Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cellect’s challenged patents are directed to personal digital-assistant devices or phones. Each claims priority from a single application, the 255 patent. The 369 and 626 patents are continuations-in-part of the 255 patent. The 742 patent is a continuation-in-part of the 369 patent; the 621 patent is a continuation-in-part of the 626 patent. The 036 patent is a continuation of the 626 patent. Each of the challenged patents was granted Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) for Patent Office delay during prosecution (pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 154(b)); each would have expired on the same day but for the grants of PTA. None were subject to a terminal disclaimer during prosecution; the patents have all expired.Cellect sued Samsung for infringement. Samsung requested ex parte reexaminations, asserting that the patents were unpatentable based on obviousness-type double patenting (ODP). The examiner determined that the challenged claims were obvious variants of Cellect’s prior-expiring reference patent claims, tracing back to the 036 patent, which did not receive PTA and retained an expiration date 20 years after the filing of the 255 application. The 621 patent claims were unpatentable over the 626 patent claims, which were unpatentable over the 369 patent claims. The 742 patent claims were unpatentable over the 369 claims. The 369 patent claims were unpatentable over the 036 claims, which did not receive PTA. The Board and Federal Circuit affirmed. ODP for a patent that has received PTA, regardless of whether a terminal disclaimer is required or has been filed, must be based on the expiration date of the patent after PTA has been added. View "In Re Cellect, LLC" on Justia Law

Volvo’s 692 patent is directed to a tractor-type stern drive for a boat. A stern drive is an engine mounted in the boat's hull, connected to a drive unit mounted outside of the hull, typically on the stern; it is also called an “inboard/outboard drive.” A tractor-type drive generally relies on forward, bow-facing propellers that pull the boat through the water. In 2015, Volvo launched its commercial embodiment of the patent, the Forward Drive, which became extremely successful for water sports, including wake-surfing. The forward-facing propellers increased the distance between the propeller and swimmers, compared with prior, pulling-type stern-drive boats. In 2020, Brunswick launched its own drive that embodies the 692 patent, the Bravo Four, and petitioned for inter partes review, asserting that all claims would have been anticipated or obvious based on several references.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found all claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board’s finding of a motivation to combine was supported by substantial evidence but the Board failed to properly consider the evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. Volvo established a nexus between its objective evidence of secondary considerations and the claimed invention. Even if its assignment of weight to each factor was supported by substantial evidence (“some weight” for copying, industry praise, and commercial success; and “very little weight” for skepticism, failure of others, and long-felt unsolved need), the Board did not discuss the summation of the factors. View "Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded ECCI a contract to design and build a military compound in Afghanistan. In 2014, ECCI sought compensation for construction delays allegedly attributable to the government. After six years of unsuccessful settlement discussions, followed by a nine-day hearing before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the government—three months after the hearing—successfully moved to dismiss ECCI’s claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for failure to state a “sum certain.”The Federal Circuit reversed. The requirement, established by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, that claims submitted under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 7101–7109, state a “sum certain”—i.e., specify the precise dollar amount sought as relief—is not jurisdictional and is subject to forfeiture. The court noted the Supreme Court’s direction to “police this jurisdictional line.” Congress did not clearly state that a claim submitted under the CDA must include a sum certain: the sum-certain requirement is not even in the CDA itself. A claim that does not state a sum certain has not sufficiently pleaded the elements of a claim under the CDA and may be denied by the contracting officer and dismissed on appeal for failure to state a claim. If a party challenges a deficient sum certain after litigation has far progressed, however, that defense may be deemed forfeited. View "ECC International Constructors, LLC v. Secretary of the Army" on Justia Law

Incept’s 723 and 913 patents relate to improved methods for treating cancer, particularly prostate cancer, using radiation. The patents describe methods of introducing a filler between a radiation target tissue and other tissue to increase the distance between the two and thereby decrease the amount of radiation received by the non-targeted tissue. Palette sought inter partes review challenging the claims of the patents as unpatentable over prior art, including “Wallace,” describes a method for the “rapid formation of a biocompatible gel . . . at a selected site within a patient’s body.”The Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in holding that the claims were anticipated or obvious, 35 U.S.C. 102, 103. Wallace discloses each element of claim 1 of the 723 patent, arranged as in that claim. The Board’s findings of motivation to combine are supported by substantial evidence in the form of the references themselves and Palette’s expert’s detailed testimony, which the Board found “persuasive.” With respect to Incept’s argument that the Board improperly dismissed the market share data that Incept provided, the court deferred to the Board’s findings concerning the credibility of expert witnesses. View "Incept LLC v. Palette Life Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

Rembrandt’s 019 patent is directed to test assay devices and methods for testing biological fluids. The test assay device receives a fluid sample “introduced directly to the sample loading zone” of one or more assay test strips. Alere petitioned for inter partes review.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found that claims 3–6 and 10 would have been unpatentable for obviousness. Rembrandt argues that the Board erred by relying on Alere’s new theories asserted for the first time in its reply brief. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Alere did not offer new theories. Alere’s reply argument was responsive to Rembrandt’s arguments and the Board’s observations. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determinations. The Board was presented with “two alternative theories” about what the prior art discloses; the court reasoned that it was not its task “to determine which theory we find more compelling.” View "Rembrandt Diagnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc." on Justia Law

