Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC.
Wonderland Switzerland AG owns two patents related to child car seats, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,625,043 and 8,141,951. Wonderland sued Evenflo Company, Inc., alleging that five Evenflo convertible car seat models, categorized as “4-in-1” and “3-in-1” seats, infringed claims of both patents. The dispute focused on specific features of the accused car seats, such as mechanisms for attaching the seat back to the seat assembly and the structure of engaging components.A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that both Evenflo’s 3-in-1 and 4-in-1 seats infringed claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and that the 4-in-1 seats also infringed claims 1 and 5 of the ’951 patent, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury found Evenflo’s infringement of the ’043 patent was not willful. The district court denied both parties’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, granted a permanent injunction covering both patents, and denied Wonderland’s motion for a new trial on willful infringement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment that Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats infringe claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, finding no substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that point. The court also reversed the permanent injunction as to both patents because the injunction for the ’951 patent was not requested and the showing for irreparable harm as to the ’043 patent was insufficient. Furthermore, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on willful infringement of the ’043 patent (for the 3-in-1 seats only) due to wrongful exclusion of key evidence. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. " on Justia Law
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Intellectual Property, Patents
Lesko v. United States
A registered nurse who worked for the Indian Health Service during the COVID-19 pandemic claimed that she and similarly situated nurses were required by supervisors to work overtime without compensation. After resigning, she filed a class action lawsuit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging, among other things, that the government violated the federal overtime statute by failing to pay for overtime that was allegedly induced by supervisors. Specifically, she argued that the statutory requirement for overtime to be “officially ordered or approved” should cover such induced overtime, even in the absence of written authorization.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed all counts of her complaint for failure to state a claim. With respect to the overtime claim (Count II), the court found that she did not allege that she or any potential class members had written authorization for their overtime, as required by the relevant Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the validity of the OPM’s regulation that requires overtime orders or approvals to be in writing, in light of the statutory language and recent Supreme Court precedent on agency rulemaking authority. The court held that the statute delegates to OPM the authority to prescribe necessary regulations for administering the overtime pay statute, and that this includes the discretion to require written authorization as part of the “officially ordered or approved” process. The court concluded that the writing requirement is a valid exercise of OPM’s rulemaking authority and does not contradict the statute. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the overtime claim and remanded the remaining claims to the original panel for further consideration. View "Lesko v. United States" on Justia Law
GOLDEN v. COLLINS
The appellant, a Navy veteran who served as a flight deck signalman from 1984 to 1988, filed claims with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in 2009 seeking service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus. The VA regional office denied both claims in 2010. Upon appeal, a VA medical examination in 2011 found the appellant’s hearing to be within normal limits during service and opined that his tinnitus was likely associated with hearing loss, but did not address whether the tinnitus itself was service connected. The regional office again denied both claims in 2012.In 2017, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted service connection for tinnitus, finding the veteran credible in reporting symptoms since service, and remanded the hearing loss claim for further medical opinion. After additional examinations, the Board denied service connection for bilateral hearing loss in 2021, with no discussion of whether the hearing loss could be connected to the now service-connected tinnitus. The appellant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board erred by not discussing secondary service connection for hearing loss. That court affirmed the Board, finding no clear error in denying direct service connection for hearing loss and concluding that the record did not reasonably raise the theory of secondary service connection.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that to establish secondary service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a), a veteran must show a causal link between the secondary condition and an underlying primary condition for which service connection was granted, not merely a direct link to an in-service event. The Federal Circuit found no error in the Veterans Court’s interpretation of the regulation or its treatment of the facts and affirmed the decision. View "GOLDEN v. COLLINS " on Justia Law
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Military Law
GAME PLAN, INC. v. UNINTERRUPTED IP, LLC
A non-profit organization focused on supporting student-athletes registered a stylized mark incorporating the phrase “I AM MORE THAN AN ATHLETE. GP GAME PLAN” for use in charitable fundraising via apparel sales. Later, a media company filed six intent-to-use applications for marks containing “I AM MORE THAN AN ATHLETE” and “MORE THAN AN ATHLETE,” covering clothing and entertainment services. The non-profit opposed these applications before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, arguing likelihood of confusion and asserting priority based on both its registration and alleged common law rights. The media company counterclaimed, seeking cancellation of the non-profit’s registration and asserting that it had acquired priority through an assignment of common law rights from a third party who had used “MORE THAN AN ATHLETE” since at least 2012.During the Board proceeding, the non-profit failed to introduce any trial evidence to establish its common law rights or priority. The Board dismissed the opposition due to lack of evidence. As to the counterclaim, the Board found that the media company had acquired valid and enforceable common law rights in the mark through its assignment, which included the goodwill associated with the mark. The Board rejected arguments that the assignment was invalid because it occurred during litigation or was an assignment in gross, and concluded that, at least for clothing, the transfer was valid. The Board canceled the non-profit’s registration and dismissed its opposition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed that the assignment was not in gross, did not violate statutory or regulatory prohibitions, and that the non-profit’s failure to submit evidence justified dismissal. The decision to cancel the non-profit’s registration and dismiss its opposition was affirmed. View "GAME PLAN, INC. v. UNINTERRUPTED IP, LLC " on Justia Law
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Intellectual Property, Trademark
IBM v. ZILLOW GROUP, INC.
