Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Blue Sky The Color of Imagination, LLC imported a spiral-bound paper product that combines monthly calendars, weekly planning pages, note sections, and additional pages for goals and contacts. Blue Sky labeled this item a “weekly/monthly planning calendar,” while the government referred to it as a “planner.” The product was designed for users to schedule future appointments and events.Initially, Customs and Border Protection classified this product under subheading 4820.10.40.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), as “[o]ther” stationery items. Blue Sky protested, seeking classification under heading 4910 as a “calendar,” but Customs denied the protest. Blue Sky then filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade. The Trade Court granted summary judgment, rejecting both parties’ proposed classifications and instead classified the product as a “diary” under subheading 4820.10.20.10. The Trade Court reasoned that “diary” covers both retrospective journals and prospective scheduling devices, and found Blue Sky’s product fit this category.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Trade Court’s summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit found that the Trade Court’s definition of “diary” conflicted with the controlling precedent set in Mead Corp. v. United States, which held that a “diary” is retrospective, not prospective. Because Blue Sky’s product is used to note future appointments, the Federal Circuit concluded that it cannot be classified as a “diary.” The court reversed the Trade Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the Trade Court to reconsider the proper classification under the HTSUS. View "BLUE SKY THE COLOR OF IMAGINATION, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

The claimant served in the U.S. Navy and, upon his voluntary separation in 1992, received a lump sum Special Separation Benefit (SSB) under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a. Many years later, in 2017, he was awarded VA disability compensation with entitlement to a total disability rating, effective from late 2016. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) notified him that it would withhold a portion of his monthly disability benefits to recoup the SSB payment, which the claimant contested, arguing that SSB payments are not subject to recoupment and that the relevant statutory authority did not apply to his situation.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that the VA acted properly in withholding his disability compensation to recoup the SSB payment. The claimant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision. He sought reconsideration, asserting that the court had relied upon the wrong statutory provision. The Veterans Court granted reconsideration, but in its new decision, it again held that the relevant statute required recoupment of his SSB payment from his VA disability compensation, and affirmed the Board’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that 10 U.S.C. § 1174(h)(2) applies to SSB payments received under 10 U.S.C. § 1174a, requiring such payments to be deducted from VA disability compensation. The court rejected the claimant’s alternative statutory interpretation, finding it inconsistent with the statutory text and structure. The court also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction arguments that were not addressed by the Veterans Court. The judgment was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "COLAGE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a patent for a type of cancer treatment called an antibody-drug conjugate (ADC), which combines an antibody, a cytotoxic drug, and a linker protein. The patent at issue claimed a particular kind of linker, a tetrapeptide consisting only of glycine and phenylalanine amino acids. Seagen, the patent holder, sued Daichii Sankyo and AstraZeneca, alleging that their ADC product, Enhertu, infringed claims of this patent. Notably, Enhertu contains the specific tetrapeptide sequence described in the patent. The patent’s priority was claimed from a 2004 application, though the sequence in question had not been expressly disclosed in that earlier filing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial. The jury found the asserted patent claims valid, not invalid for lack of written description or enablement, and determined that the defendants had willfully infringed. Damages exceeding $41 million were awarded to Seagen. The district court denied the defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), upholding the jury’s verdict and entering final judgment for Seagen.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in denying JMOL because the original 2004 application did not provide adequate written description support for the claimed subgenus of Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides. The Federal Circuit found that the patent specification failed to demonstrate that the inventors possessed the claimed invention as of the 2004 filing date, and that the patent was not enabled because a skilled artisan would need to engage in undue experimentation to make and use the full scope of the claimed ADCs. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, found the patent invalid, and vacated the jury’s findings of infringement and damages. View "SEAGEN INC. v. DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY, LTD. " on Justia Law

