Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Crews served in the Air Force from 1954-1958. In connection with his service, he was originally granted a 100% disability rating for schizophrenia. In 1960, his disability rating was lowered to 70%. In 2006, Crews sought an increased schizophrenia rating, which was denied in 2007. In 2009, Mrs. Crews (Yvonne) submitted a letter stating that Crews was 100% disabled and requested further evaluation; she did not mention an effective date. The VA responded that it would not consider the letter a notice of disagreement (NOD) with the 2007 decision because it was filed more than one year after that decision. It construed the letter as a new “claim for an increased rating. In March 2010, the VA increased his schizophrenia rating from 70% to 100% effective from September 2009. In October 2010, Crews died. In 2011, Yvonne moved to be substituted as the appellant and filed a notice of disagreement with the 2009 effective date, alleging clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the 1960 rating decision.The VA rejected her request for substitution because Crews had no claim or NOD pending at the time of his death. Yvonne was not eligible to seek benefits on past decisions that had been finalized; the 1960 rating decision became final once the appeal window closed. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. Yvonne’s CUE allegation is not part of a “pending” claim for which she could substitute under 38 U.S.C. 5121A. View "Crews v. McDonough" on Justia Law

In 2017-2018, Borusan imported circular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes that were subject to decades-old antidumping duties. In 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9705 separately imposed a duty on imported steel articles (including Borusan’s carbon steel pipe) under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. 1862. In the annual administrative review of the antidumping duties owed on Borusan’s imports for May 2017–April 2018, the Department of Commerce treated the Proclamation 9705 duty as a “United States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. 1677a(c)(2)(A), resulting in higher antidumping duties for Borusan’s imports.The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit affirmed. Commerce correctly determined that the particular duty imposed by Proclamation 9705 is a “United States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. 1677a(c)(2)(A). Proclamation 9705 makes clear that the newly-imposed duty was to add to, not partly or wholly offset, the antidumping duties that would be due without the new duty The antidumping duty must be calculated as if the Proclamation 9705 duty did not exist. This treatment is not inconsistent with Commerce’s long-recognized categorical exclusion of antidumping duties themselves from classification as “United States import duties.” Antidumping duties cannot be subtracted in the calculation of dumping margins (and hence antidumping duties), because doing so would produce a spiraling circularity. View "Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States" on Justia Law

AlterWAN sued Amazon for infringement of two patents concerning improvements to implementing wide area networks (WANs) over the Internet. The patents share a common specification that describes two core problems with WANs: latency (delay) due to uncontrolled “hops” from one node to another while the data packet is en route to its destination and the lack of security for data transmitted over the Internet. The patents purport to address those problems with a “private tunnel” that provides “preplanned high bandwidth, low hop-count routing paths between pairs of customer sites.” The parties disputed claim construction of the terms “non-blocking bandwidth” and “cooperating service provider.”The district court agreed with Amazon’s constructions: “bandwidth that will always be available and will always be sufficient,” even if the Internet is down, and changed its construction of “cooperating service provider” to be a “service provider that agrees to provide non-blocking bandwidth.” The Federal Circuit vacated a stipulated judgment of non-infringement that provided that Amazon does not infringe under the court’s constructions of the two terms. Under the circumstances of this case, the stipulation does not provide sufficient detail to the resolution of the claim construction issues presented on appeal. View "AlterWAN, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

PACT’s 908 patent relates to multiprocessor systems and how processors in those systems access data. Multiprocessor systems typically store data in several places: a main memory, where all of a system’s data is stored, and various cache memories, where smaller pieces of that same data are stored. Cache memories are closer to the processors, allowing the processors quicker access to the data available in a given cache. A system can use multiple cache levels, where a primary cache is closer to the processer but can store less data than a further-away secondary cache. The use of multiple cache memories can pose problems for cache coherency.In seeking inter partes review (IPR), Intel asserted that the prior art taught a multiprocessor system that used the separated cache and interconnect system as described in the patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board determined that Intel had failed to establish obviousness in light of prior art. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board’s finding that prior art did not teach the segment-to-segment limitation and its rejection of Intel’s “known-technique” rationale for a motivation to combine lacked substantial evidence. View "Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Apple and four other companies, have repeatedly been sued for patent infringement and thereafter petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to institute inter partes reviews (IPRs), under 35 U.S.C. 311–319, with unpatentability challenges to patent claims that were asserted against them in court. They sued the PTO under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701– 706, challenging instructions issued to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board concerning how to exercise, under delegation by the Director, the Director’s discretion whether to institute a requested IPR. Plaintiffs assert that the instructions are likely to produce too many denials.The district court dismissed the APA action, finding that the Director’s instructions were made unreviewable by 35 U.S.C. 314(d): “The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under [section 314] shall be final and nonappealable.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the unreviewability dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenges to the instructions as being contrary to the statute and arbitrary and capricious. No constitutional challenges are presented. The court reversed the unreviewability dismissal of the challenge to the instructions as having been improperly issued because they had to be, but were not, promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553. Apple had standing to present that challenge. View "Apple Inc. v. Vidal" on Justia Law

