Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sanofi-Aventis’s 614 patent, entitled “Drug Delivery Device and Method of Manufacturing a Drug Delivery Device,” relates to a “drug delivery device” that can be “configured to allow setting of different dose sizes.” Mylan petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board for inter partes review of claims 1–18, citing a combination of three prior art references: Burren, Venezia, and de Gennes. Mylan relied on Burren—cited as prior art within the 614 patent—to teach the use of springs within a drug-delivery device and sought to combine Burren with Venezia to teach the use of spring washers within drug-delivery devices and de Gennes to add “snap-fit engagement grips” to secure the spring washer. Mylan argued that “De Gennes, while concerned with a clutch bearing [in automobiles], addresses a problem analogous to that addressed in Burren (axially [sic] fixation and support of two components relative to one another).”The Board found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit reversed. Mylan failed to argue that de Gennes constitutes analogous art to the 614 patent and instead compared de Gennes to another prior art reference. Mylan did not meet its burden to establish obviousness premised on de Gennes. The Board’s factual findings regarding analogousness are not supported by substantial evidence. View "Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc." on Justia Law

UCANN sued Hemp for infringing its patent, entitled “Cannabis Extracts and Methods of Preparing and Using the Same.” UCANN filed for bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the litigation. After the bankruptcy petition was dismissed, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the patent case. UCANN’s infringement claims were dismissed with prejudice; Hemp’s invalidity and inequitable conduct counterclaims were dismissed without prejudice.Hemp sought attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, 28 U.S.C. 1927, and the court’s inherent authority, claiming that UCANN’s prosecution counsel had committed inequitable conduct by copying text from a piece of prior art into the specification of the patent and not disclosing it to the Patent and Trademark Office as prior art and UCANN’s litigation counsel purportedly took conflicting positions in its representation of UCANN and another client (the owner of the prior art). Hemp expressly notified the court that it did not seek any further proceedings, including a trial or evidentiary hearing, in connection with its motion. The district court denied the motion based on the existing record.The Federal Circuit affirmed upholding findings that Hemp failed to establish that it is the prevailing party under section 285, that this is an “exceptional” case warranting an attorney’s fee award, or that UCANN’s counsel acted in a vexatious or otherwise unreasonable manner. While Hemp’s position was extremely weak, it was neither “frivolous as filed” nor “frivolous as argued.” View "United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc." on Justia Law

Frazier served in the Navy from 1988-1993. In 2008, Frazier fractured the fourth and fifth fingers of his right hand after being startled by a nightmare--according to Frazier, a frequent occurrence due to PTSD, a disability for which Frazier had been awarded service connection. The VA's examining physician noted that Frazier experienced pain in his right hand and that the injury was secondary to his PTSD but that the pain “does not result in/cause functional loss.” The Board of Veterans Appeals granted Frazier service connection for the injury; the regional office assigned a noncompensable rating for that injury,The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Frazier’s argument that he was entitled to a compensable rating of 10 percent under 38 C.F.R. 4.59. That regulation provides: The intent of the schedule is to recognize painful motion with joint or periarticular pathology as productive of disability. It is the intention to recognize actually painful, unstable, or malaligned joints, due to healed injury, as entitled to at least the minimum compensable rating for the joint. Frazier cited Diagnostic Codes 5219 and 5223, which provide 20 percent and 10 percent ratings, respectively, for unfavorable and favorable ankylosis of the ring and little fingers. The Board properly focused on Diagnostic Code 5230, which provides for a zero percent rating for limitations of motion in the little or ring fingers. Section 4.59 does not “create a freestanding painful motion disability that is always entitled to a 10% disability rating” and Frazier did not have ankylosis. View "Frazier v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Hormel met with Howard of HIP, which produced food safety and thermal processing equipment. The parties entered into an agreement to develop an oven for a particular process. Hormel conducted testing relating to color development, using both an infrared oven and a conventional spiral oven. Howard later alleged that it was during the meetings and testing that he disclosed the infrared preheating concept at issue. Hormel conducted additional testing using HIP’s test oven at Hormel's facility. The testing eventually revealed that turning off internal electrical heating elements in the oven solved the charred, off-flavor of bacon, and preheating the bacon with a microwave oven prevented condensation from washing away the flavor. That testing resulted in a two-step cooking process, the first step involving preheating the bacon and the second step involving cooking the meat in a superheated steam oven.Hormel filed a non-provisional patent application for the two-step cooking process in 2011, listing four joint inventors, who assigned their interests to Hormel. The application issued as the 498 patent. HIP sued, alleging that Howard was either the sole inventor or a joint inventor. The district court concluded that he was a joint inventor, 35 U.S.C. 256, based on his alleged contribution of the infrared preheating concept. The Federal Circuit reversed. Howard’s alleged contribution of preheating meat pieces using an infrared oven is “insignificant in quality” to the claimed invention. View "HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp" on Justia Law

Moore is a male Examination Manager at the SEC's Washington, D.C. headquarters. Two women Examination Managers in that office perform the same work as Moore under similar working conditions. In 2014, the SEC initiated a Pay Transition Program to recalibrate its employees’ pay so that they could receive credit for years of relevant work experience regardless of their SEC hire date. The Program was open to all SEC employees from September 14-October 14, 2014. The women applied for the Program during this open period. Moore did not, due to family-related issues occupying his attention. The SEC permitted 10 other employees with extenuating circumstances to apply for the Program in November-December 2014. Program pay adjustments began taking effect around June 2015; the women’s salaries were increased. In August-September 2016, Moore unsuccessfully tried to apply for the Program.Moore's Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), lawsuit argues that the SEC lacks justification for any Program-related pay differential between him and the women because the application process was unnecessary, given that the SEC always had the necessary information in its records and the SEC had no valid basis for creating, or not extending, an application deadline. The Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal of Moore’s complaint, first overruling its own 2009 decision, Yant, which added an element to the prima facie case–a showing that the pay differential “is either historically or presently based on sex.” The court remanded for consideration on non-Yant grounds. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law

