Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. and other appellants challenged the United States Department of Commerce's calculation of an all-others antidumping duty rate for non-selected respondents in the fourth administrative review of an antidumping duty order on certain steel nails from Taiwan. Commerce had assigned an adverse facts available (AFA) rate of 78.17% to the mandatory respondents, who failed to cooperate, and used this rate to calculate the all-others rate for non-selected respondents, including Liang Chyuan.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) upheld Commerce's decision, finding that the use of the expected method to calculate the all-others rate was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. The Trade Court determined that the burden of proof lay with the non-selected respondents to show that the expected method was not reasonable, which they failed to do. The court also rejected PrimeSource's argument that Liang Chyuan should receive an individual rate, noting that Liang Chyuan did not meet the statutory requirements to be considered a voluntary respondent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision. The court held that Commerce's use of the expected method was appropriate and that the burden was on the appellants to demonstrate that the method was not feasible or did not reasonably reflect the potential dumping margins of the non-selected respondents. The court found that the appellants failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of representativeness of the mandatory respondents. Additionally, the court agreed that Liang Chyuan was not entitled to an individual rate as it did not submit the necessary information in a timely manner to be considered a voluntary respondent. View "PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

In September 2020, the CDC issued a nationwide order temporarily halting residential evictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This eviction moratorium remained effective for nearly a year. Owners of residential rental properties sued the government, claiming that the CDC’s order constituted a physical taking of their property for public use, requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.The U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissed the property owners' complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court agreed with the government’s argument that a takings claim cannot be premised on government action that was unauthorized, and it concluded that the CDC’s order was unauthorized because it exceeded the CDC’s statutory authority under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The Federal Circuit concluded that the CDC’s order was “authorized” for takings-claim purposes because it was issued within the normal scope of the CDC’s duties and pursuant to a good faith implementation of the PHSA. The court also determined that the order did not contravene any explicit prohibition or positively expressed congressional intent. Furthermore, the court held that the property owners’ complaint stated a claim for a physical taking, as the CDC’s order prevented them from evicting non-rent-paying tenants, thus infringing on their fundamental right to exclude others from their property. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "DARBY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves Mobile Acuity Ltd. ("Mobile Acuity") and several Blippar entities ("Blippar"). Mobile Acuity owns U.S. Patent Nos. 10,445,618 and 10,776,658, which disclose methods and devices for storing information that can be accessed using a captured image. Mobile Acuity alleged that Blippar infringed these patents by using similar technology. The patents describe a process where a user captures an image, uploads it to a server, and associates information with the image. Another user can later access this information by capturing a similar image.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Mobile Acuity's patent infringement action, ruling that the asserted patents claimed ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The court found that the patents were directed to the abstract idea of leaving information at a location or object for future use or reference and did not contain an inventive concept that would transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. The court also denied Mobile Acuity's request to amend its complaint, concluding that any amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the claims were directed to an abstract idea and lacked an inventive concept. The court noted that the claims involved generalized steps of collecting, analyzing, and presenting information using conventional computer components, which are not patent-eligible. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Mobile Acuity's motion for leave to amend, finding that the proposed amendments would not cure the defects in the complaint. Thus, the dismissal of the patent infringement action was affirmed. View "MOBILE ACUITY LTD. v. BLIPPAR LTD. " on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a trademark application for "COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" by a hip-hop record label. The appellants, Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac and Institut National des Appellations d’Origine, are responsible for controlling and protecting the certification mark "COGNAC" for brandy from the Cognac region of France. They opposed the trademark application, arguing that it would likely cause confusion and dilute their certification mark.The United States Patent and Trademark Office's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dismissed the opposition. The Board found that the "COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" mark, when used for hip-hop music and production services, was not likely to cause confusion or dilute the "COGNAC" certification mark. The Board concluded that the marks were dissimilar in connotation and commercial impression, and that the relevant goods, services, trade channels, and purchasers did not overlap. The Board also found that the appellants had not proven the fame of the "COGNAC" mark for purposes of dilution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the Board's decision. The court found that the Board applied an incorrect legal standard for determining the fame of the "COGNAC" mark and improperly discounted relevant evidence. The court also found that the Board erred in its analysis of the similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods, services, and trade channels. Additionally, the court concluded that the appellants had sufficiently pleaded their dilution claim. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the likelihood of confusion and dilution issues. View "BUREAU NATIONAL INTERPROFESSIONNEL DU COGNAC v. COLOGNE & COGNAC ENTERTAINMENT" on Justia Law

