Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between the municipality of Anchorage and the United States regarding two agreements related to the improvement of the Port of Alaska. In 2003, Anchorage and the United States, through the Maritime Administration (MARAD), signed a Memorandum of Understanding (2003 Memorandum) to upgrade and expand the port. In 2011, they signed a Memorandum of Agreement (2011 Memorandum) to address issues that arose during the project, including large-scale damage discovered in 2010.The United States Court of Federal Claims held that the United States breached the 2003 Memorandum by failing to deliver a defect-free port and the 2011 Memorandum by settling subcontractor claims without consulting Anchorage. The court awarded Anchorage $367,446,809 in damages, including $11,279,059 related to the settlement of subcontractor claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2003 Memorandum did not require the United States to deliver a defect-free port, as it lacked specific terms such as what was to be built, where, dimensions, deadlines, and costs. The court vacated the Court of Federal Claims' decision regarding the 2003 Memorandum and remanded for further proceedings.However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' decision that the United States breached the 2011 Memorandum by settling subcontractor claims without conferring with Anchorage. The court upheld the award of $11,279,059 in damages to Anchorage for this breach. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further consideration consistent with the Federal Circuit's opinion. View "ANCHORAGE v. US " on Justia Law

Malcolm Pipes, a former reservist in the United States Air Force, sought disability-retirement pay and benefits after suffering a stroke while participating in the Air Force’s Self-paced Fitness Improvement Program (SFIP). Pipes argued that he was in inactive-duty training (IDT) status at the time of his injury, which would entitle him to the benefits under 10 U.S.C. § 1204. The Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) and the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) previously denied his claim, leading to this appeal.In the first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, holding that Pipes was in a duty status when ordered to participate in the SFIP. However, the court did not address whether Pipes was in IDT status when performing the SFIP. On remand, the AFBCMR and the Claims Court again denied relief, concluding that Pipes did not have the necessary advance authorization for IDT status as required by Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 36-8001.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Claims Court's decision. The court found that the AFMAN applies to all IDT and requires advance authorization for such status. Pipes failed to provide evidence of receiving this authorization. The court also rejected Pipes's argument that the lawful order to participate in the SFIP automatically placed him in IDT status. The court noted that the Department of Veterans Affairs' grant of service connection for Pipes's stroke did not impact the determination of his duty status under the AFMAN.The court affirmed the Claims Court's judgment, concluding that the AFBCMR's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "PIPES v. US " on Justia Law

