Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Grounds served in the Army from 1969-1972. He was charged with being AWOL during three periods in 1972 (less than 180 days). To avoid a court-martial. Grounds requested to be discharged “for the good of the service,” citing marital and financial problems and stating, if he were to remain in the Army, he would continue going AWOL. Grounds was discharged “[f]or the good of the [s]ervice” and “[u]nder conditions other than [h]onorable.”In 2013, Grounds applied for veterans' benefits. The VA found his multiple periods of AWOL constituted “willful and persistent misconduct,” rendering him ineligible for benefits under 38 C.F.R. 3.12(d)(4). The Board of Veterans Appeals agreed, concluding his discharge was considered “dishonorable” for VA benefits purposes. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's rejection of an argument that 38 U.S.C. 5303(a) controls and cannot be superseded by 38 C.F.R. 3.12(d)(4). Section 5303(a) provides that a veteran is not eligible for benefits if he was discharged by reason of court-martial on the basis of being AWOL for a continuous period of at least 180 days. Under Federal Circuit precedent, section 5303(a) is not the exclusive test for benefits eligibility; 38 C.F.R. 3.12(d)(4) is consistent with and authorized by statute. While Grounds’ misconduct did not constitute a statutory bar to VA benefits under section 5303. the Board did not clearly err in finding that his multiple periods of AWOL constituted a regulatory bar to benefits. View "Grounds v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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SNIPR's patents, directed to methods of selectively killing bacteria using CRISPR gene editing, claim priority to a 2016 Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) Application. Because their effective filing dates are after March 2013, they are pure America Invents Act (AIA) patents, examined and issued under first-inventor-to-file patentability requirements. The Rockefeller Application is also directed to selectively killing bacteria. It claims priority to a 2014 PCT Application and a February 2013 U.S. Provisional Application; it is a pure pre-AIA application.The Patent Board declared an interference to determine which party was the first to invent, then identified Rockefeller as the senior party, with an accorded benefit date of February 2013, and SNIPR as the junior party, with a May 2016 accorded benefit date (the date for which the Board recognizes that a patent application provides a proper constructive reduction to practice of the invention under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(1)). SNIPR unsuccessfully moved to terminate, arguing that the AIA eliminated interferences for AIA patents. The Board reasoned that pre-AIA patent claims must “comply with [pre-AIA] 35 U.S.C. 102(g),” which requires an interference. SNIPR had not filed any priority statement asserting an invention date earlier than Rockefeller’s earliest accorded benefit date and failed to overcome Rockefeller’s senior party status. The Board canceled the SNIPR Patents.The Federal Circuit reversed. Pure AIA patents may not be part of an interference. SNIPR’s pure AIA patents were examined and issued under the AIA’s first-inventor-to-file patentability requirements and cannot be canceled under the pre-AIA invention priority requirements. View "SNIPR Technologies Ltd. v. Rockefeller University" on Justia Law

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Float‘N’Grill's patent is directed to a float designed to support a grill to facilitate a user grilling food while remaining in a body of water. The specification describes a single embodiment. The apparatus includes a float and a pair of grill supports, each of which has a base rod, and an “inverted substantially U-shaped upper support medially attached to a top surface of the base rod.” Each of the supports “includes a plurality of magnets disposed within the middle segment of the upper support of each” grill support. After the patent was issued, FNG, believing that it claimed less than it was entitled to claim in the original patent, filed a reissue application, seeking claims that did not contain the narrow “plurality of magnets” limitation; the claims more generically call for the removable securing of a grill to the float apparatus.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed an Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) and 251 of the 13 claims of the reissue application. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The reissue claims in question do not cover “the invention disclosed in the original patent” as required by 35 U.S.C. 251. The court did not address the indefiniteness of those claims under section 112(b). View "In Re Float‘N’Grill LLC" on Justia Law