IBM owns a patent concerning single sign-on (SSO) technology, which allows users to access protected resources on a second system using credentials from a first system. In simplified terms, the invention facilitates account creation on a second platform (such as a healthcare provider) using a user identifier already stored by the first platform (such as a social media website), thereby avoiding the need for users to create separate accounts for each service. The patent describes specific systems and processes for transmitting user identifiers and managing account creation in distributed environments.Ebates Performance Marketing, Inc. (Rakuten) filed petitions for inter partes review of IBM’s patent at the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), asserting anticipation and obviousness based on several prior art references, especially a system disclosed in Sunada. The PTAB adopted IBM’s construction of certain claim terms but found that Sunada taught or suggested most relevant limitations. The Board held claims 1–4, 12–16, and 18–19 unpatentable, while claims 5–11, 17, and 20 were found not unpatentable because the prior art did not disclose a specific process required by those claims.IBM appealed the PTAB’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Board’s analysis exceeded the scope of Rakuten’s petition and that its findings lacked substantial evidence. Zillow, which had joined the review, cross-appealed regarding claims found not unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s analysis was consistent with the petition and supported by substantial evidence. It found the Board’s distinction between similar claims reasonable and affirmed both the appeal and cross-appeal, leaving the PTAB’s patentability determinations undisturbed. View "IBM v. ZILLOW GROUP, INC. " on Justia Law
Posted in:
Intellectual Property, Patents
In Re BAYOU GRANDE COFFEE ROASTING CO.
Bayou Grande Coffee Roasting Company applied to register the trademark KAHWA for use in connection with cafés and coffee shops. The trademark examiner refused registration on the grounds that KAHWA was generic or merely descriptive, relying on two meanings: one, that KAHWA allegedly means “coffee” in Arabic, and two, that it refers to a specific type of Kashmiri green tea. The examiner also invoked the doctrine of foreign equivalents, which tests foreign words for genericness and descriptiveness by translating them into English.After Bayou responded, arguing that KAHWA does not mean coffee in Arabic and that the Kashmiri green tea meaning is not relevant to American cafés and coffee shops, the examiner maintained refusals on both grounds. Bayou requested reconsideration, and the examiner continued to refuse registration, reiterating both rationales. Bayou appealed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the refusal solely on the basis of the Kashmiri green tea meaning, without addressing the Arabic coffee meaning.On further appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Bayou contended that the Board’s findings of genericness and mere descriptiveness were unsupported by substantial evidence, and also challenged reliance on the doctrine of foreign equivalents. The Federal Circuit held that there was no evidence showing any café or coffee shop in the United States has ever sold kahwa, and thus KAHWA cannot be generic or merely descriptive for cafés and coffee shops. The court also concluded that the doctrine of foreign equivalents does not apply because KAHWA has a well-established English meaning as Kashmiri green tea. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision, holding that KAHWA is registrable for the identified services. View "In Re BAYOU GRANDE COFFEE ROASTING CO. " on Justia Law
Posted in:
Intellectual Property, Trademark
CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O. v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
The plaintiffs, Coda Development s.r.o., Coda Innovations s.r.o., and Frantisek Hrabal, brought claims against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and Robert Benedict, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets related to self-inflating tire technology and seeking correction of inventorship on a Goodyear patent. Coda claimed that Goodyear misappropriated five specific trade secrets involving technical solutions, testing data, and optimal component placement for this technology. The alleged misappropriation stemmed from communications and interactions between the parties concerning this technology.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the case proceeded to a jury trial on the trade secret claims. The jury found in favor of Coda, concluding that Goodyear misappropriated five trade secrets and awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Following the trial, the district court granted Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, determining that the asserted trade secrets were either not sufficiently definite, not secret, not used by Goodyear, or not adequately conveyed to Goodyear, and thus set aside the jury’s verdict. The court also denied Coda’s claim seeking correction of inventorship on Goodyear’s patent, after considering the parties’ briefing in lieu of a bench trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could have found that all elements required for trade secret misappropriation were met for any of the asserted trade secrets. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the denial of the correction of inventorship claim, concluding that Coda failed to provide evidence that would entitle it to such relief. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O. v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY" on Justia Law
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Intellectual Property, Patents
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PRATT & WHITNEY