In their divorce settlement, Roman gave Iris $150,000. Iris transferred to Roman her interest in their home. Roman agreed to pay any taxes assessed on Iris for her receipt of the $150,000. The IRS assessed $50,002.04 in taxes and penalties and mailed her a notice of intent to take possession of her property, including the home. Although Iris no longer had any ownership rights in the home and no lien had been placed, an IRS employee stated that the tax liability must be paid to stop a levy against Roman’s home and that Roman could appeal once the tax was paid. Roman apparently believed that he had no alternative to paying "a tax that he did not owe.” An installment agreement listed Iris as the taxpayer, identifying Roman’s checking account. Roman did not sign the agreement but sent the IRS payments until the obligation was satisfied.Roman sought a refund, arguing that under 26 U.S.C. 121(a) his payment to Iris qualified for an exclusion from gross income of gain for certain sales of a principal residence. The Federal Circuit vacated Roman’s award. Roman was not a “taxpayer” under 26 U.S.C. 6511(a), so the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Roman’s third-party refund claim under section 1346(a)(1). Roman nevertheless pled a claim under 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1); a party who pays a tax for which he is not liable may sue to recover that tax if it was paid under duress. View "Roman v. United States" on Justia Law

Spicer served in the Air Force from 1958-1959 and was exposed to benzene in aircraft fuel. Years later, he developed chronic myeloid leukemia, a blood cancer. The VA recognized his leukemia as service-connected and granted him a 100 percent disability rating. Spicer developed arthritis in both knees, which required him to use a wheelchair. His scheduled knee replacement surgery was canceled because the leukemia medications lowered his hematocrit (red blood cell level). Spicer's hematocrit will never rise to a level that would permit surgery. He sought secondary service connection for his knee disability. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals and Veterans' Court affirmed the VA's denial of his claim. The statute, 38 U.S.C. 1110 establishes entitlement to service connection, providing compensation for veterans “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty.” The court reasoned that unless “the current state of his arthritis would not exist in the absence of his cancer or chemotherapy,” there is “no actual but-for causation.”The Federal Circuit vacated. Section 1110 provides that the United States will pay a veteran “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty”; “disability” refers to a veteran’s present-day “functional impairment.” “Resulting from" requires “but-for causation,” which is not limited to bringing something about or the onset or etiological link. That language may encompass situations where the service-connected disease or injury impedes the treatment of a disability. View "Spicer v. McDonough" on Justia Law

May is a disabled child of a deceased veteran. The VA found that May was disabled from birth, with permanent incapacity for self-support, and granted him entitlement to dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) benefits in October 2018, with an effective date of May 18, 2016, concluding that May’s entitlement to DIC benefits ended on February 1, 2017, when he married. May sought reinstatement of DIC benefits based on his divorce. May filed a notice of appeal to the Veterans Court in February 2021, listing the date of the Board’s decision as February 19, 2019. The Board had not rendered a decision on February 19, 2019; rather, May had received correspondence that day from a VA regional office certifying an appeal to the Board.The Veterans Court ordered May to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. In letters, May asked that his appeal not be dismissed and that his benefits be reinstated. May did not identify a Board decision from which he was appealing, nor did he argue that the Board had unreasonably delayed its decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court’s jurisdiction is limited to appeals from Board decisions; absent such a decision, it could not consider May’s appeal, 38 U.S.C. 7252(a), 7266(a)). View "May v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Gilead filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition challenging claims of the University of Minnesota’s 830 patent, directed to phosphoramidate prodrugs of nucleoside derivatives that prevent viruses from reproducing or cancerous tumors from growing. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board found certain claims unpatentable as anticipated by the asserted prior art.The Federal Circuit affirmed. There is no “ipsis verbis” written description disclosure sufficient to support the patent’s claims, 35 U.S.C. 112. The court referred to “a compendium of common organic chemical functional groups, yielding a laundry list disclosure of different moieties for every possible side chain or functional group. Indeed, the listings of possibilities are so long, and so interwoven, that it is quite unclear how many compounds actually fall within the described genera and subgenera.” The court found no violations of the Administrative Procedures Act and rejected the University argument that sovereign immunity barred IPR proceedings against it. View "Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Gilead Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Commerce issued duty orders covering imports from China of “aluminum extrusions which are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process, made from” specified aluminum alloys; "parts for final finished products that are assembled after importation, including, but not limited to, window frames, door frames, solar panels, curtain walls, or furniture." The scope includes aluminum extrusion components that are attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise unless imported as part of the finished goods “kit.” The Orders exclude “finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and backing material, and solar panels and “finished goods containing aluminum extrusions that are entered unassembled in a ‘finished goods kit.’” A finished goods kit is a packaged combination of parts that contains, at the time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final finished good and requires no further finishing or fabrication, such as cutting or punching, and is assembled “as is” into a finished product.Commerce, the Trade Court, and the Federal Circuit concluded that CCM’s solar panel mounts are subject to the Orders. The mounts are not eligible for “finished merchandise” exclusion because the mounts are just one component of a downstream product—i.e., a solar panel mounting system. View "China Custom Manufacturing, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law