Eric Mote, a former Captain in the United States Air Force, sought the removal of a Letter of Admonishment (LOA) and a Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) from his military records, along with back pay for the fine associated with the NJP. The LOA and NJP were issued following Mote's repeated requests for a "White Heritage Month" at Hill Air Force Base, which were denied by his superiors. Mote's subsequent communications, which were deemed disrespectful, led to the LOA and NJP.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed Mote's case and granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of the government, upholding the decision of the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR). The Claims Court found that the AFBCMR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the LOA and NJP were not illegal reprisals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Claims Court's decision regarding the NJP, finding that the AFBCMR's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. However, the appellate court vacated the portion of the Claims Court's decision that reviewed the LOA and remanded the case for a determination of whether the Claims Court had jurisdiction over the LOA claim under the Tucker Act. The appellate court emphasized that the Claims Court's jurisdiction to grant non-monetary relief is limited to cases where such relief is incident to a money judgment. View "MOTE v. US " on Justia Law

Voice Tech Corporation owned U.S. Patent No. 10,491,679, which relates to using voice commands on a mobile device to remotely access and control a computer. Unified Patents, LLC petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of claims 1–8 of the patent, arguing they were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) found all challenged claims unpatentable based on prior art references Wong and Beauregard.The Board's decision was appealed by Voice Tech. The Board had previously determined that the combination of Wong and Beauregard disclosed all the limitations of the challenged claims, including the "audio command interface" and "mobile device interface." Voice Tech argued that the Board misinterpreted these terms and that the prior art did not teach the claimed limitations. The Board, however, found that Wong’s speech recognition engine and Beauregard’s command interpreter taught the necessary elements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Voice Tech did not forfeit its claim construction arguments by not raising them in its request for rehearing. However, the court found that the Board's constructions and findings were supported by substantial evidence. The court agreed with the Board that the prior art disclosed the "receiving," "decodes," and "deciding/selecting" limitations of the claims. The court also rejected Voice Tech's argument that the Board's decision was based on hindsight bias, finding that the Board had properly considered the motivation to combine the prior art references.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision, holding that all challenged claims of the '679 patent were unpatentable as obvious over the prior art. View "VOICE TECH CORP. v. UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC " on Justia Law

