Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Missouri River, in its natural state, experienced annual flooding that constantly morphed its path and the topography of its floodplain, rendering it unproductive for development. The 1944 Flood Control Act (FCA) authorized the construction of dams to create a reservoir storage system. The FCA required the Army Corps of Engineers to promote navigation and flood control and, secondarily, fish and wildlife conservation. Under the 1945 Bank Stabilization and Navigation Project, the Corps altered the River’s water flow (location, volume, and rate); the floodplain was no longer dynamic by 1980. The Corps' 1979 Master Manual prioritized flood control over recreation and wildlife By 2005, 95 percent of the floodplain was developed for agricultural, urban, and industrial uses. The programs had significant environmental side effects, eliminating fish and bird habitats and interrupting wildlife breeding cycles. In 1986, Congress authorized the Corps to purchase River-adjacent land to recreate lost habitats. The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) placed several species on the endangered species list. The Corps did not make changes recommended by FWS, concerned about exacerbating flooding. Lawsuits followed. The district court ordered the Corps to revise its Master Manual,.The 2004 Master Manual was intended to restore the River to a more natural state.About 372 plaintiffs who operate River-adjacent farms in six states sued, alleging the 2004 Changes caused frequent and severe flooding on their farms and amounted to permanent, physical takings under the Fifth Amendment. The Claims Court determined there was a taking and awarded compensation for the diminished value of the land but dened damages for lost crops. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to the takings claims but vacated the denial of crop damages and a finding that the Government did not causally contribute to 2011 flooding. View "Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The pending claims of the 422 application recite methods of increasing prostacyclin release in the systemic blood vessels of a human with essential hypertension to improve vasodilation. Increased prostacyclin release is achieved by co-administering two well-known antihypertensive agents: a GABA-a agonist and an Angiotensin II Receptor Blocker (ARB). Essentially, the claims relate to combatting hypertension with known anti-hypertensive agents and claiming their previously unappreciated mechanism of action. During prosecution, Couvaras conceded that GABA-a agonists and ARBs “have been known as essential hypertension treatments" for decades. The Examiner agreed, citing 10 references establishing that GABA-a agonists and ARBs lower blood pressure; the claimed results of increased prostacyclin release, activation of uninhibited GABA-a receptors, and smooth muscle relaxation were not patentable because they naturally flowed from the claimed administration of the known antihypertensive agents.The Patent Board affirmed the rejection, holding that the claimed result of an increased prostacyclin release was inherent in the obvious administration of the two known antihypertension agents and that Couvaras’s objective indicia arguments did not overcome the prima facie case of obviousness. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Board erred in affirming that a skilled artisan would have had motivation to combine the art; that the claimed mechanism of action was unexpected, and that the Board erred in discounting its patentable weight; and that the Board erred in weighing objective indicia of nonobviousness. View "In Re Couvaras" on Justia Law

The Parus patents are directed to an interactive voice system that allows a user to request information from a voice web browser. Their shared specification discloses two preferred embodiments: a voice- based web browser system and a voice-activated device controller. On inter parties review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found several claims unpatentable as obvious.The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board’s decision to disregard evidence submitted by Parus and to consider a certain reference prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103. The Board’ determinations concerning written description did not exceed its statutory authority; its finding that the challenged clams were not entitled to an earlier priority date was supported by substantial evidence. View "Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

Blue Gentian owns the asserted patents. Berardi, Blue Gentian’s principal was the sole named inventor on each patent. The utility patents generally relate to an expandable hose. The design patents claim the ornamental design for an expandable hose. Blue Gentian sued Tristar for infringement. Tristar counterclaimed to correct the inventorship of all six patents. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that a nonparty, Ragner, should have been a named co-inventor on all asserted patents and entered judgment on the inventorship counterclaim, ordering correction of the patents under 35 U.S.C. 256.The Federal Circuit affirmed. The district court properly determined that the three key elements were a significant contribution to the conception of at least one claim of each asserted patent. To the extent the district court should have provided a more detailed claim-by-claim comparison of Ragner’s contributions, any error was harmless. The three elements, taken together, were a significant contribution to at least one claim of each asserted patent. Blue Gentian’s insistence that claim construction was a prerequisite to an inventorship hearing, without more, did not present a dispute about claim scope since it did not otherwise present a material dispute about claim meaning. View "Blue Gentian, LLC v. Tristar Products, Inc." on Justia Law

MacNeil’s patents share a specification, covering a “vehicle floor tray . . . thermoformed from a polymer sheet of substantially uniform thickness.” The specification explains the need “for a floor tray that will have a more exact fit to the vehicle footwell” and “that stays in place once it is installed.”In inter partes reviews (IPRs) of challenges to all claims of the patents on obviousness grounds, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board rejected the challenges, concluding that—although a relevant artisan would have been motivated to combine, and had a reasonable expectation of success in combining, the teachings of the asserted prior-art references to arrive at each challenged claim—“[MacNeil’s] evidence of secondary considerations [was] compelling and indicative of non-obviousness.” The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board made a result-determinative legal error regarding MacNeil’s secondary-consideration evidence; the finding of secondary considerations lacks substantial-evidence support under the proper legal standard. View "Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) contracted with Eagle for construction work in Yellowstone National Park, to be completed by October 2018. The contract required Eagle to submit a schedule detailing how it would complete the project on time. By late January 2017, FHWA had rejected Eagle’s eight formal schedule submissions as not complying with the contract. In February 2017, the contracting officer terminated the contract for default, concluding that Eagle was insufficiently likely to complete the project on time.Eagle challenged the termination for default under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 7101–7109, before the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, which ruled that the termination for default was improper. The Board converted the termination to one for the convenience of the government, relying heavily, though not exclusively, on its view of deficiencies in the contracting officer’s reasoning, rather than on de novo findings about whether the record developed before the Board showed that standard for termination for default was met. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for the Board to adjudicate the case de novo. The Board’s evaluation of the contracting officer’s reasoning exceeded the limited scope of the threshold inquiry. The Board also failed to separate that threshold analysis from its de novo evaluation of the evidence. View "Department of Transportation v. Eagle Peak Rock & Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