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The Medtronic patents describe and claim a neurostimulation lead and a method for implanting and anchoring the lead. Axonics, having been sued by Medtronic for infringement, challenged various claims of the Medtronic patents for obviousness in inter partes reviews (IPRs) under 35 U.S.C. 311–319. In both IPRs, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board concluded that Axonics had failed to prove any of the challenged claims unpatentable.The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, The Board erred in its obviousness analysis and the errors cannot be regarded as harmless. Even if the Board was correct to treat the Medtronic patents as limited in the problem they address to the sacral-nerve context, it committed a fundamental legal error in confining the motivation inquiry to whether a motivation would exist to make the proposed combination for use in the specific trigeminal-nerve context—to which the Medtronic patents are not limited. The Board was also incorrect in its view that “the relevant art is medical leads specifically for sacral neuromodulation,” as the Medtronic patents’ claims are not limited to the sacral-nerve context; the shared specification, properly read, is not so limited either. View "Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronics, Inc." on Justia Law

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Williams was a Beaumont, Texas federal corrections officer beginning March 4, 2018. In 2016, Williams met Hayes. The two were engaged and had a child in September 2018. Hayes had been in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody from 2005-2013, including at FCC-Beaumont. He was on supervised release until July 15, 2018. Williams knew Hayes had been incarcerated but was unaware he had been in federal custody. In May 2019, after learning of the relationship, BOP placed Williams on administrative reassignment. Under the Standards of Employee Conduct, employees may not “become emotionally, physically, sexually, or financially involved with inmates, [or] former inmates.” If employees engage in improper contact, they must report the contact. A “former inmate” is an inmate for whom less than one year has elapsed since release from BOP custody or federal court supervision. Hayes met this definition until July 15, 2019. Williams learned, on June 3, 2019, that Hayes had been incarcerated in federal prison. She reported her relationship the next day. BOP issued a notice of proposed removal. The warden sustained the charges and removed Williams.An arbitrator sustained the charge of improper contact but did not sustain the charge of failure to report and upheld the removal, finding that the warden considered the relevant "Douglas" factors and exercised his discretion “within tolerable limits of reasonableness.” The Federal Circuit vacated. The arbitrator failed to independently analyze the appropriateness of alternative sanctions and accepted for sanctions purposes the warden’s fact findings which the arbitrator had rejected. View "Williams v. Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

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Using a patent directed to a method for sorting sperm cells according to specific DNA characteristics to preselect the gender of a domestic animal’s offspring, STGenetics, provided bull semen-processing services to ABS, which sells semen drawn from its own bulls, packaged in small tubes for use in artificial insemination.In 2014, ABS filed an antitrust lawsuit, alleging that ST was maintaining monopoly power for sexed semen processing. ST brought counterclaims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, and patent infringement. ABS stipulated to direct infringement of three claims. A jury awarded ST $750,000 for past infringement and a royalty on future sales of sexed semen tubes sold by ABS. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the validity findings and issued a remand that did not concern the ongoing royalty.ST filed another infringement suit, which was consolidated with the remand proceedings, then learned that ABS had begun selling and licensing ST’s system to third parties. ST filed a third suit, asserting induced infringement (35 U.S.C. 271(b)). The district court dismissed the action, citing claim preclusion.The Federal Circuit reversed. An induced patent infringement claim brought at the time of the first trial would have been based on speculation; the parties stipulated to direct infringement and the question of inducement was not before the jury. The scope of ABS’s direct infringement allegations cannot reasonably be expanded to cover actions of third-party licensees using the technology to make their own tubes. View "Inguran, LLC v. ABS Global, Inc." on Justia Law

