Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A 2012 antidumping duty order (19 U.S.C. 1673) for solar cells from China and two subsequent reviews assigned Qixin a separate rate lower than the country-wide rate. For the third administrative review, for 2014-2015 Qixin requested review and filed a separate rate application with a Customs Entry Summary for a single sale. Commerce repeatedly asserted that Qixin had not provided an entry number that corresponded to subject merchandise. Commerce issued preliminary results without mentioning Qixin’s eligibility for a separate rate. Qixin argued that Commerce had erroneously omitted Qixin, or, if Commerce concluded that there had been no entries during the review period, it should rescind the review with respect to Qixin. Commerce rejected both arguments. On remand, Commerce issued a third supplemental questionnaire. Qixin responded that it was unable to obtain the requested information. Commerce noted that the burden rested on Qixin to show it was entitled to a separate rate and reaffirmed.Before the Trade Court, Qixin unsuccessfully sought to file new information. no longer contesting that the previously identified sale was not a sale of subject merchandise and identifying five additional entries. The Trade Court and Federal Circuit sustained Commerce’s denial of a separate rate. The Trade Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Qixin’s motion to file new material out of time. Commerce did not make a conclusive finding that Qixin had no entries in the review period as required to rescind a review. View "Canadian Solar International Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Nordby served as an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration. He was also a First Lieutenant in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the Army Reserve. From January-May 2017, Nordby was activated under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d) to perform military service in the Army Reserve; he conducted basic training for new Judge Advocates in Georgia and Virginia. Federal employees who are absent from civilian positions due to military responsibilities and who meet the requirements listed in 5 U.S.C. 5538(a) are entitled to differential pay to account for the difference between their military and civilian compensation.The agency denied Nordby’s request for differential pay, reasoning that those called to voluntary active duty under section 12301(d) are not entitled to differential pay. The Merit Systems Protection Board rejected Nordby's argument that he was called to duty under section 101(a)(13)(B)— “any [] provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress” and that his activation was “during a national emergency” because the U.S. has been in a continuous state of national emergency since September 11, 2001. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Nordby failed to allege any connection between the training and the ongoing national emergency that resulted from the September 11 attack. View "Nordby v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

The Army issued a solicitation for a Next Generation Load Device Medium to encrypt and decrypt sensitive information on the battlefield, stating that in order to be eligible for the award Offerors must receive a minimum of acceptable rating in each Technical Subfactor. CACI's initial proposal received a Technical/Risk Rating of unacceptable because it failed to provide for two-factor authentication for all modes of operation as required by the solicitation. Nonetheless, CACI’s proposal was included in the competitive range. CACI was allowed to submit a final proposal. The Army assigned three deficiencies to CACI’s proposal related to its two-factor authentication proposal, making CACI ineligible for the award. The Army awarded the contract to others. CACI filed a bid protest challenging the technical deficiencies.The Claims Court dismissed CACI’s complaint for lack of standing under a new theory not raised before the contracting officer–that CACI had an organizational conflict of interest that could not be waived or mitigated, which made CACI ineligible for the award. Alternatively, the Claims Court found that, even if CACI had standing, the Army acted reasonably in its assessment of CACI’s proposal. The Federal Circuit held that the Claims Court erred in treating the statutory standing issue as jurisdictional but affirmed on the merits. View "CACI, Inc.-Federal v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, Dixon’s tax preparer filed amended tax returns for him, within the time permitted by law, claiming a refund for tax years 2013 and 2014. After an audit, the IRS denied those claims and assessed additional taxes. Dixon filed suit. During the litigation, it became clear that Dixon had not personally signed his name on the 2017 amended returns—the tax preparer had signed Dixon’s name—and no authorizing power-of-attorney documentation accompanied the amended returns. Because 26 U.S.C. 7422(a) prevents a taxpayer from filing suit to claim a refund without having earlier submitted a “duly filed” refund claim to the IRS, and the 2017 amended returns were not “duly filed,” the Claims Court dismissed the case. Within days, Dixon filed duly signed amended returns for the 2013 and 2014 tax years, though the time allowed for amended returns claiming a refund for those years had passed. He filed another suit based on the IRS’s failure to act on his 2020 amended returns.The Claims Court again dismissed. Dixon’s first action was properly dismissed because the claims, though timely filed, were not “duly filed.” By the time MDixon filed corrected claims with the IRS, the time limits for filing with the IRS had passed unless the corrected claims related back to the earlier claims under the informal-claim doctrine, which does not apply because the IRS loses authority to act on an amendment of an unperfected claim once a suit is filed. View "Dixon v. United States" on Justia Law