The case involves Gesture Technology Partners, LLC, which owns U.S. Patent No. 7,933,431 related to methods and apparatus for rapid TV camera and computer-based sensing of objects and human input, usable in devices such as handhelds, cars, and video games. After Samsung Electronics requested an ex parte reexamination of the patent, the United States Patent and Trademark Office initiated proceedings. Concurrently, two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings were filed against the same patent by Unified Patents LLC and other entities, resulting in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board invalidating most claims of the patent.After the Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued final written decisions in both IPRs, Gesture Technology Partners petitioned the Patent Office to terminate the ex parte reexamination, arguing that Samsung, as a party to the IPR, was estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) from maintaining further proceedings on grounds that could have been raised in the IPRs. The Patent Office denied the petition, holding that the estoppel provision did not apply to ongoing ex parte reexaminations. Subsequently, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claims 11 and 13 as anticipated by a prior patent, Liebermann. Gesture appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) does not apply to ongoing ex parte reexamination proceedings, as the requester does not “maintain” the proceeding—the Patent Office does. The court also affirmed the Board’s finding that the Liebermann patent anticipates claims 11 and 13. Furthermore, it rejected the argument that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the patent had expired, citing continued rights to past damages. The court affirmed the Board’s decision as to claims 11 and 13 and dismissed the appeal as to the previously invalidated claims. View "In Re GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC " on Justia Law

Akamai Technologies, Inc. filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement regarding two patents owned by AMHC, Inc. and its subsidiary, MediaPointe, Inc. These patents describe systems and methods for efficiently routing streamed media content over the Internet using an “intelligent distribution network.” After Akamai initiated litigation, MediaPointe counterclaimed for infringement, and Akamai further sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity.During claim construction, the district court issued an order finding that certain claims containing the terms “optimal” and “best” were invalid for indefiniteness. For the remaining asserted claims, the district court granted Akamai summary judgment of noninfringement. The court excluded key portions of MediaPointe’s expert testimony as untimely, and also found that, even considering that testimony, MediaPointe’s evidence did not create a genuine dispute regarding infringement. Specifically, the court determined that the accused Akamai system did not meet the required limitation of “receiving an initial request for media content” as understood in the context of the patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed both the invalidity and noninfringement judgments. The court held that the “optimal” and “best” claim terms were indefinite because the intrinsic record failed to provide objective boundaries for determining what is “optimal” or “best.” The court also concluded that, even with the excluded expert testimony included, MediaPointe had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. MEDIAPOINTE, INC. " on Justia Law

EscapeX IP, LLC brought a patent infringement suit against Google LLC, alleging that Google’s YouTube Music product infringed its ’113 patent. After Google responded, pointing out factual deficiencies in EscapeX’s claims and highlighting that the accused features either did not exist or predated the patent, EscapeX amended its complaint to target a different Google product. Google repeatedly notified EscapeX that its claims were baseless and requested dismissal, but EscapeX did not respond. The case was transferred from the Western District of Texas to the Northern District of California. Meanwhile, a separate court found all claims of the ’113 patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which EscapeX did not appeal.Upon transfer, EscapeX attempted to file a joint stipulation of dismissal without Google’s consent, misstating that both parties would bear their own fees. Google demanded withdrawal, and a corrected stipulation was later filed. Google moved for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, arguing EscapeX’s claims were frivolous and that EscapeX had unreasonably prolonged litigation. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Google to be the prevailing party, determined EscapeX’s case was exceptional due to its lack of adequate pre-suit investigation and frivolous claims, and awarded Google attorneys’ fees and costs. EscapeX then moved to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), presenting new declarations as “new evidence,” but the district court denied the motion, finding the evidence was not newly discovered.Google sought additional attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for costs incurred opposing EscapeX’s Rule 59(e) motion. The district court found EscapeX’s motion frivolous and sanctioned EscapeX and its attorneys jointly and severally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed all of the district court’s orders. The main holdings were that the case was exceptional under § 285, supporting an award of attorneys’ fees, and that sanctions under § 1927 for frivolous litigation conduct were appropriate. View "ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was removed from his position in 2012. He appealed his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and in 2013, he and the VA reached a settlement agreement. The agreement provided that the VA would furnish a neutral employment reference, disclosing only the dates of employment, job title, and that the officer resigned, with no further information. Years later, the officer received a conditional job offer from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but the offer was revoked after a background investigation. The officer learned that a VA Human Resources officer had informed investigators that her disclosures were restricted by a legal agreement, which the officer believed violated the settlement’s terms.The officer filed a petition for enforcement (PFE) of the settlement agreement with the MSPB in January 2018, claiming the VA breached the agreement, leading to the loss of his DHS job opportunity. The VA moved to dismiss the PFE as untimely. An MSPB administrative judge found that the officer became aware of the alleged breach in November 2016 and concluded that his fourteen-month delay in filing the PFE was unreasonable. The Board adopted the administrative judge’s decision, holding that, even if the officer did not fully realize the harm until his DHS offer was rescinded in September 2017, the subsequent four-month delay was also unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision. The court held that the officer filed his petition within a reasonable time under the circumstances. It found that waiting to file until the officer experienced actual harm was not unreasonable, and the ten-month and four-month periods between knowledge of the breach, loss of the job offer, and filing were both reasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "REYES v. MSPB " on Justia Law