Meyer Corporation, U.S. (Meyer) imported cookware manufactured in Thailand and China, which was sold to distributors in Macau and Hong Kong before being imported to the U.S. Meyer requested that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Customs) value the cookware based on the first-sale price paid by the distributors to the manufacturers. Customs rejected this request and assessed duties based on the second-sale price Meyer paid to the distributors. Meyer protested and appealed to the Court of International Trade.The Court of International Trade affirmed Customs' decision, holding that Meyer failed to prove the first-sale prices were free of market-distortive influences, particularly due to the lack of financial documents from Meyer’s parent company, Meyer International Holdings, Ltd. (Meyer Holdings). Meyer appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the trial court to reconsider without imposing requirements beyond the statute and regulations.On remand, the trial court again held that Meyer could not rely on the first-sale price, citing Meyer’s failure to produce Meyer Holdings' financial documents as dispositive. The trial court presumed that the absence of these documents indicated potential market-distortive influences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court improperly applied an evidentiary presumption against Meyer and failed to address other record evidence. The appellate court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of whether Meyer may rely on the first-sale price, instructing the trial court to evaluate the extensive record without relying on speculative adverse inferences. The appellate court did not address Meyer’s argument regarding the interpretation of "the firm" in the relevant regulation, as the trial court's decision did not hinge on this interpretation. View "Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of companies, sought refunds for H-1B visa petitions they filed on behalf of their foreign national employees who were already in the United States under a different nonimmigrant classification. They argued that the enhanced fees imposed by the government for these petitions were not applicable to change of status petitions, which involve nonimmigrants already in the U.S.The United States Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument. The court found that the statutory language did not exclude change of status petitions from the enhanced fees. The court interpreted the phrase "application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], including an application for an extension of such status" to include change of status petitions, as these petitions are a sub-category of initial grant petitions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the statutory language "an application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], including an application for an extension of such status" does not exclude change of status petitions. The court reasoned that a strict application of the statutory definitions would render part of the statute meaningless and that the ordinary meaning of the phrase includes change of status petitions. The court also noted that this interpretation aligns with longstanding USCIS practice and the legislative intent behind the statute. As a result, the plaintiffs' claim for a refund was denied, and the government's imposition of the enhanced fees was upheld. View "Itserve Alliance, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. and CarnaudMetalbox Engineering Ltd. (collectively, “Crown”) sued Belvac Production Machinery, Inc. (“Belvac”) for infringing claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,308,570, 9,968,982, and 10,751,784, which relate to necking machines used in manufacturing metal beverage cans. Belvac argued that the patents were invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because a necking machine embodying the invention was on sale in the U.S. before the critical date. Both parties sought summary judgment on this issue.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary judgment to Crown, ruling that the patents were not invalid under the on-sale bar, and denied Belvac’s motion. After a jury trial, the court entered a judgment that the asserted claims were not invalid and not infringed. Crown appealed the noninfringement judgment, and Belvac appealed the no invalidity judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the letter sent by Crown to Complete Packaging Machinery constituted a commercial offer for sale in the U.S. before the critical date, thus invalidating the patents under § 102(b). The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Crown and remanded for entry of judgment in Belvac’s favor. The court did not address the issue of infringement due to the invalidity finding. View "Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. v. Belvac Production Machinery, Inc." on Justia Law

Risen Energy Co., Ltd. (Risen), a Chinese exporter of solar cells, was subject to an antidumping order by the Department of Commerce (Commerce). In the Sixth Administrative Review, Commerce used surrogate values from Malaysia to calculate normal values for Risen's products. Risen challenged Commerce's surrogate value calculations for its backsheet and ethyl vinyl acetate (EVA) inputs, as well as the overhead ratio calculation.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) initially found Commerce's surrogate value calculations for Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter for further explanation. Commerce then provided additional evidence from ASTM standards to support its choice of HTS categories for these inputs, which the Trade Court sustained. However, the Trade Court upheld Commerce's surrogate financial ratio calculation for overhead despite some reservations about Commerce's rationale.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Commerce's use of the HTS categories for "sheet" to value Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found Commerce's surrogate overhead ratio calculation unsupported by substantial evidence. The court noted that Commerce's reliance on the Hanwha financial statement and the IFRS standard was unclear and speculative.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision regarding the surrogate value calculations for backsheet and EVA inputs but vacated the decision on the surrogate overhead ratio calculation. The case was remanded to Commerce for further proceedings to provide substantial evidence for its overhead calculation. View "Risen Energy Co., LTD. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of ambulance service providers, challenged the validity of a final rule promulgated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The rule, titled "Change in Rates VA Pays for Special Modes of Transportation," amended how the VA pays for noncontract ground and air ambulance transports for eligible beneficiaries. The rule stipulated that the VA would pay the lesser of the actual charge or the Medicare fee schedule amount for these services, rather than the actual costs. Petitioners argued that this rule exceeded the VA's statutory authority under 38 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3)(C).The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court examined whether the VA had the authority to implement the rule under the cited statute. The court noted that while 38 U.S.C. § 111(a) allows the VA to pay for travel expenses to or from a "Department facility or other place," § 111(b)(3)(C) specifically limits the VA's payment discretion to ambulance transports to or from a "Department facility" only. The court found that the VA's rule improperly extended this payment methodology to transports to or from places other than Department facilities, which was not authorized by the statute.The Federal Circuit held that the VA's final rule exceeded the statutory authority granted by Congress under 38 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3)(C). Consequently, the court granted the petition and set aside the final rule. The court did not address other arguments raised by the petitioners, as the decision on the statutory authority was sufficient to resolve the case. The petitioners' motion to stay the rule pending judicial review was denied as moot, given the court's decision on the merits. View "Metropolitan Area EMS Authority v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In July 2009, veteran John H. Casey filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) with the VA challenging the denial of service connection for disabilities. In June 2010, Robert Goss entered into a contingent fee agreement with Casey, agreeing to represent him in his pursuit of benefits from the VA and receive twenty percent of any past-due benefits awarded. Goss filed the necessary forms with the VA, and in January 2011, Casey terminated their attorney-client relationship. Despite this, the VA awarded past-due benefits to Casey in September 2011 and February 2012, and paid Goss twenty percent of these benefits. Casey challenged the payment of fees to Goss, arguing that Goss did not perform any work on his case.The VA issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) denying Casey’s challenge, and Casey appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board). The Board remanded the case to the VA Regional Office (RO) three times, instructing the RO to request an itemized account of Goss’s work to determine the reasonableness of the fees. Goss refused to provide this information, and the RO repeatedly denied Casey’s claim without providing full reasons and bases. In November 2020, the Board found the twenty percent fee unreasonable, as Goss had not contributed significantly to the case, and Casey’s NOD was filed before Goss’s appointment.Goss appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the reasonableness of the fee award. The VA initially opposed but later conceded this point. The Veterans Court accepted the VA’s concession, vacated the Board’s decision on reasonableness, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Goss then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s decision, holding that the Board did have jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the fee award. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination. View "Goss v. McDonough" on Justia Law