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The VA’s Schedule for Rating Disabilities includes diagnostic codes (DCs), each with a corresponding disability rating, 38 U.S.C. 1155. A particular veteran’s disability may not clearly fall under a delineated DC. VA regulations provide: When an unlisted condition is encountered it will be permissible to rate under a closely related disease or injury in which not only the functions affected but the anatomical localization and symptomatology are closely analogous. The VA considers the functions affected by ailments, the anatomical localization of the ailments, and the symptomatology of the ailments.Webb served in the Army, from 1968-1970, receiving an honorable discharge. Webb later developed service-connected prostate cancer, the treatment for which caused him to develop erectile dysfunction (ED). In 2015, Webb was assigned a non-compensable (zero percent) rating for his ED. The Schedule did not then include a diagnostic code for ED. The VA rated Webb’s disability by analogy to DC 7522, which provides a 20 percent disability rating for “[p]enis, deformity, with loss of erectile power.” The Board explained that DC 7522 required Webb to show “deformity of the penis with loss of erectile power.” Without such a deformity, he was not entitled to a compensable disability rating. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated. The listed disease or injury to which a veteran’s unlisted condition is being rated by analogy must be only “closely related,” not identical. View "Webb v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Jenkins purchased a 1987 Oldsmobile and a 2001 Chevrolet and transferred the titles to his mother, Buchanan, retaining exclusive use of both vehicles. The DEA, investigating Jenkins for drug conspiracy crimes, seized the vehicles, which were towed to an impound lot. The DEA obtained a search warrant, which was executed in October 2012. In April 2013, Jenkins pled guilty and was sentenced to 252 months of imprisonment. In October, the impound lot sent letters to the address on file for Buchanan notifying her that the vehicles could be reclaimed upon payment of towing and storage charges. Buchanan did not receive the letters, having moved. No letter was addressed to Jenkins. Jenkins acknowledged that he “was informed" to pick up the vehicles. In February 2014, the impound lot sent final notices to Buchanan, who was incarcerated, then sold the vehicles, retaining the proceeds.In 2017, Jenkins moved in his criminal case for the return of the cars (FRCP 41(g)). The government responded that the cars “are available for return.” The court dismissed the motion. In 2019, Jenkins unsuccessfully sought monetary compensation in excess of $10,000, then filed a civil action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), alleging a physical taking of his vehicles. The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment. While the government’s police power may preclude liability for an initial seizure, there is no police power exception that precludes takings liability for the period after the property is not needed for criminal proceedings. The court noted a factual issue of abandonment and affirmed the dismissal of the due process clause for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice. View "Jenkins v. United States" on Justia Law

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Medytox’s patent is directed to the use of an animal-protein-free botulinum toxin composition that exhibits a longer-lasting effect compared to an animal protein-containing botulinum toxin composition and purportedly can be used to treat both cosmetic and non-cosmetic conditions. Galderma requested post-grant review of claims 1–10, which the Patent Trial and Appeal Board granted. Medytox filed a non-contingent motion to amend seeking to cancel claims 1–10 and substitute claims 11–18 and requested that the Board issue a Preliminary Guidance. Galderma argued that the claims added new matter because the claims covered compounds with a 16-week responder rate between 50-100% but the specification only disclosed responder rates of up to 62%.Reversing its Preliminary Guidance, the Board found that the substitute claims impermissibly introduced new matter with the inclusion of the responder rate limitation and failed to meet the requirements for revised motions to amend; that the proposed substitute claims were unpatentable for a lack of written description; and that the full scope of the claims was not enabled.The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board’s claim construction of the responder rate limitation as a range. The Board provided adequate explanation for its enablement finding. The Board’s revision of its claim construction of the responder rate limitation made between its Preliminary Guidance and final decision was not arbitrary and capricious, depriving Medytox of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. View "Medytox, Inc. v. Galderma S.A." on Justia Law

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In 2018, Spireon sought to register the mark FL FLEX, for “[e]lectronic devices for tracking the locations of mobile assets" such as trailers, cargo containers, and transportation equipment, using global positioning systems and cellular communication networks. An Examining Attorney approved the application. Flex opposed the registration, citing priority and the likelihood of confusion with Flex’s marks, FLEX, FLEX (stylized), and FLEX PULSE, registered in 2016-2017, for services including supply chain management services, transportation logistics services, and inventory management, and computers, computer software for use in supply chain management, logistics and operations management, quality control, inventory management, scheduling, and related services.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Board sustained Flex’s opposition. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board erred in analyzing conceptual strength under the first DuPont factor, the similarity of the marks, rather than the sixth DuPont factor. The existence of third-party registrations on similar goods can bear on a mark’s conceptual strength. Third-party registrations containing an element that is common to both the opposer’s and the applicant’s marks can show that that element has “a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning.” Flex failed to show that the identical marks for identical goods were not used in the marketplace, but on remand, should be allowed to make such a showing. The Board also erred by comparing FL FLEX to FLEX PLUS rather than the relevant mark. View "Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Lrd." on Justia Law