Duke University and Allergan Sales, LLC own a patent relating to methods for treating hair loss using certain prostaglandin F (PGF) analogs. The patent describes a method of growing hair by topically applying a composition containing a PGF analog with specific structural features. Allergan markets Latisse®, a product containing bimatoprost, a PGF analog, for eyelash hair growth. Sandoz manufactures a generic version of Latisse®. Allergan sued Sandoz for patent infringement, specifically asserting claim 30 of the patent, which covers a subgenus of PGF analogs with defined chemical characteristics.In the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Sandoz stipulated to infringement but challenged the validity of claim 30, arguing it lacked adequate written description, was obvious, and not enabled. After a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Allergan on all grounds, concluding Sandoz had not proven invalidity and awarding damages. Sandoz moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, both of which the district court denied. Sandoz then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying Tenth Circuit standards. The Federal Circuit held that no reasonable jury could have found that claim 30 was adequately described in the patent specification. The court found that the specification broadly described billions of compounds, while claim 30 covered a much narrower subgenus, and the patent failed to provide sufficient guidance (“blaze marks”) to direct a skilled artisan to the claimed compounds. The court concluded that the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) was not met and reversed the district court’s judgment, holding claim 30 invalid for lack of adequate written description. View "DUKE UNIVERSITY v. SANDOZ INC. " on Justia Law

Turkish steel producers, including Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S., were subject to a countervailing duty (CVD) order after the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that the Turkish government subsidized steel rebar exports. During an administrative review, Commerce found that Kaptan sourced steel scrap, a key input for rebar, from several affiliates, including Nur, a shipbuilder. Commerce initially determined that Nur’s steel scrap was primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production, making Nur a cross-owned input supplier whose subsidies should be attributed to Kaptan, thereby increasing Kaptan’s CVD rate.The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed Commerce’s decision after Kaptan challenged the cross-attribution of Nur’s subsidies. The CIT found that Commerce had not adequately explained whether steel scrap was merely a link in the rebar production chain or addressed prior cases treating steel scrap as a byproduct. The CIT remanded the case for further explanation. On remand, Commerce developed a multi-factor analysis and ultimately reversed its position, finding that Nur’s steel scrap was a common, unprocessed input used in various products and industries, and that Nur’s primary business activity—shipbuilding—was not dedicated almost exclusively to producing rebar. As a result, Commerce concluded that Nur was not a cross-owned input supplier, and Kaptan’s CVD rate was reduced to a de minimis level. The CIT sustained Commerce’s remand decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision for abuse of discretion and Commerce’s remand findings for substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce’s determination that Nur’s steel scrap was not primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production was adequately explained, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with the applicable regulation. View "KAPTAN DEMIR CELIK ENDUSTRISI VE TICARET A.S. v. US " on Justia Law

Nutricia North America, Inc. imported five products from the United Kingdom that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classified as “medical foods” under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. These products are specially formulated for individuals with specific metabolic or medical conditions, such as phenylketonuria, intractable epilepsy, and other disorders that require nutritional therapy not achievable through ordinary diet modification. The products are administered enterally, contain no active pharmacological ingredients, and are intended for use under medical supervision.Upon importation in 2014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified these products under subheading 2106.90.99 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), which covers “food preparations not elsewhere specified” and imposes a duty. Nutricia protested, arguing that the products should be classified as “medicaments” under heading 3004 of chapter 30, which would allow duty-free entry, or alternatively under a duty-free provision for articles for handicapped persons in chapter 98. Customs denied the protests, and Nutricia filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the products were excluded from chapter 30 by note 1(a) and thus properly classified under chapter 21.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit held that Nutricia’s medical foods are properly classified under heading 3004 as “medicaments” because they are specially formulated for therapeutic or prophylactic uses under medical supervision. The court found that chapter 30 note 1(a) does not exclude these medical foods from heading 3004. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s judgment and remanded for determination of the appropriate subheading under heading 3004. View "NUTRICIA NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. US " on Justia Law