Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Property owners sought compensation for an alleged taking pursuant to the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241–51. When a railroad wishes to relinquish responsibility over a railroad corridor, it must seek permission to abandon the corridor. Under the Trails Act, before abandonment is consummated, other entities can intervene to railbank the corridor and preserve it for future railroad use. The railbanking intervention process allows a railroad to negotiate with the intervening entity to assume financial and managerial responsibility for the corridor by operating it as a recreational trail. The issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking if the railroad was granted an easement, interim trail use and railbanking were beyond the scope of that easement, and the NITU caused a delay in termination of the easement.The Claims Court found that the property interests at issue were easements, but that interim trail use was within the scope of the easements. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Claims Court erred in interpreting Missouri law and in concluding that interim trail use was within the scope of the easements; railbanking is not within the scope of the easements. With no causation dispute, the NITU issuance constituted a taking. View "Behrens v. United States" on Justia Law

The 1976 Magnuson–Stevens Act contemplated “[a] national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. 1801(a)(6), and established the United States 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A 2007 amendment established national criteria for quota-based fishing programs, (limited access privilege programs) and authorized the quota-based fishing permits and licenses at issue in this Fifth Amendment takings claim, in which fishing businesses challenged four different permitting, licensing, and endorsement requirementsThe Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of a cognizable property interest in the fishing endorsements, licenses, and permits, separate from or appurtenant to their fishing vessels. Precedent establishes that fishing permits and licenses issued under the Act are revocable privileges, not compensable property interests. The Magnuson–Stevens Act refers to “congressional intent not to confer any right, title, or interest, and to preserve the government’s authority to revoke privileges enjoyed in” fishing licenses and permits. The National Marine Fisheries Service’s regulations did not create compensable property rights in permits or licenses. licenses; permits did not have the essential characteristics of compensable property—transferability and the right to exclude others. There is no inherent right in vessel ownership to fish within the EEZ. View "Fishermen's Finest, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Google filed two petitions for inter partes review (IPR) challenging CyWee’s patents. On December 11, 2018, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims. Each IPR was joined by other parties, so the Board extended its one-year deadline for the final written decisions by one month, to January 10, 2020. On January 9, 2020, the Board issued its final decisions, finding all challenged claims unpatentable for obviousness. CyWee challenged the merits of the unpatentability determinations and the appointment of Board administrative patent judges (APJs) as unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause, In March 2021 the Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Appointment Clause challenge as foreclosed by then-governing precedent, including its “Arthrex” decision.The Supreme Court subsequently held, in Arthrex, that APJs’ power to render final patentability decisions unreviewable by an accountable principal officer was an Appointments Clause violation. The Court remedied the violation by vitiating anything in 35 U.S.C. 6(c) that prevented the Director from reviewing final Board IPR decisions and “remand[ing] to the Acting Director” for a decision on whether to rehear the case. The Federal Circuit then remanded to allow CyWee to request a rehearing. The Commissioner denied rehearing. CyWee filed amended notices of appeal challenging the rehearing denials and the Commissioner’s authority to perform the review Arthrex contemplates. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the one-month extension rendered the decisions untimely. The Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision compelled rejection of its other arguments. View "CyWee Group Ltd. v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

In 2018, under the Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. 1862, the Secretary of Commerce reported to the President that steel imports threatened national security by contributing to unsustainably low use of domestic steel-producing capacity. The President, agreeing with the finding, issued Proclamation 9705, imposing higher tariffs on steel imports from certain countries but providing for monitoring and future adjustments. In 2020, the President issued Proclamation 9980, which, based on the required monitoring, raised tariffs on imports of steel derivatives such as nails and fasteners. The Trade Court held Proclamation 9980 to be unauthorized by the statute because the new derivatives tariffs were imposed after the passing of certain deadlines; within 90 days of receiving the Secretary’s report, the President must determine whether to concur in the finding and, if so, within the same 90 days “the President shall” also “determine the nature and duration of the action.”In the meantime, in another case, the Federal Circuit upheld a presidential proclamation that increased tariffs on steel beyond Proclamation 9705’s rate, concluding that when the President, within the Act’s time limits, adopts a plan that contemplates future contingency-dependent modifications, those time limits do not preclude the President from adding to the initial import impositions to help achieve the originally stated national-security objective if the underlying findings and objective have not grown stale.The Federal Circuit then upheld Proclamation 9980, reversing the Trade Court. The proclamation’s new imposition reaches imports that are within section 232’s authorization of presidential action based on the Secretary’s finding and there is no staleness or other persuasive reason for overriding the President’s judgment. View "PrimeSource Building Products, Inc.v, United States" on Justia Law