Bean served in the U.S. Army from 1966-1969. In 1997, he sought disability compensation. Bean was diagnosed with major depression and generalized anxiety disorder, but not PTSD. The VA denied him entitlement to service connection for PTSD. In 2006, Bean sought service connection for major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and PTSD. In response, the VA notified Bean that it was “working on [his] application for service-connected compensation” for major depression and generalized anxiety disorder and his “claim to reopen for” his PTSD-related claim. In 2007, he was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder. The VA found service connection for PTSD, deemed the PTSD 30% disabling, and assigned an August 2006 effective date. Bean filed a Notice of Disagreement, concerning the disability rating and effective date.In 2012, the Board of Veterans Affairs addressed Bean’s rating. Bean sought reconsideration. In 2019, the Board dismissed Bean’s appeal of the 2013 denial of his claim without addressing the merits.The Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. When a claim is adequately presented to, but is not addressed by the Board, the Board’s disposition of the appeal constitutes the Board's decision on that claim that may be appealed to the Veterans Court. The Veterans Court's jurisdiction is not limited to the Board's affirmative determinations and covers the disposition of an appeal that is challenged as improperly failing to address contentions clearly before the Board. View "Bean v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Crawford served in the U.S. Army and Florida National Guard for two decades. He was discharged in 2011 due to his service-connected PTSD. Crawford’s PTSD began after his second tour of duty in Iraq. The Florida State Surgeons Medical Discharge Review Board (SSMDRB) found Crawford did not meet medical retention standards and that his PTSD was incurred in the line of duty. It recommended a fitness determination by a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB), a prerequisite for medical retirement, 10 U.S.C. 1201. Crawford was not referred to a PEB but was discharged as if his PTSD was not service-related, without medical retirement.Crawford sought correction of his records and retroactive benefits before the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR). Notwithstanding the SSMDRB’s findings and the fact that Crawford was discharged for failure to meet medical retention standards, a doctor opined Crawford met retention standards at the time of his discharge. Crawford filed suit. On the government's motion, the court remanded for a fitness determination and development of the record. On remand, the ABCMR found Crawford was entitled to medical retirement based solely on the evidence available at the time of his separation and granted him complete relief, including the correction of his records and retroactive medical retirement benefits.The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of Crawford’s subsequent motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Crawford was a prevailing party. View "Crawford v. United States" on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce initiated a countervailing duty investigation concerning imports of softwood lumber products from Canada and individually investigated five groups of companies that produced and/or exported covered products. Commerce issued a final determination, imposing duties on the products of those companies at company-specific rates ranging from 3.34% to 18.19%, with an “all-others” rate, 14.19%. Within days of publication of the countervailing duty (CVD) order in January 2018, about 36 Canadian companies that alleged they were subject to the all-others rate requested “expedited review” to give them individually determined rates. Commerce initiated that review and ultimately awarded the individual requesters reduced or de minimis CVD rates.A domestic trade group filed suit, arguing that Commerce lacked statutory authority to create the expedited-review process. Canadian parties intervened and, with the United States, asserted that Commerce had the authority to adopt the expedited-review procedures of 19 C.F.R. 351.214(k) to give exporters a chance to secure individual rates shortly after the publication of a CVD order, arguing for the existence of such authority chiefly in provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). The Trade Court ruled against Commerce. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the Secretary had statutory authority to adopt the expedited-review process as a procedure for implementing statutory provisions that authorize individualized determinations in CVD proceedings, 19 U.S.C. 1667f1(e), 1677m, 3513(a)(2). View "Committee Overseeing Action for Lumber International Trade Investigations or Negotiations v. United States" on Justia Law

For pressing projects, the government can issue “Undefinitized Contract Actions” (UCAs) to allow contractors to begin work before the parties have reached a final agreement on contract terms, like price. The Air Force entered into two UCAs with Lockheed for upgrades to F-16 aircraft. Both UCAs include “definitization” clauses that provide that if the parties are unable to reach agreements on price by a certain time, the Contracting Officer (CO) may determine a reasonable price. After years of negotiations, the Air Force and Lockheed were unable to agree on the price terms. The CO assigned to each UCA unilaterally definitized a price of about $1 billion.The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), acting under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), dismissed appeals for lack of jurisdiction because Lockheed failed to submit a certified contractor claim to the COs requesting a final decision on its claims as required under the CDA. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Lockheed’s argument that the COs’ unilateral definitizations qualified as government claims under the CDA, which a contractor can directly appeal to the ASBCA without having to submit its own claim to the COs. The COs’ definitizations of the contract prices were not demands or assertions by the government seeking relief against Lockheed. View "Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. v. Secretary of the Air Force" on Justia Law

Corning filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission alleging FS violated 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed four patents that generally relate to fiber optic technology commonly used in data centers. After investigating, the ALJ found that FS’ importation of high-density fiber optic equipment violated section 337; that FS induced infringement of two claims of the 320 patent, multiple claims of the 456 patent, and four claims of the 153 patent; and that FS’ accused modules directly infringed claims of the 206 patent. The ALJ adopted the Office of Unfair Import Investigations’ construction of “a front opening” as recited in the claims. The ALJ rejected invalidity challenges, including arguments that certain claims of the 320 and 456 patents were not enabled.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination that FS violated section 337, and issuance a general exclusion order prohibiting the importation of infringing high-density fiber optic equipment and components thereof and a cease-and-desist order directed to FS. The court upheld the enablement determination and the claim construction of “a front opening.” View "FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law