Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Julien P. Champagne, a veteran who served from December 1953 to December 1956, filed a claim in September 1987 for benefits related to his cerebellar degenerative disorder (CDD) using VA Form 21-526. The VA regional office (RO) interpreted this as a pension claim and awarded a disability pension in December 1987. In 1999, Champagne sought service connection compensation for malaria and any residual illnesses, including CDD. The RO granted service connection for malaria at 0% in 2002 but did not grant compensation for CDD. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement in 2003, and after multiple proceedings, he was granted compensation for CDD at 100%, effective February 3, 2005. This effective date was later changed to July 14, 2003, but Champagne sought an earlier date, arguing it should be from 1987.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an earlier effective date in October 2020, finding no indication in the 1987 application that Champagne intended to claim service connection compensation. Champagne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision in July 2022. The Veterans Court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the VA may consider a pension claim as a compensation claim but is not required to do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) is permissive, allowing but not requiring the VA to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim. The court also found no merit in Champagne’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding, as the court had merely determined that any findings by the RO would not bind the Board. View "Champagne v. McDonough" on Justia Law

PS Products, Inc. and Billy Pennington (collectively, PSP) own a U.S. Design Patent for a long-spiked electrode for a stun device. They filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Arkansas against Panther Trading Company, Inc. (Panther) for patent infringement. Panther responded with a Rule 11 letter and a motion to dismiss, arguing the infringement claims were frivolous and the venue was improper. PSP did not respond to these communications and later moved to voluntarily dismiss the case with prejudice. Panther then sought attorney fees and sanctions, claiming the lawsuit was frivolous.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the case with prejudice and awarded Panther attorney fees and costs under 35 U.S.C. § 285, deeming the case exceptional. The court also imposed $25,000 in deterrence sanctions on PSP under its inherent power, citing PSP's history of filing meritless lawsuits. PSP filed a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. PSP appealed the $25,000 sanctions, arguing the district court lacked authority to impose them in addition to attorney fees and that the court applied the wrong legal standard. The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in imposing sanctions under its inherent power, even after awarding attorney fees under § 285. The court found that PSP's conduct, including filing a meritless lawsuit and citing the wrong venue statute, justified the sanctions. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and declined Panther's request for attorney fees for the appeal, determining the appeal was not frivolous as argued. View "PS Products, Inc. v. Panther Trading Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Mirror Worlds Technologies, LLC owns three patents related to methods for storing, organizing, and presenting data in time-ordered streams on a computer system. In 2017, Mirror Worlds sued Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) for patent infringement, alleging that Facebook's features, such as News Feed, Timeline, and Activity Log, infringed on these patents. Facebook moved for summary judgment of non-infringement, which the district court granted, concluding that Facebook did not infringe the patents as a matter of law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that Facebook's systems did not meet the "main stream" or "main collection" limitations of the patents, as the evidence showed that not all data units received or generated by Facebook's systems were stored in the accused main streams. The court also rejected Facebook's defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101 but granted summary judgment of non-infringement on several grounds, including that the accused systems did not display a "glance view" as required by the '538 and '439 patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's summary judgment of non-infringement. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's construction of "data unit" and found that the evidence supported the conclusion that Facebook's systems received data units not stored in the accused main streams. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain evidence presented by Mirror Worlds and found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the "glance view" limitation. Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of non-infringement and dismissed Facebook's cross-appeal regarding the invalidity defense. View "MIRROR WORLDS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. META PLATFORMS, INC. " on Justia Law

