Board and the Veterans Court did not legally err in their application of the implicit denial rule. The court held that the reasons provided for the explicit denial of Steele's head injury claim in 1991 were sufficient to implicitly deny the related claim for headaches, thus closing off the earlier filing date. View "STEELE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Fintiv, Inc. sued PayPal Holdings, Inc. for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, asserting four patents related to a cloud-based transaction system. The district court determined that certain claim terms in the asserted patents were subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and held the asserted claims invalid as indefinite.The district court found that the payment-handler terms in the patents invoked § 112 ¶ 6 because they recited function without sufficient structure. The court noted that the terms were drafted in a format consistent with traditional means-plus-function limitations and merely replaced the term "means" with "payment handler" or "payment handler service." The court also found that the specifications of the asserted patents failed to disclose adequate structure corresponding to the claimed functions, rendering the claims indefinite.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's indefiniteness determination. The Federal Circuit agreed that the payment-handler terms invoked § 112 ¶ 6 because they recited function without sufficient structure. The court also agreed that the specifications did not disclose any algorithm to perform the recited functions, and thus, the claims were indefinite. The Federal Circuit concluded that the payment-handler terms were no more than a "black box recitation of structure" and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have understood how to implement the recited functions based on the specifications. View "FINTIV, INC. v. PAYPAL HOLDINGS, INC. " on Justia Law

PT Medisafe Technologies, a medical glove manufacturer, applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for registration of a color mark for use on medical examination gloves. The proposed mark was described as the color dark green (Pantone 3285 c) applied to the entire surface of chloroprene examination gloves. The PTO’s examining attorney found the color was not inherently distinctive and could not be registered without showing acquired distinctiveness. Medisafe attempted to prove acquired distinctiveness but was ultimately rejected by the examining attorney, who determined the mark was generic and had not acquired distinctiveness.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) reviewed the examining attorney’s decision. The Board applied a modified version of the H. Marvin Ginn test, tailored for color marks, as set out in Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Freud America, Inc. The Board defined the genus of goods as all chloroprene medical examination gloves and found the relevant public to include all purchasers of such gloves. The Board agreed with the examining attorney that the dark green color was common in the industry and could not identify a single source, thus deeming the mark generic. The Board also found Medisafe’s evidence of acquired distinctiveness unconvincing and affirmed the refusal to register the mark.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court affirmed the Board’s application of the Milwaukee test and found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s determination that the mark was generic. The court held that the dark green color was so common in the industry that it could not serve as a source indicator, making it ineligible for registration on either the principal or supplemental registers. The court did not address the issue of acquired distinctiveness, as a generic mark cannot acquire distinctiveness. View "In Re PT MEDISAFE TECHNOLOGIES " on Justia Law

Qualcomm Incorporated owned U.S. Patent No. 8,063,674, which relates to integrated circuit devices using multiple power supplies. Apple Inc. filed two petitions for inter partes review (IPR) challenging various claims of this patent as unpatentable due to obviousness. Each petition included a ground that relied on applicant admitted prior art (AAPA) in combination with other prior art patents. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) initially determined that the use of AAPA complied with 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), which allows IPR petitions to be based only on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications. Qualcomm appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that the PTAB misinterpreted § 311(b) because AAPA is not considered prior art consisting of patents or printed publications. The case was remanded for the PTAB to determine whether the AAPA in Apple's petitions formed the basis of the ground at issue in violation of § 311(b). On remand, the PTAB concluded that the AAPA did not form the basis of the ground because it was used in combination with prior art patents, thus complying with § 311(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB's decision and held that the PTAB erred in its interpretation of § 311(b). The court clarified that the statute's plain meaning does not permit AAPA to form the basis of an IPR ground, even if used in combination with prior art patents or printed publications. The court found that Apple's petitions expressly included AAPA in the basis of the ground, violating § 311(b). Consequently, the court reversed the PTAB's decision, determining that the challenged claims of the '674 patent are not unpatentable as obvious. View "QUALCOMM INCORPORATED v. APPLE INC. " on Justia Law

The case involves a breach of contract action brought by socially disadvantaged farmers against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) regarding Farm Service Agency (FSA) loans. The plaintiffs, Lester Bonner and Princess Williams, claimed that the USDA breached an express or implied-in-fact contract by failing to provide debt relief after the Inflation Reduction Act repealed a provision of the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) that mandated such relief.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege the formation of a contract, as they failed to demonstrate mutuality of intent, lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance, consideration, and a government representative with actual authority to bind the United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege mutuality of intent to contract, which is a threshold condition for contract formation. The court found that the language of ARPA § 1005, which directed the Secretary of Agriculture to provide payments, did not create a contractual obligation. The court also determined that the FSA-2601 form, which informed recipients of their eligibility for payment, did not demonstrate the government's intent to contract. The court concluded that the statutory grant of payment under ARPA was a gratuity and not a contractual right. Consequently, the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "BOYD v. US " on Justia Law

Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., and Marmen Energy Co. (collectively, “Marmen”) appealed the U.S. Court of International Trade’s (CIT) decision that sustained the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) final determination of a 4.94% dumping margin for utility-scale wind towers from Canada. Commerce had initiated an antidumping (AD) investigation in July 2019, and in June 2020, issued its final AD determination. Marmen challenged Commerce’s decision on three grounds: the weight-averaging of steel plate costs, the rejection of a USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation, and the use of the average-to-transaction (A-to-T) methodology based on Cohen’s d test.The CIT affirmed Commerce’s weight-averaging of Marmen’s steel plate costs but remanded the case on the other two issues. Commerce again rejected the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation on remand, arguing it would double count an exchange-rate adjustment. Commerce also maintained its use of Cohen’s d test, despite concerns raised by the Federal Circuit in Stupp Corp. v. United States. The CIT sustained Commerce’s determination on both issues, leading to Marmen’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Commerce’s rejection of the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation was not supported by substantial evidence, as the proposed adjustment did not duplicate other adjustments and was reliable. The court also concluded that Commerce’s use of Cohen’s d test was unreasonable because the data did not meet the necessary assumptions of normal distribution, equal variability, and sufficient size. The court vacated Commerce’s calculated dumping margin and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MARMEN INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Dongkuk S&C Co., Ltd., a Korean producer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the United States Department of Commerce's final determination that its wind towers were being sold in the United States at less than fair value, resulting in an antidumping duty order. Commerce's investigation covered sales from July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019, and found that Dongkuk's sales were below normal value, leading to the imposition of antidumping duties.The Court of International Trade (CIT) initially remanded Commerce's decision to adjust Dongkuk's steel plate costs, questioning the analytical support for Commerce's determination. Commerce provided additional analysis on remand, demonstrating that the cost variations were due to the timing of steel plate purchases rather than the physical characteristics of the wind towers. The CIT subsequently sustained Commerce's remand redetermination and upheld the choice of surrogate financial data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that Commerce's determination to adjust Dongkuk's steel plate costs was supported by substantial evidence, as the cost variations were unrelated to the physical characteristics of the wind towers. Additionally, the court upheld Commerce's use of SeAH Steel Holdings Corporation's consolidated financial statement as a reasonable source of surrogate data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses, despite Dongkuk's preference for SeAH Steel Corporation's standalone financial data. The court found that Commerce's decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. View "DONGKUK S&C CO., LTD. v. US" on Justia Law

Target Corporation (Target) imported goods subject to an antidumping duty order and paid duties at a lower rate than specified in a final judgment. The United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) later realized the error but did not correct it within the statutory 90-day window. The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) ordered Customs to reliquidate the entries at the correct rate, despite the statutory finality provisions.In the lower court, the CIT granted the government's motion to dismiss Target's challenge to the reliquidation, relying on its previous decision in Home Products International, Inc. v. United States. The CIT held that it had the authority to enforce its judgments and that the principle of finality in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 did not bar correcting Customs' errors in liquidating entries covered by a trade action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the CIT's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the case was governed by its precedent in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, which established that Customs' liquidation decisions, even if erroneous, are final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) unless specific statutory exceptions apply. The court rejected the CIT's interpretation that it could use its equitable powers to override the statutory finality provisions. The Federal Circuit emphasized that Congress has carefully crafted a statutory scheme for finality and that any remedy for the harshness of the statute should come from Congress, not the courts. View "TARGET CORPORATION v. US " on Justia Law

Recentive Analytics, Inc. owns four patents related to the use of machine learning for generating network maps and schedules for television broadcasts and live events. The patents are divided into two groups: the "Machine Learning Training" patents and the "Network Map" patents. The Machine Learning Training patents focus on optimizing event schedules using machine learning models, while the Network Map patents focus on creating network maps for broadcasters using similar techniques. Recentive sued Fox Corp. and its affiliates for patent infringement.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed the case, ruling that the patents were directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The court found that the patents were focused on the abstract idea of using generic machine learning techniques in a specific environment without any inventive concept. Recentive acknowledged that the patents did not claim the machine learning techniques themselves but rather their application to event scheduling and network map creation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the patents were directed to abstract ideas and did not contain an inventive concept that would transform them into patent-eligible applications. The court noted that the use of generic machine learning technology in a new environment, such as event scheduling or network map creation, does not make the patents eligible. The court also rejected Recentive's argument that the increased speed and efficiency of the methods rendered them patent-eligible. The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying leave to amend, as any amendment would have been futile. View "RECENTIVE ANALYTICS, INC. v. FOX CORP. " on Justia Law

Sage Products, LLC (“Sage”) challenged the final written decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) which found all challenged claims of two of its patents unpatentable. The patents in question, U.S. Patent Nos. 10,398,642 and 10,688,067, relate to a sterilized chlorhexidine product in a package, such as an applicator filled with an antiseptic composition for disinfecting skin. The key claims at issue include claims 1-3, 5-8, 10-18, and 20 of the ’642 patent and claims 1-3, 5-8, and 10-19 of the ’067 patent.The Board relied on four key pieces of prior art in finding Sage’s claims unpatentable: the ChloraPrep Public Assessment Report (“PAR”), British Standard EN 556-1 (“BS EN-556-1”), U.S. Patent Application Publication 2015/0190535 (“Degala”), and U.S. Patent Publication No. 2014/0371695 (“Chiang”). The Board found that a skilled artisan would understand the PAR’s references to “sterile” to mean “sterilized” as used in the Sage patents. The Board determined that the PAR disclosed all elements of the challenged claims, including the sterilized chlorhexidine gluconate composition and the sterilized applicator.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s findings and affirmed the judgment. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings that a skilled artisan would understand the PAR to describe a “sterilized” composition and product. The court also found that the Board correctly determined that the PAR disclosed the limitations of the dependent claims, including the “sterilized colorant” and the sterility assurance level (SAL) of 10-3 to 10-9. The court rejected Sage’s procedural arguments, finding no abuse of discretion in the Board’s reliance on expert testimony and other evidence to interpret the PAR. The court concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the Board’s finding of unpatentability. View "SAGE PRODUCTS, LLC v. STEWART " on Justia Law