Acquisition imported tires manufactured by Shandong from China. Shandong tires were subject to a countervailing duty order; Acquisition deposited estimated duties for the entries at the "all others" rate of 30.61%. Commerce initiated an administrative review of the duty order covering 2016 entries, instructing Customs to suspend the liquidation (final assessment of the duties owed) of entries under review. Before the review was completed, Shandong withdrew. Commerce ordered Customs to liquidate Shandong-manufactured entries imported in 2016. The Acquisition entries were liquidated with final duties assessed at 30.61%. Importers that wish to challenge the liquidation of their entries can file a protest within 180 days, 19 U.S.C. 1514(a)(5), (c)(3)(A). Acquisition did not do so. Commerce later set the final duty rates for the 2016 entries at 15.56% for “non-selected companies under review.” Acquisition then filed protests to Customs’ failure to refund the difference between the 30.61% rate and the 15.56% rate, arguing that Shandong was the same company as another company that had remained under review.Customs denied the protests as untimely. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Acquisition’s subsequent complaint. The Trade court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Acquisition could have timely protested the liquidations of these entries on the theory that Customs had improperly liquidated them because the manufacturer of Acquisition’s goods was participating in an administrative review. View "Acquisition 362, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Jawbone sued Google for patent infringement in the Western District of Texas after being assigned ownership of the nine asserted patents and seven months after being incorporated in Texas. Jawbone rents space in Waco to store documents relating to the patents, from which it conducts some distribution and sales activities. No Jawbone personnel work at any location in the Western District. Google moved under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) to transfer the action to the Northern District of California, arguing that: the relevant technical aspects of the accused earbuds, smartphones, speakers, displays, and software products were researched, designed, and developed at Google’s headquarters within Northern California; the technology underlying the asserted patents assigned to Jawbone was likewise developed and prosecuted in Northern California; witnesses and sources of proof (prototypes, Google’s key personnel, and four of the six named inventors) were primarily located in Northern California; no witnesses or sources of proof were located in Western Texas.The Federal Circuit ordered the district court to grant the motion. The center of gravity of this action, focusing on the “Volkswagen factors” and the overriding convenience inquiry, is clearly in the Northern District of California, not in the Western District of Texas. Four factors favor transfer and four factors are neutral. No factor weighs against transfer. View "In Re Google LLC" on Justia Law

The 2010 ACA (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act) created a three-year Risk Corridors program with the creation of new health-insurance marketplaces, which presented uncertain risks for participating health-insurance companies. Qualified health-plan issuers (QHP issuers) that offered their products in the new marketplaces were entitled to payments from HHS if they suffered sufficient losses, 42 U.S.C. 18062(b).The government failed to make those payments. QHP issuers sued under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). In two such lawsuits, the Quinn law firm was lead counsel for classes of QHP issuers seeking payments. In the opt-in notices sent to potential class members with court approval, Quinn represented that it would seek attorney’s fees out of any recovery, that it would seek no more than 5% of any judgment or settlement, and that the Claims Court would determine the exact amount by considering how many issuers participated, the amount at issue, and a “lodestar cross-check” (based on hours actually worked). Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, in other cases, held that QHP issuers were entitled to collect ACA-promised payments.The Claims Court entered judgments in favor of the classes, totaling about $3.7 billion, then awarded Quinn 5% of the common funds, rejecting objections. The total fee was about $185 million. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Claims Court’s analysis was inconsistent with the class opt-in notices and did not adequately justify the extraordinarily high award. View "Health Republic Insurance Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Doyon served in the Navy, 1966-1968; he received several medals and commendations. In 1967, Doyon witnessed the immediate aftermath of an explosion and fire that resulted in more than 130 deaths. When four of his friends went AWOL. Doyon was allegedly harassed and threatened by his shipmates. In 1968, Doyon went AWOL for two days. Upon his return, Doyon was referred to the sick bay. He was sedated with Thorazine, and later was diagnosed with “passive-aggressive personality disorder.” Doyon later witnessed a fatal plane crash, including the dismemberment of a fellow Airman, while he was standing duty at a video recording console. Doyon later spent hours replaying video recordings of the crash for Report Personnel. In 1968, Doyon was discharged. Doyon’s DD-214 form characterized his discharge as “Honorable,” and the “Reason and Authority” field contained a code indicating unsuitability due to a personality disorder. Doyon was not eligible to receive a military disability retirement.In 2013, Doyon unsuccessfully petitioned the Board for the Correction of Naval Records to correct his service records to state that he was discharged for service-connected PTSD, to be eligible for disability retirement payment under 10 U.S.C. 1201. The Claims Court upheld the denial. The Federal Circuit vacated. Doyon challenges the correctness of the narrative reason for his discharge, as stated in his military records. Both 10 U.S.C. 1552(h) and a Department of Defense memorandum (Kurta Memo) require “liberal consideration” for such correction requests. View "Doyon v. United States" on Justia Law

Cooper served on active duty in the Marine Corps from March-September 1972 and from February-April 1973. In 2008, the VA granted Cooper entitlement to a non-service-connected (NSC) pension. In 2014, the VA notified Cooper that it had adjusted his income from December 2008-2010 based on his receipt of unemployment compensation from the state of Wisconsin, which resulted in an overpayment of $13,094.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals and Veterans Court found that unemployment compensation payments are not excluded from a veteran’s annual income under an exception for “donations from public or private relief or welfare organizations,” 38 U.S.C. 503(a)(1). The Federal Circuit affirmed NSC pensions are need-based, so the maximum annual rate of pension is “reduced by the amount of the veteran’s annual income.” In general, a veteran’s “annual income” includes “all payments of any kind or from any source,” 38 U.S.C. 1503(a). View "Cooper v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Van Dermark served in the Navy from 1963 until his 1976 honorable discharge. The VA found Van Dermark to be totally and permanently disabled due to service-connected injuries. Van Dermark received treatment in Thailand (where he lived) at non-VA facilities, from physicians and others not affiliated with VA, in 2016 and in 2018, both times for cardiac conditions not related to his service-connected disability. For each of the two instances of treatment abroad, Van Dermark filed a claim with VA under 38 U.S.C 1728 and 1725 seeking VA payment—to him or his medical creditors—for the surgical or other heart-related treatment he received abroad.VA Community Care denied both claims. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals maintained the denials. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. Section 1724(a) prohibits the VA from “furnish[ing] hospital . . . care or medical services” abroad, where the care or services are unrelated to the service-connected disability. The “furnishing” phrase encompasses the payment for a veteran’s hospital care or medical expenses abroad at issue here; sections 1728 and 1725 do not override that prohibition. View "Van Dermark v. McDonough" on Justia Law