Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case concerns a patent dispute between Harris Brumfield, Trustee for Ascent Trust (Plaintiff-Appellant) and IBG LLC and Interactive Brokers LLC (Defendants-Appellees). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants infringed several patents owned by Trading Technologies International, Inc., the plaintiff's predecessor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s challenges and affirmed the district court's rulings.The district court had invalidated the asserted claims of two of the plaintiff's patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The court also excluded one basis for recovering "foreign damages" proposed by the plaintiff's damages expert, and denied the plaintiff's post-verdict motion for a new trial on damages.On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the law in determining that the asserted claims of the patents were ineligible for patenting under § 101. The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude certain damages evidence, and it upheld the denial of the plaintiff's request for a new trial on damages. View "Brumfield v. IBG LLC" on Justia Law

This case revolves around Mr. Orville Thomas, a former U.S. Navy serviceman, who sought an earlier effective date for his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) claim connected to his service. Thomas had initially filed a claim for "depressive mania" in 1971, after surviving a plane crash during his service, which had been denied by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In 2014, he requested to reopen his claim, submitting additional service department records not previously considered by the VA. While the VA granted service connection for PTSD in 2014, they denied an earlier effective date.Thomas appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, arguing the VA had overlooked certain service department records and regulations, specifically 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c), which could have potentially allowed for an earlier effective date. However, the Board agreed with the VA’s denial. Thomas further appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board failed to consider all potentially relevant issues, violating its statutory duty under 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1).The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decision, arguing that Thomas did not demonstrate the relevance of his service records to his 1971 claim. Thomas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the Veterans Court applied a more stringent legal standard than required under 38 U.S.C. § 7104. It ruled that the Board must consider all "potentially applicable" regulations raised in the record, not only those proven to be relevant or favorable by the veteran.The Federal Circuit court vacated the Veterans Court’s decision and remanded the case to the Board to provide an adequate written statement of its reasons for denying Thomas's claim for an earlier effective date for his PTSD, considering all relevant regulations and records. View "Thomas v. McDonough" on Justia Law

This case involves Virtek Vision International ULC (Virtek) and Assembly Guidance Systems, Inc. d/b/a Aligned Vision (Aligned Vision) who both appealed a decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board concerning U.S. Patent No. 10,052,734 owned by Virtek. The patent discloses an improved method for aligning a laser projector with respect to a work surface. The Board had held that certain claims of the patent were unpatentable, finding them to be obvious in light of certain prior art references.Virtek appealed the Board's determination that claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 10–13 of the patent were unpatentable. Aligned Vision cross-appealed the Board's holding that it failed to prove claims 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 of the patent were unpatentable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's determination that claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 10–13 were unpatentable, finding that there was not substantial evidence to support a motivation to combine the prior art references in the manner claimed in the patent. The court noted that it was an error to suggest that because two coordinate systems were disclosed in a prior art reference and were therefore “known,” that satisfies the motivation to combine analysis. The court affirmed the Board's determination that Aligned Vision failed to prove claims 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 would have been obvious, agreeing with the Board that Aligned Vision had failed to show a motivation to combine the references for these claims. View "Virtek Vision International ULC v. Assembly Guidance Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the plaintiff, Dr. Leslie Boyer, alleged that a violation of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) occurred when the United States government set her pay lower than a male comparator in the same job role. The Court of Federal Claims had granted a summary judgment in favor of the United States, stating that the pay differential was justified by a “factor other than sex,” namely Dr. Boyer’s prior salary. The Court of Federal Claims relied on the pay-setting statutes, 5 U.S.C. § 5333 and 38 U.S.C. § 7408, which allow consideration of prior pay in hiring, to arrive at this conclusion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this judgment, stating that the EPA applies equally to the United States as to other employers and that mere reliance on prior compensation alone is not an affirmative defense to a prima facie case under the EPA unless the employer can demonstrate that the prior pay itself was not based on sex. The court concluded that the employer can only rely on prior pay if either (1) the employer can demonstrate that prior pay is unaffected by sex-based pay differentials or (2) prior pay is considered together with other, non-sex-based factors. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "BOYER v. US " on Justia Law

This case deals with the importation of two transcatheter heart valve systems by Meril Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. and Meril, Inc. (collectively, "Meril") into the United States for a medical conference in San Francisco. The plaintiff, Edwards Lifesciences Corporation and Edwards Lifesciences LLC (collectively, "Edwards"), a competitor medical device company, alleged that this act constituted patent infringement. Meril argued that the importation was covered by the "safe harbor" provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which exempts certain activities from being considered patent infringement if they are reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Meril, and Edwards appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, noting that the undisputed evidence showed that the importation of the valve systems was reasonably related to submitting information to the United States Food and Drug Administration. The court rejected Edwards' arguments that the district court had disregarded contemporaneous evidence, applied the safe harbor with an objective standard, and relied improperly on declarations from Meril employees. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that Meril was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORPORATION v. MERIL LIFE SCIENCES PVT. LTD. " on Justia Law