Sony petitioned for inter partes review of claims 1–6 of the Bot’s 540 patent, which concerns a gaming machine that authenticates certain data and that has both a motherboard and a different board. Independent claims 1 and 4 require that the “game program” be written to the motherboard only after the game program has been authenticated; the dependent claims (2, 3, 5, and 6) require two different CPUs—one on the motherboard, one on a different board— for executing the “authentication program” and “preliminary authentication program” respectively. The Board determined that the independent claims are unpatentable based on asserted combinations of prior art.The Federal Circuit affirmed. Bot failed to demonstrate that the Board, in making its unpatentability determinations, actually relied—or even might have relied—on a construction that permits writing portions of the game program to the motherboard before authenticating the game program. The Board found that both prior art references disclose writing only non-game-program data to the motherboard before authenticating the game program. Given Sony’s expert’s explanation and the references themselves, it nonetheless would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references to yield the claimed invention. Substantial evidence supports the findings underpinning the obviousness determination. View "Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC" on Justia Law

Sanofi-Aventis’s 614 patent, entitled “Drug Delivery Device and Method of Manufacturing a Drug Delivery Device,” relates to a “drug delivery device” that can be “configured to allow setting of different dose sizes.” Mylan petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board for inter partes review of claims 1–18, citing a combination of three prior art references: Burren, Venezia, and de Gennes. Mylan relied on Burren—cited as prior art within the 614 patent—to teach the use of springs within a drug-delivery device and sought to combine Burren with Venezia to teach the use of spring washers within drug-delivery devices and de Gennes to add “snap-fit engagement grips” to secure the spring washer. Mylan argued that “De Gennes, while concerned with a clutch bearing [in automobiles], addresses a problem analogous to that addressed in Burren (axially [sic] fixation and support of two components relative to one another).”The Board found all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit reversed. Mylan failed to argue that de Gennes constitutes analogous art to the 614 patent and instead compared de Gennes to another prior art reference. Mylan did not meet its burden to establish obviousness premised on de Gennes. The Board’s factual findings regarding analogousness are not supported by substantial evidence. View "Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc." on Justia Law

UCANN sued Hemp for infringing its patent, entitled “Cannabis Extracts and Methods of Preparing and Using the Same.” UCANN filed for bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the litigation. After the bankruptcy petition was dismissed, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the patent case. UCANN’s infringement claims were dismissed with prejudice; Hemp’s invalidity and inequitable conduct counterclaims were dismissed without prejudice.Hemp sought attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, 28 U.S.C. 1927, and the court’s inherent authority, claiming that UCANN’s prosecution counsel had committed inequitable conduct by copying text from a piece of prior art into the specification of the patent and not disclosing it to the Patent and Trademark Office as prior art and UCANN’s litigation counsel purportedly took conflicting positions in its representation of UCANN and another client (the owner of the prior art). Hemp expressly notified the court that it did not seek any further proceedings, including a trial or evidentiary hearing, in connection with its motion. The district court denied the motion based on the existing record.The Federal Circuit affirmed upholding findings that Hemp failed to establish that it is the prevailing party under section 285, that this is an “exceptional” case warranting an attorney’s fee award, or that UCANN’s counsel acted in a vexatious or otherwise unreasonable manner. While Hemp’s position was extremely weak, it was neither “frivolous as filed” nor “frivolous as argued.” View "United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc." on Justia Law