Cytiva BioProcess R&D AB ("Cytiva") appealed the final written decisions from six inter partes reviews (IPRs) that determined 79 claims of three challenged patents were unpatentable. JSR Corp. and JSR Life Sciences, LLC (collectively, "JSR") cross-appealed the decisions in four of these IPRs, which held the remaining four challenged claims not unpatentable. The patents in question relate to chromatography matrices and processes for isolating target compounds using those matrices, specifically involving a ligand made from Protein A (SPA) found in staphylococcus aureus.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) found that it would have been obvious to make the G29A mutation to Domain C of SPA based on prior art, which suggested this modification for any of the SPA domains. The Board held that claims 1–7, 10–20, 23–26 of the '765 patent, claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–16, 18–20, 23–30 of the '142 patent, and claims 1–10, 12–14, 16–28, 30–32, and 34–37 of the '007 patent were unpatentable. However, the Board found that claims 4 and 17 of the '142 patent and claims 11 and 29 of the '007 patent were not unpatentable, as JSR had not shown a reasonable expectation of success for these claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's determination that the majority of the claims were unpatentable, agreeing that the prior art expressly suggested the G29A modification to Domain C. The court also concluded that the Board erred in limiting the construction of "Fab part of an antibody" to Fab fragments and reversed the Board's determination that claims 4 and 17 of the '142 patent and claims 11 and 29 of the '007 patent were not unpatentable. The court held that if a property of a composition is inherent, there is no question of a reasonable expectation of success in achieving it, and thus, both the composition and process claims were unpatentable. View "CYTIVA BIOPROCESS R&D AB v. JSR CORP." on Justia Law

Chad Sheller, as the personal representative of the estate of his son Daniel Elias Sheller, sought attorneys' fees after voluntarily dismissing a Vaccine Act petition. Daniel passed away at two months old, two days after receiving several vaccinations. Sheller filed for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, relying on the "Triple Risk Model" of vaccine-triggered sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) proposed by Dr. Douglas Miller. This model had previously been accepted in another case, Boatmon v. Secretary of Health & Human Services.The Special Master denied Sheller's request for attorneys' fees, concluding that the Triple Risk Model did not provide a reasonable basis for the claim. The United States Court of Federal Claims affirmed this decision. The Special Master also struck certain medical articles from the record, which were submitted after the petition was dismissed, deeming them irrelevant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Special Master abused his discretion by not considering whether the Triple Risk Model was a reasonable basis at the time of filing, given its prior acceptance in the Boatmon case. The court noted that the model was plausible and had succeeded before another special master, making it a reasonable basis for the petition when filed. The court also found that the Special Master did not abuse his discretion in striking the medical articles, as he assessed their relevance appropriately.The Federal Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for the Special Master to determine, in his discretion, whether attorneys' fees should be granted, considering the Vaccine Act's objective of maintaining access to qualified legal assistance. View "SHELLER v. HHS " on Justia Law

Herbert McCoy, Jr. applied for a Program Analyst position with the General Services Administration (GSA) but was not selected. He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), claiming his veteran's preference and 30% or more Disabled Veteran status were not considered. McCoy had not filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor before appealing to the Board.The Board's Administrative Judge (AJ) ordered McCoy to provide proof of filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, as required under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). McCoy failed to provide such proof. Consequently, the AJ dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. McCoy petitioned the Board for review, but the Board affirmed the AJ's decision, stating McCoy had not exhausted his Department of Labor (DOL) remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that McCoy had not demonstrated he exhausted his DOL remedies, a prerequisite for the Board's jurisdiction under the VEOA. McCoy's arguments did not address this failure. The court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding it lacked jurisdiction over McCoy's petition. View "MCCOY v. MSPB " on Justia Law