For decades, cardiologists have used guide catheters to deliver interventional cardiology devices (e.g., guidewires, stents, balloon catheters) designed to alleviate stenoses. These procedures involved certain challenges and risks. Telex’s patents sought to address these problems by using a coaxial extension catheter insertable into standard guide catheters that offered increased backup support and the ability to deep seat without the attendant drawbacks of traditional systems.Medtronic petitioned for inter partes review (IPR), alleging the challenged claims would have been obvious over prior art. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found certain claims unpatentable. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board did not err in determining Medtronic failed to carry its burden to show that certain claims would have been obvious, and substantial evidence supports its underlying findings of fact. The court also upheld the Board’s determination that Telex's proposed Substitute Claims had adequate written description support and would not have been obvious over Medtronic’s asserted grounds. View "Medtronic, Inc. v. Teleflex Innovations S.à.r.l." on Justia Law

Hampton served in the Navy from 1985-1989. In 1997, she filed a claim for VA disability compensation for migraines. In 1998, the regional office (RO) increased Hampton’s rating to 30 percent, effective from 1997. In 1999, Hampton applied for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) effective from 1997 due to “migraine[s], bladder, [and] reflux.” The RO denied TDIU. Hampton never filed a notice of disagreement but filed a new claim for increased compensation based on migraines. This claim was denied in 1999; Hampton filed a notice of disagreement. In 2000, the Board affirmed the RO. In 2003, Hampton filed a new claim for increased compensation and a second TDIU application. The Board ultimately granted Hampton TDIU, effective from 2003. Hampton argued that her 1999 TDIU claim was still pending because she submitted additional evidence within the one-year appeal window but never received a determination. The Board denied entitlement to an earlier effective date, finding that the 1999 TDIU claim was not still pending when Hampton filed her 2003 claims.The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed; 38 CFR 3.156(b) does not require the VA to explicitly state whether submitted evidence is new and material to a claim, where that claim is implicitly denied after consideration of the evidence. The Board’s 2020 decision, by finding the 2000 decision an implicit denial of TDIU, was not making a new and material evidence determination in the first instance. The RO did so in 1999. View "Hampton v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Wilmington charges its residential and non-residential property owners a stormwater management fee, based on an estimation of each property’s contribution to stormwater runoff. Because a precise measure of the actual amount of stormwater pollution from each property is impossible, the city devised a methodology for approximating the runoff attributable to each property based on recommendations from an engineering firm. For non-residential properties, the city assesses the fee based on a formula comprised of four variables. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) owns five properties in Wilmington, comprising 270 acres, classified as vacant, and used to store dredged material. USACE disputed whether the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1323, waived its sovereign immunity with respect to this fee.The Federal Circuit affirmed a Claims Court holding that the fees are not reasonable service charges, allowable under the CWA. Wilmington did not explain how the vacant land use code corresponded to the runoff coefficients nor whether its stormwater class fairly captured variability in vacant parcels, given that only one parcel contains any paved surface. Wilmington’s methodology, as applied, led to charges that are not a fair approximation of the properties’ proportionate contribution to stormwater pollution. View "City of Wilmington, Delaware v. United States" on Justia Law

Kelly served as a Navy diver from 2008-2013 and received numerous accolades but suffered multiple injuries. Following a 2012 dive mission, Kelly received hyperbaric chamber treatment. Kelly then experienced emotional and behavioral changes. He was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder, depressed mood, and anxiety. In 2013, Kelly was cited for criminal incidents. The Navy removed Kelly’s diver classification. Kelly was discharged “Under Honorable Conditions (general).” The narrative recited “misconduct” for the commission of a “serious offense.” Based on the “liberal consideration” policy, the Discharge Review Board removed the reason for separation.Kelly subsequently requested that the Record Correction Board correct his military records to reflect disability retirement under 10 U.S.C. 1201. A Senior Medical Officer advisor opined that Kelly was fit to perform his duties at the time of his separation and that his misconduct did not result from “a legal[ly] exculpating level of psychological impairment incident to a potentially compensable psychiatric condition.” The Board denied Kelly’s request.The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board failed to evaluate all relevant criteria under Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1850.4E 3304 (common military tasks, physical readiness/fitness tests, deployability, special qualifications); failure to evaluate the effect the upgrade change in Kelly’s record had on his eligibility for retirement disability pay was arbitrary. The Board must determine whether Kelly’s medical condition affected his deployability or special qualifications. Section 1201 military disability retirement benefits are nondiscretionary and statutorily mandated; they confer a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. View "Kelly v. United States" on Justia Law