Frazier served in the Navy from 1988-1993. In 2008, Frazier fractured the fourth and fifth fingers of his right hand after being startled by a nightmare--according to Frazier, a frequent occurrence due to PTSD, a disability for which Frazier had been awarded service connection. The VA's examining physician noted that Frazier experienced pain in his right hand and that the injury was secondary to his PTSD but that the pain “does not result in/cause functional loss.” The Board of Veterans Appeals granted Frazier service connection for the injury; the regional office assigned a noncompensable rating for that injury,The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting Frazier’s argument that he was entitled to a compensable rating of 10 percent under 38 C.F.R. 4.59. That regulation provides: The intent of the schedule is to recognize painful motion with joint or periarticular pathology as productive of disability. It is the intention to recognize actually painful, unstable, or malaligned joints, due to healed injury, as entitled to at least the minimum compensable rating for the joint. Frazier cited Diagnostic Codes 5219 and 5223, which provide 20 percent and 10 percent ratings, respectively, for unfavorable and favorable ankylosis of the ring and little fingers. The Board properly focused on Diagnostic Code 5230, which provides for a zero percent rating for limitations of motion in the little or ring fingers. Section 4.59 does not “create a freestanding painful motion disability that is always entitled to a 10% disability rating” and Frazier did not have ankylosis. View "Frazier v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Hormel met with Howard of HIP, which produced food safety and thermal processing equipment. The parties entered into an agreement to develop an oven for a particular process. Hormel conducted testing relating to color development, using both an infrared oven and a conventional spiral oven. Howard later alleged that it was during the meetings and testing that he disclosed the infrared preheating concept at issue. Hormel conducted additional testing using HIP’s test oven at Hormel's facility. The testing eventually revealed that turning off internal electrical heating elements in the oven solved the charred, off-flavor of bacon, and preheating the bacon with a microwave oven prevented condensation from washing away the flavor. That testing resulted in a two-step cooking process, the first step involving preheating the bacon and the second step involving cooking the meat in a superheated steam oven.Hormel filed a non-provisional patent application for the two-step cooking process in 2011, listing four joint inventors, who assigned their interests to Hormel. The application issued as the 498 patent. HIP sued, alleging that Howard was either the sole inventor or a joint inventor. The district court concluded that he was a joint inventor, 35 U.S.C. 256, based on his alleged contribution of the infrared preheating concept. The Federal Circuit reversed. Howard’s alleged contribution of preheating meat pieces using an infrared oven is “insignificant in quality” to the claimed invention. View "HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp" on Justia Law

Moore is a male Examination Manager at the SEC's Washington, D.C. headquarters. Two women Examination Managers in that office perform the same work as Moore under similar working conditions. In 2014, the SEC initiated a Pay Transition Program to recalibrate its employees’ pay so that they could receive credit for years of relevant work experience regardless of their SEC hire date. The Program was open to all SEC employees from September 14-October 14, 2014. The women applied for the Program during this open period. Moore did not, due to family-related issues occupying his attention. The SEC permitted 10 other employees with extenuating circumstances to apply for the Program in November-December 2014. Program pay adjustments began taking effect around June 2015; the women’s salaries were increased. In August-September 2016, Moore unsuccessfully tried to apply for the Program.Moore's Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), lawsuit argues that the SEC lacks justification for any Program-related pay differential between him and the women because the application process was unnecessary, given that the SEC always had the necessary information in its records and the SEC had no valid basis for creating, or not extending, an application deadline. The Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal of Moore’s complaint, first overruling its own 2009 decision, Yant, which added an element to the prima facie case–a showing that the pay differential “is either historically or presently based on sex.” The court remanded for consideration on non-Yant grounds. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law