NexStep, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, alleging infringement of nine patents, including U.S. Patent Nos. 8,885,802 and 8,280,009. The District Court for the District of Delaware granted summary judgment of non-infringement for the '802 patent after construing the term "VoIP" to require two-way voice communication, which NexStep's infringement theory did not meet. The '009 patent proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found no literal infringement but did find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, the district court granted Comcast's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding NexStep's proof inadequate.The district court's summary judgment for the '802 patent was based on the construction of "VoIP" as requiring two-way voice communication, supported by technical dictionaries and the agreed industry standard meaning. NexStep's argument that VoIP should include one-way audio transmission was rejected. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and granted summary judgment of non-infringement.For the '009 patent, the jury found no literal infringement but did find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. However, the district court set aside this verdict, ruling that NexStep failed to provide the required particularized testimony and linking argument to support the doctrine of equivalents. The court found that NexStep's expert testimony was too conclusory and lacked specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court agreed with the district court's construction of "VoIP" and its grant of summary judgment for the '802 patent. For the '009 patent, the appellate court found that NexStep's expert testimony did not meet the evidentiary requirements for the doctrine of equivalents, as it lacked particularized testimony and linking argument. The court dismissed Comcast's conditional cross-appeal related to the validity of the '009 patent. View "NEXSTEP, INC. v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC " on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two companies over the enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) related to the 5G wireless-communication standard. The plaintiff, a telecommunications company, had made a commitment to license its SEPs on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The defendant, another technology company, sought an antisuit injunction to prevent the plaintiff from enforcing injunctions it had obtained in Colombia and Brazil based on these SEPs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the defendant's request for an antisuit injunction. The district court applied a three-part framework to analyze the request, focusing on whether the domestic suit would be dispositive of the foreign actions. The court concluded that the domestic suit would not necessarily result in a global cross-license between the parties and therefore did not meet the threshold requirement for issuing an antisuit injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court vacated the district court's denial and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court concluded that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the "dispositive" requirement. Specifically, the appellate court held that the FRAND commitment precludes the plaintiff from pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief unless it has first complied with its obligation to negotiate in good faith over a license to those SEPs. Since whether the plaintiff had complied with this obligation was an issue before the district court, the appellate court determined that the "dispositive" requirement was met.The appellate court did not decide whether the defendant was ultimately entitled to the antisuit injunction, leaving that determination to the district court's discretion upon further analysis. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the remaining parts of the foreign-antisuit-injunction framework. View "TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON v. LENOVO (UNITED STATES), INC. " on Justia Law

Shamrock Building Materials, Inc. imported steel tubing from Mexico, which had a thin interior coating primarily composed of epoxy, melamine, and silicone additives. The United States Customs and Border Protection classified the tubing under heading 7306 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), which pertains to other tubes and pipes of iron or nonalloy steel. Shamrock contested this classification, arguing that the tubing should be classified under heading 8547 of the HTSUS, which covers electrical conduit tubing of base metal lined with insulating material. Customs rejected Shamrock's protests.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, upholding Customs' classification under heading 7306. The court found that the interior coating of the tubing did not provide significant electrical insulation, which is a requirement for classification under heading 8547. The court noted that the coating's primary function was to facilitate the installation of electrical wires by reducing friction, rather than providing electrical insulation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of International Trade. The Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court's interpretation that heading 8547 requires a commercially significant level of electrical insulation. The court found that Shamrock did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the interior coating of the tubing provided such insulation. Consequently, the court held that the tubing was correctly classified under heading 7306 of the HTSUS. View "SHAMROCK BUILDING MATERIALS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Sage Acquisitions LLC ("Sage") entered into contracts with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to provide management and marketing services for properties in HUD's Real Estate Owned ("REO") disposition program. Sage was awarded three contracts for different geographic areas. Sage filed claims with the HUD contracting officer for settlement costs due to the termination for convenience of the contracts, equitable adjustments for reduced property assignments, and damages for scope reduction. Sage also claimed damages for HUD's alleged breach of a contractual option provision and a related bridge contract.The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals ("Board") denied Sage's claims. The Board held that the contracts were Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity ("IDIQ") contracts, not requirements contracts, and that HUD had met its obligations by ordering the guaranteed minimum quantities. The Board also found that HUD did not breach the contracts by issuing six-month task orders instead of one-year orders and that HUD did not breach the bridge contract by using REO alternatives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision. The court held that the contracts were indeed IDIQ contracts, as they explicitly stated and included guaranteed minimums. The court found that the language in the contracts did not confer exclusivity to Sage, and HUD's reservation of the right to work with other contractors was incompatible with a requirements contract. The court also held that HUD's issuance of six-month task orders was permissible under the contract terms. Finally, the court concluded that HUD did not breach the bridge contract, as Sage was aware of HUD's use of REO alternatives, and HUD's actions were based on legitimate business purposes. View "SAGE ACQUISITIONS LLC v. HUD " on Justia Law