The case originates from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The appellant, Herbie D. Vest, served on active duty in the United States Army from 1966 to 1971. In 1971, Vest filed a claim for service connection for hearing loss and tinnitus, which was granted at a 0% rating. A subsequent request for an increased rating was denied. In 1972, Vest sent a letter to the Veterans Administration Regional Office (RO) expressing his belief of an error in their decision. In 2016, Vest submitted a claim for compensation for Meniere's disease and "ears-ringing," which was granted at a 60% disability rating, which Vest disputed.In 2020, Vest argued that his 1972 letter constituted a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) and should be considered as such. However, the RO did not accept the letter as an NOD. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that the letter expressed dissatisfaction with the decision on his hearing loss disability, but did not express disagreement with the decision regarding tinnitus. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed Vest's appeal, holding that they did not have jurisdiction to address the question of defective notice. The court noted that Vest did not argue that he had submitted an NOD with the initial decision concerning tinnitus, and he didn't challenge the Board’s determinations that the letter was not an NOD for the tinnitus decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the appeal by the Veterans Court due to lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the absence of an NOD on the 1971 tinnitus claim and the lack of any decision by the Board on that claim defeat jurisdiction in the Veterans Court. View "Vest v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The case involves RKW Klerks Inc. (RKW), an importer of net wraps used to wrap round bales of harvested crops, who contested the classification of its products by the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Customs had classified the net wraps under HTSUS Chapter 60 under subheading 6005.39.00 as “warp knit fabric,” dutiable at the rate of 10% ad valorem. RKW argued that the net wraps should be classified under Chapter 84, subheading 8433.90.50 as “parts” of harvesting machinery or alternatively subheading 8436.99.00 as “parts” of other agricultural machinery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the decision of the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) that the net wraps were not a part of harvesting or other agricultural machinery. The court reasoned that the net wraps were not dedicated solely for use with baling machines, nor were they integral to the function of the machines. The court further noted that the net wraps performed a function outside of the machine, maintaining the shape of the bale after it had been compressed and released, and thus could not be classified as a part of the machine.The court therefore affirmed the CIT’s decision that the net wraps were correctly classified under HTSUS Chapter 60 under subheading 6005.39.00 as “warp knit fabric,” rather than as parts of harvesting or other agricultural machinery. View "RKW KLERKS INC. v. US " on Justia Law

This case involves Avue Technologies Corporation ("Avue") and the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. Avue is a software development company that sells its software to private and government entities, which helps them automate administrative tasks while complying with statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements. Avue does not sell its software licenses directly to federal agencies. Instead, it sells annual subscriptions through third party Carahsoft Technology Corporation (“Carahsoft”), an authorized reseller that has a Federal Supply Schedule (“FSS”) contract with the General Services Administration (“GSA”).Avue tried to govern its relationship with end users of its software through an end-user licensing agreement ("EULA"), which is incorporated into the FSS contract between Carahsoft and the GSA. In 2015, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") placed a task order for a subscription to Avue's software under the FSS contract. However, in 2016, the FDA chose not to renew its subscription, leading Avue to claim that the FDA had violated its EULA.The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals ("Board") dismissed Avue's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that even if the EULA established a contract between Avue and the U.S. Government, the Board lacked jurisdiction because the EULA was not a procurement contract within the meaning of the Contract Disputes Act ("CDA"). Avue appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The court disagreed with the Board's decision, stating that Avue only needed to allege non-frivolously that it had a contract with the U.S. Government to establish the Board's jurisdiction, and it didn't need to prove the existence of such a contract. The court held that Avue's allegation that it was part of a procurement contract was non-frivolous and sufficient to establish the Board's jurisdiction. Therefore, the court vacated the Board's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. View "AVUE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION v. HHS " on Justia Law

In a dispute between Maxell, Ltd. and Amperex Technology Limited, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was asked to review a decision by the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The case involved Maxell's U.S. Patent No. 9,077,035, which pertains to a rechargeable lithium-ion battery. Maxell had asserted that Amperex infringed upon its patent, while Amperex contested the patent's validity. The district court had deemed the claim language defining a transition metal element in the patent to be indefinite, ruling in favor of Amperex.The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision. It found that the two limitations of the claims did not contradict each other. The first limitation stated that the transition metal element must contain cobalt, nickel, or manganese, while the second requirement stated that the transition metal element must contain cobalt at a content of 30% to 100% by mole. The court found it possible for a transition metal element to meet both these requirements, thus concluding that there was no contradiction. The court emphasized that all limitations of a claim must be considered to understand the invention's scope. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MAXELL, LTD. v. AMPEREX TECHNOLOGY LIMITED " on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Chewy, Inc., (Chewy) brought a suit against International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of several IBM patents. In response, IBM filed counterclaims alleging Chewy’s website and mobile applications infringed the patents.The patents in question relate to improvements in web-based advertising. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Chewy's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement of claims of the ’849 patent and also granted Chewy's motion for summary judgment that claims of the ’443 patent are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. IBM appealed both summary judgment rulings.The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remand for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision on noninfringement of the ’849 patent, ruling that Chewy's website and applications did not infringe certain claims of the patent because they didn't perform the specific limitation of "selectively storing advertising objects" as described in the patent.However, the Court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 12 of the ’849 patent, concluding that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Chewy "establish[es] characterizations for respective users."As for the ’443 patent, the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the claims are ineligible under § 101. The patent claims, according to the Court, could not transform the abstract idea of identifying advertisements based on search results into patent-eligible subject matter. View "CHEWY, INC. v. IBM " on Justia Law