Medtronics’s patents, which share a specification, relate to the transcutaneous (through the skin) charging of implanted medical devices. This charging occurs by inductive coupling, whereby energy is transferred between a primary coil in the external charger and a secondary coil in the implanted device when the two coils are placed in proximity to each other. The patents seek to improve charging efficiency by automatically varying the power output of the external charger based on various measured parameters of the current passing through the implanted device.In two inter partes review (IPR) determinations. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board held that the petitioner had failed to show that claims of the patents were unpatentable as anticipated or obvious. In each decision, the Board adopted a "two-input" claim construction first presented in the patent owner’s response after the institution decision and declined to consider the petitioner’s reply arguments and evidence under the new claim construction, reasoning that the petitioner had not identified anywhere in the petition that the two-input anticipation arguments had been made.The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board’s refusal to consider the new arguments and evidence was erroneous. The court remanded for the Board to consider the merits of Axonics’ responsive arguments and evidence under the new claim construction. View "Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc." on Justia Law

Bufkin served in the Air Force from 2005-2006. In 2013, he sought service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. VA medical records reflected his visits with a VA psychiatrist, who wrote that he met the criteria for PTSD but did not identify the specific stressor or whether the stressor related to Bufkin’s military service. The VA scheduled an examination with a VA psychiatrist, who opined that his “symptoms do not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD.” Bufkin filed a notice of disagreement, arguing that the favorable opinion and the unfavorable opinion were in equipoise, and therefore, VA was legally obligated to grant service connection. Bufkin underwent another VA examination with another examiner, who concluded that his symptoms did not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. The VA continued its denial of service connection. While his appeal was pending, another VA psychiatrist opined that in addition to a severe anxiety disorder, Bufkin “suffers from chronic PTSD.”The Board of Appeals denied service connection, finding that the preponderance of evidence supported a finding that Bufkin does not have PTSD. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. There was no error in the Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule, 38 U.S.C. 5107(b): “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence” the Secretary “shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” The Board considered conflicting medical statements but found that the rule did not apply. View "Bufkin v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Katana, a California-based distributor of high-end wheels and tires, was the importer of record for 386 entries of passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China in 2009-2012 and supplied Customs and Border Protection with invoices that listed prices lower than what Katana actually paid its Chinese vendors. Due to this error, Katana undercalculated the amount of safeguard duties, regular customs duties, harbor maintenance fees, and merchandise processing fees it owed by $5,742,483.80. Customs issued a demand to Katana for the unpaid duties and fees and later filed suit under 19 U.S.C. 1592(d).Katana sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because the government had filed suit after the statute of limitations, 19 U.S.C. 1621, had run. Katana stated that, although it had signed a waiver of the limitations period on October 25, 2016, it had revoked the waiver before the expiration of the limitations period. The Trade Court found that Katana had properly revoked its waiver and that the suit was untimely.The Federal Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations in 19 U.S.C. 1621 is not a jurisdictional time limit; it is subject to waiver and equitable tolling. On remand, Katana can assert an affirmative defense concerning the invalidity of its waiver. View "United States v. Katana Racing, Inc." on Justia Law

Cavaciuti served in the Army, 1965-1967. In 2020, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted him entitlement to a total disability rating due to individual unemployability (TDIU) and directed the VA to assign him an effective date. The VA nonetheless denied Cavaciuti’s claim, finding that he was capable of gainful employment. Cavaciuti sought a writ of mandamus. After negotiations, the VA informed the Veterans Court that it had granted Cavaciuti entitlement to TDIU with a 2008 effective date. Cavaciuti argued that the case was not moot because the RO had not invalidated its erroneous rating decision and that the VA misused confidential settlement information to render the case moot.The court dismissed Cavaciuti’s petition as moot because the VA had provided him with the relief that he sought. Cavaciuti sought attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Veterans Court denied the application, finding that Cavaciuti did not satisfy the criterion for prevailing party status because the dismissal order did not award benefits, change the parties’ legal relationship, or otherwise address the merits of Cavaciuti’s writ petition. The Federal Circuit affirmed. There was no judicial change in the parties' legal relationship. The VA implemented the Board’s decision, as Cavaciuti requested, following a settlement rather than based on any court order. The fact that the government’s representations would prevent future changes does not render the dismissal a judicial imprimatur sufficient to make Cavaciuti the prevailing party. View "Cavaciuti v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Johnson first enlisted in 1999; in 2006 he extended his enlistment for 23 months to affiliate with the Marine Corps. Active Reserve (AR) Program. He subsequently reenlisted for terms of three and four years; his scheduled end of active service was November 2015. In March 2013, the Corps issued permanent change of station (PCS) orders for Johnson to relocate from Virginia Beach to Phoenix. Johnson unsuccessfully tried to have his orders changed, citing personal hardship. Johnson stayed in Virginia despite being counseled. He signed a “page 11,” acknowledging that he was assigned code RE-3O for failing to comply with PCS orders, and was not eligible for promotion, reenlistment, commissioning or warrant officer programs, special education programs, or involuntary separation pay unless specially authorized. Johnson was transferred into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program and received a DD Form 214 reflecting the RE-3O code. Months later, the Reserve mobilized Johnson back to the AR Program, stationed in Quantico, and preliminarily approved him for appointment to warrant officer. His appointment was delayed due to the RE-3O code.Johnson reenlisted for two years and unsuccessfully petitioned the Board of Naval Corrections to remove the RE-3O code and grant his appointment. The Federal Circuit held that Johnson was properly released from the AR Program and transferred to the IRR under the procedures described in the AR Program Policy Manual. Johnson was not entitled to additional notice and a separation board before his transfer. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law