Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several U.S. companies that import products from China challenged the imposition of tariffs on certain Chinese goods, known as List 3 and List 4A tariffs. These tariffs were implemented by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) after an investigation found that China engaged in unreasonable or discriminatory practices that burdened U.S. commerce. The initial tariffs, covering $50 billion in imports (Lists 1 and 2), were not contested. However, after China retaliated with its own tariffs, USTR expanded the tariffs to cover an additional $200 billion (List 3) and later $120 billion (List 4A) in Chinese imports. The plaintiffs argued that these expanded tariffs exceeded USTR’s statutory authority and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to properly consider public comments.The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case first. It found that USTR acted within its authority under Section 307(a)(1)(B) of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows modification of trade actions when the burden on U.S. commerce increases or decreases. However, the court also determined that USTR had not adequately responded to significant public comments as required by the APA. The court ordered a limited remand for USTR to further explain its reasoning and how it considered public input. After USTR provided a more detailed explanation, the trial court sustained the List 3 and List 4A tariffs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Section 307(a)(1)(C) independently authorized USTR’s modifications, allowing escalatory trade actions when the original action was no longer appropriate. The court also found that USTR’s remand redetermination satisfied the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed and sustained the challenged tariffs. View "HMTX Industries LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

A company that provides credit card services under the registered mark ASPIRE opposed the registration of two marks—ASPIRE BANK word and design marks—by a Tennessee retail bank, Apex Bank. Apex Bank, which does not offer credit cards but provides various banking services, filed intent-to-use applications for the ASPIRE BANK marks for “banking and financing services.” CC Serve, the credit card company, argued that Apex’s proposed marks were confusingly similar to its own ASPIRE mark, which has been used in connection with credit card services since 1996.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) reviewed the opposition and sustained it under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, finding that there was a likelihood of consumer confusion between the marks. The Board analyzed several factors from the E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. case, including the similarity of the services and the marks themselves, and concluded that the services were highly similar and that confusion was likely. Apex Bank appealed the TTAB’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s finding that the parties’ services are highly similar, upholding the Board’s analysis of the second DuPont factor. However, the appellate court found that the Board erred in its analysis of the sixth DuPont factor by narrowly considering only marks used for credit card services, rather than similar marks used for broader banking and financing services. The court also vacated the Board’s analysis of the first DuPont factor, as reconsideration of the sixth factor could affect the assessment of the marks’ commercial impression. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Apex Bank v. CC Serve Corp." on Justia Law

Finesse Wireless LLC owns two patents related to methods for mitigating interference in radios caused by intermodulation products (IMPs), which can arise when radio signals interact with passive obstacles. Finesse alleged that AT&T Mobility LLC, by using a particular feature in Nokia radios, infringed specific claims of both patents. Nokia intervened in the case. The dispute centered on whether the accused radios performed the patented methods for reducing IMP interference, specifically whether they sampled the required signals and performed certain signal multiplications as described in the patent claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial in which the jury found all asserted claims of both patents valid and infringed, awarding Finesse a lump-sum damages amount for the remaining life of the patents. After the verdict, AT&T and Nokia moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement and for a new trial on damages, but the district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL de novo, applying Fifth Circuit law. The Federal Circuit found that Finesse’s evidence, particularly its expert’s testimony, was insufficient and self-contradictory regarding whether the accused radios sampled both the “signals of interest” and “interference generating signals” as required by the first patent. For the second patent, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have found the accused radios performed the seven specific signal multiplications required by the claims. As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL of noninfringement for both patents and vacated the damages award. Costs were awarded to the defendants-appellants. View "FINESSE WIRELESS LLC v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a patent owned by a pharmaceutical company, which describes methods for reducing the risk of cardiovascular events in patients with coronary artery disease or peripheral artery disease by administering specific doses of rivaroxaban and aspirin. The patent claims include both general methods of administering these drugs and a particular claim involving a “first product” that combines both drugs in a single dosage form. The patent is based on results from a clinical trial known as COMPASS, which evaluated the efficacy and safety of this drug combination.Three generic drug manufacturers challenged the patent’s validity by filing petitions for inter partes review with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), arguing that the claims were anticipated or obvious in light of prior art references, including published articles describing similar drug regimens and ongoing clinical trials. The PTAB joined the proceedings and ultimately held that claims 1–2 were unpatentable as anticipated and claims 1–8 were unpatentable as obvious, relying on the prior art and its interpretation of the patent’s claim language.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s decision. The court affirmed the PTAB’s finding that claims 1–4 were unpatentable, holding that the phrase “clinically proven effective” in the claims, even if considered limiting, did not create a patentable distinction because it was functionally unrelated to the method itself. However, the court found that the PTAB had incorrectly construed the “first product” limitation in claims 5–8, which should require a single dosage form containing both drugs. The court vacated the PTAB’s unpatentability finding for claims 5–8 and remanded for further proceedings under the correct claim construction. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case, with no costs awarded. View "BAYER PHARMA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. " on Justia Law

A patent owner brought two infringement lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against a semiconductor company, alleging that certain integrated circuit products infringed three patents related to electronic circuitry and power-saving features. The accused products included specific chips that allegedly implemented a particular feature. After the lawsuits were filed, the defendant challenged the cases on grounds including improper service, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. During the litigation, the plaintiff produced a licensing agreement with a third party, and subsequently entered into another agreement covering the accused products. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed both cases without prejudice.Following the dismissals, the defendant moved for attorneys’ fees, costs, and sanctions, arguing that the lawsuits were baseless. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, costs under Rule 54(d)(1), and sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but converted the voluntary dismissals to dismissals with prejudice as a sanction. The court also denied the defendant’s discovery requests related to confidentiality and access to certain materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in denying fees under § 285 and costs under Rule 54(d)(1), because the defendant became a prevailing party when the dismissals were converted to dismissals with prejudice. The Federal Circuit vacated those portions of the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions and fees under § 1927, finding no abuse of discretion. It also affirmed the denial of the remaining discovery request, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the protective order. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "FUTURE LINK SYSTEMS, LLC v. REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION " on Justia Law