DDR Holdings, LLC (DDR) sued Priceline.com LLC and Booking.com B.V. (collectively, Priceline.com) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,818,399 (’399 patent). The ’399 patent relates to generating a composite web page that combines visual elements of a “host” website with content from a third-party “merchant.” The dispute centered on the construction of the claim terms “merchants” and “commerce object.” DDR argued that “merchants” should include purveyors of both goods and services, while Priceline.com contended it should be limited to purveyors of goods alone.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware construed “merchants” as “producers, distributors, or resellers of the goods to be sold” and “commerce object” to exclude services. Following this construction, the parties stipulated to non-infringement, agreeing that the accused instrumentalities did not infringe the asserted claims of the ’399 patent under the court’s claim constructions. The district court entered final judgment in favor of Priceline.com, and DDR appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s construction of “merchants” as purveyors of goods, not services, noting the significant deletion of any reference to services in the final specification of the ’399 patent compared to the provisional application. The court also affirmed the construction of “commerce object” as “a product, a product category, a catalog, or an indication that a product, product category, or catalog should be chosen dynamically,” consistent with the construction of “merchants.”The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court correctly construed the disputed terms and affirmed the judgment of non-infringement in favor of Priceline.com. View "DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC" on Justia Law

Galderma Laboratories, L.P. and TCD Royalty Sub LP (collectively, Galderma) own and market Oracea®, a doxycycline-based treatment for rosacea. They hold U.S. Patent Nos. 7,749,532 and 8,206,740 (the Asserted Patents), which cover a specific formulation of doxycycline. Lupin Inc. and Lupin Ltd. (collectively, Lupin) filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to market a generic version of Oracea®, claiming bioequivalence. Galderma sued Lupin for patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act, asserting that Lupin’s product infringed the Asserted Patents.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware held a three-day bench trial and found that Lupin’s ANDA product did not infringe the Asserted Patents. The court concluded that Galderma failed to prove that Lupin’s product met the specific formulation requirements of the Asserted Patents, particularly the immediate release (IR) and delayed release (DR) portions of doxycycline. The court also found that Galderma did not demonstrate infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Galderma argued that the district court erred in disregarding dissolution test data from Lupin’s ANDA, admitting evidence from a rebuttal batch, imposing additional claim limitations, and not finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s findings. It held that the district court correctly determined that the two-stage dissolution test did not represent in vivo behavior and that Galderma did not prove its theory of infringement. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the rebuttal batch evidence and no imposition of additional claim limitations. Finally, the court upheld the district court’s finding that Galderma did not prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that Lupin’s ANDA product did not infringe the Asserted Patents. View "Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Lupin, Inc." on Justia Law