A manufacturer of aircraft engines contracted with both the federal government and commercial clients. The contracts at issue were cost-plus agreements, requiring the government to reimburse the manufacturer for a share of overhead costs, calculated under federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), specifically CAS 418. The manufacturer used unique “collaboration agreements” with suppliers, involving payments tied to program revenues rather than direct part costs. A central dispute arose over whether certain costs, known as “Drag”—representing amounts paid by collaborators to compensate the manufacturer for shared expenses—should be included in the pool of overhead costs to be allocated, and over how to measure the material costs of parts for allocation purposes.After protracted disagreements and administrative decisions dating back to the 1990s, a contracting officer in 2013 determined that the manufacturer’s accounting violated CAS 418 and that Drag amounts should be excluded from the overhead pool. The manufacturer appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The Board held in part for each side: it found the Drag agreement between the parties valid, so Drag need not be excluded, but rejected the manufacturer’s method for calculating material costs, settling on a “net revenue share” approach. The Board remanded to the parties to negotiate quantum (the amount owed), retaining jurisdiction if they failed to agree.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision on the material cost allocation base (CAS 418 Claim) because no final determination of quantum had been made. However, the court found the Board’s decision on the Drag Claim was final and reviewable. The Federal Circuit held that the Drag agreement was unenforceable against the government because it did not comply with required federal regulations for advance agreements, and therefore reversed the Board’s ruling on that point. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PRATT & WHITNEY" on Justia Law
MOSAIC COMPANY v. US
Russian producers of phosphate fertilizers were investigated by the U.S. Department of Commerce after a domestic company alleged that the Russian government was providing subsidies, specifically through the provision of natural gas at prices below market value. Commerce’s investigation focused on whether these subsidies were both “specific” to an industry or enterprise and constituted a financial benefit through the sale of gas at less than adequate remuneration. During the investigation, Commerce requested and reviewed data from Russian authorities and Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas supplier, about the volume and pricing of natural gas provided to various Russian industries. The evidence showed that the agrochemical industry, which includes fertilizer producers, was the largest industrial consumer of natural gas, though some non-industrial sectors consumed more in total.Commerce determined that the subsidy was “de facto specific” because the agrochemical industry was a predominant industrial user of natural gas. It also found that natural gas was provided at less than adequate remuneration, using a third-tier benchmark analysis that relied on international energy price data, after concluding that Russian market prices were distorted by government intervention and not set by market principles. Commerce’s final determination imposed countervailing duties on Russian phosphate fertilizer imports.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s decisions and upheld both the specificity and pricing determinations, remanding only on unrelated issues. Upon remand, Commerce reaffirmed its conclusions, and the Trade Court entered final judgment in support of the agency’s findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s judgment. The court held that Commerce has reasonable flexibility in determining the appropriate comparator group for the “predominant user” analysis and that its approach in this case was reasonable. The court also upheld Commerce’s less-than-adequate-remuneration analysis and rejected arguments that further adjustments were required by statute. The judgment sustaining the countervailing duties was affirmed. View "MOSAIC COMPANY v. US " on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, International Law
ADNEXUS INC. v. META PLATFORMS, INC.
Adnexus, Inc. owns a patent for a system and method of online advertising that aims to deliver targeted advertisements to users without overwhelming them with irrelevant content. Adnexus alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc.'s Lead Ads product infringed at least one claim of this patent. Specifically, Adnexus argued that Lead Ads retrieves a user profile containing delivery method preferences and other information, which matches the patent’s claim requirement. Adnexus attached detailed claim charts and a preliminary infringement analysis to its amended complaint to show how Lead Ads purportedly meets each element of the asserted claim.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Meta moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Adnexus failed to plausibly allege that Lead Ads met the claim limitation requiring retrieval of a user profile containing delivery method preferences. The district court agreed with Meta, finding that “contact information” was distinct from “delivery method preferences” and that Adnexus’s allegations were insufficient. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, as Adnexus had already amended its pleading once. The court also dismissed indirect and willful infringement claims, and found Adnexus estopped from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in implicitly construing the claim term “delivery method preferences” against Adnexus, the non-moving party, without providing Adnexus an opportunity to address claim construction. The Federal Circuit found that Adnexus’s amended complaint, when taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Adnexus, plausibly alleged infringement of the relevant claim limitation. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ADNEXUS INC. v. META PLATFORMS, INC. " on Justia Law
Posted in:
Intellectual Property, Patents