Norah R. Lewis, Sr., a U.S. Army veteran, had his disability rating for PTSD increased from 30 percent to 70 percent in 2009. However, in 2016, the VA Regional Office (RO) reduced his rating back to 30 percent, citing evidence from a 2015 VA examination and outpatient treatment records. Mr. Lewis appealed this decision, arguing that the reduction was improper.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals initially sustained the RO's decision in 2018, but the Veterans Court vacated and remanded the case, requiring the Board to address favorable evidence. The Board issued a second decision in 2019, which was again vacated and remanded by the Veterans Court for failing to comply with the prior remand order. On the second remand, Mr. Lewis argued that the 2016 rating decision was void ab initio because the RO did not make a required finding under 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a) that the improvement in his condition would be maintained under ordinary conditions of life.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's March 2021 decision, which had found that Mr. Lewis’s PTSD had materially improved and that the improvement was likely to be maintained under ordinary conditions of life. The Veterans Court held that the RO was not required to make specific findings in its initial decision, as long as the Board made the necessary findings on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that while the RO failed to make the required findings under 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a) in its initial decision, the Board's subsequent findings cured this deficiency. The Board's de novo review and ultimate decision on Mr. Lewis’s disability rating were consistent with its role in the statutory scheme, satisfying the VA’s duty to follow procedural protections for rating reductions. View "LEWIS v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Sanho Corporation appealed a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that found all challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 10,572,429 unpatentable as obvious. The PTAB's decision relied on U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2018/0165053 (Kuo) as prior art. Sanho argued that Kuo should not be considered prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(B) because the inventor of the '429 patent had publicly disclosed the relevant subject matter before Kuo's effective filing date through the private sale of a product called HyperDrive.The PTAB concluded that the private sale of the HyperDrive did not qualify as a public disclosure under § 102(b)(2)(B), and therefore, Kuo was considered prior art. The PTAB found that Sanho failed to show that the inventor publicly disclosed the subject matter of Kuo before Kuo's effective filing date. Consequently, the PTAB determined that all challenged claims of the '429 patent were unpatentable as obvious based on combinations that included Kuo.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB's decision. The court held that the private sale of the HyperDrive did not constitute a public disclosure under § 102(b)(2)(B). The court reasoned that the term "publicly disclosed" in the statute requires that the invention be made available to the public, which was not the case with the private sale between the inventor and Sanho. The court affirmed the PTAB's decision, concluding that Kuo was prior art and that the challenged claims of the '429 patent were unpatentable as obvious. View "SANHO CORP. v. KAIJET TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, INC. " on Justia Law

The United States Capitol Police (USCP) faced allegations of unfair labor practices after it suspended its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Fraternal Order of Police due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The USCP argued that the suspension was necessary to quickly implement changes to protect its workforce. The Union contended that the USCP failed to provide proper notice and did not negotiate the changes, violating the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS).The Office of Congressional Workplace Rights (OCWR) General Counsel filed a complaint against the USCP, and a hearing officer granted summary judgment in favor of the General Counsel and the Union. The hearing officer found that the USCP committed unfair labor practices by suspending the CBA, failing to reinstate non-interfering provisions, and not bargaining over changes to employment conditions. The USCP appealed to the OCWR Board of Directors, which affirmed the hearing officer's decision in part, concluding that the USCP did not provide the Union with specific and definitive notice of the changes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that genuine issues of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment. The court noted that it was unclear which changes listed in the Hoyer Letter were subject to bargaining and whether the Union had adequate notice of these changes. The court emphasized that not all changes mentioned in the letter necessarily constituted changes in conditions of employment. Additionally, there was evidence suggesting that the USCP and the Union communicated regularly about the COVID-19 response, which could indicate that the Union had sufficient notice.The Federal Circuit reversed the Board's decision to grant summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the specific changes that required bargaining and whether the Union received adequate notice. View "UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE v. OCWR " on Justia Law

SoftView LLC appealed a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) regarding the invalidation of all claims of its U.S. Patent No. 7,461,353. The PTAB's decision was based on a prior inter partes review (IPR) proceeding that found the claims invalid under the estoppel provision in 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3)(i). SoftView argued that the PTAB misinterpreted the regulation, that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) lacked statutory authority to issue such a regulation, and that the regulation should not apply to already issued claims.The PTAB had previously stayed reexamination proceedings pending the outcome of the IPR. After the IPR invalidated 18 claims, the PTAB lifted the stay and resumed reexamination. The PTAB found most claims unpatentable over prior art but reversed the examiner's obviousness rejections. Instead, it applied the estoppel provision to invalidate all claims, including amended and previously issued claims, reasoning that they were not patentably distinct from the canceled claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the validity of the regulation and its estoppel standard but agreed with SoftView that the regulation applies only to new or amended claims, not to previously issued claims. The court affirmed the PTAB's application of the regulation to the amended claims, finding them not patentably distinct from the canceled claims. However, it vacated the PTAB's decision regarding the previously issued claims, as the regulation does not apply to maintaining existing claims.The court concluded that the PTO had the authority under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) to issue the regulation, which governs the relationship of IPR to other proceedings. The case was affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part for further consideration of the issued claims. View "SOFTVIEW LLC v. APPLE INC. " on Justia Law