A company developed and patented a process for desulfurizing heavy marine fuel oil (HMFO) to comply with international sulfur content standards. The patented process involves taking a high-sulfur HMFO that meets certain physical property requirements and then hydroprocessing it to reduce its sulfur content. The company marketed its technology to various refineries, including the defendants, but no licensing agreement was reached. The defendants later modified their refineries to produce low-sulfur HMFO, prompting the plaintiff to sue for patent infringement, specifically alleging that the defendants’ processes at one refinery infringed two claims of the relevant patent.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the parties disputed the proper construction of certain claim terms and the appropriate method and location for testing the fuel’s compliance with the required standards. During discovery, the defendants argued that it was too dangerous to obtain certain test samples, and the court accepted their position, allowing the plaintiff to use an estimation formula instead. On the eve of trial, however, the defendants introduced a new noninfringement theory, arguing that only actual test data—not estimates—could prove compliance. The district court allowed this argument, and the jury returned a general verdict of noninfringement. The district court later found the defendants’ argument improper and prejudicial but deemed the error harmless and denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the error harmless because the jury’s general verdict made it impossible to determine whether the improper argument affected the outcome. The appellate court reversed the denial of a new trial and remanded for further proceedings, also affirming the district court’s construction of the disputed claim term. View "MAGEMA TECHNOLOGY LLC v. PHILLIPS 66 " on Justia Law

The case concerns an administrative review of an antidumping duty order imposed by the United States Department of Commerce on certain large diameter welded pipe imported from Greece. The Greek producer, Corinth Pipeworks Pipe Industry SA, and its U.S. subsidiary, CPW America Co., were the sole exporter and importer of the subject merchandise. During the review period, Commerce required Corinth to submit cost data and a reconciliation of those costs to its financial statements. Corinth submitted responses to Commerce’s initial and two supplemental questionnaires, but Commerce found that the data did not reconcile as required, included double-counted costs, and failed to provide a single, complete reconciliation for the review period.After receiving Corinth’s responses, Commerce initially issued preliminary results finding no dumping. However, after reviewing the final submissions, Commerce determined that Corinth’s cost data were unreliable and incomplete. Commerce concluded that Corinth had withheld necessary information, failed to provide data in the requested form, and significantly impeded the review. As a result, Commerce applied “facts otherwise available” with an adverse inference, assigning Corinth the highest dumping margin alleged in the original petition. Corinth challenged this determination before the United States Court of International Trade, arguing that Commerce’s actions were unreasonable, that it was not given an opportunity to comment on a change in methodology, and that the adverse inference was not justified.The United States Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s final determination, finding that Commerce’s use of total adverse facts available was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit held that Commerce’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence and not contrary to law, that Corinth had failed to cooperate to the best of its ability, and that Commerce was not required to provide an additional opportunity to comment under the circumstances. The judgment of the Trade Court was affirmed. View "CORINTH PIPEWORKS PIPE INDUSTRY SA v. US " on Justia Law

Several small businesses and a coalition of states challenged a series of executive orders issued by the President that imposed new tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods imported from most countries. These tariffs, referred to as the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs, were imposed in response to declared national emergencies related to drug trafficking and trade imbalances. The executive orders directed changes to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, resulting in significant increases in import duties on products from Canada, Mexico, China, and other major trading partners.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by imposing these tariffs. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose the challenged tariffs and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The government appealed, and the Federal Circuit consolidated the cases, stayed the injunction pending appeal, and heard the matter en banc.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate” importation does not include the power to impose tariffs of the type and scope at issue. The court found that IEEPA does not mention tariffs, duties, or taxes, and contrasted it with other statutes where Congress has explicitly delegated tariff authority to the President with clear limitations. The court also concluded that the government’s interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns under the major questions and non-delegation doctrines. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s declaratory judgment that the executive orders were invalid, but vacated the universal injunction and remanded for the CIT to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. View "V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump" on Justia Law

The petitioner received a flu vaccine on November 1, 2017. Over a month later, he developed upper respiratory symptoms and, after several days, experienced sudden generalized weakness. He was diagnosed with Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) and also found to have a bacterial infection (H. influenzae pneumonia). During his hospitalization, multiple treating physicians associated his GBS with his respiratory infection, and none suggested a link to the flu vaccine. Upon discharge, his diagnoses included both GBS and H. influenzae pneumonia.The petitioner filed a claim for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the flu vaccine caused his GBS. The case was assigned to a special master, who found that although the petitioner established a prima facie case for vaccine causation, the government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the unrelated H. influenzae infection was the sole substantial factor causing the GBS. The special master explicitly excluded the vaccine as a causal factor. The petitioner sought review in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that the special master erred in applying the burden of proof and in making certain factual findings. The Court of Federal Claims rejected these arguments and upheld the special master’s decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Claims Court’s decision de novo, applying the same standards of review. The Federal Circuit held that, in a Table case under the Vaccine Act, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a factor unrelated to the vaccine was the sole substantial cause of the injury, but need not disprove vaccine causation as if it had been affirmatively established. The court found that the special master’s findings were not arbitrary or capricious and that the correct legal standards were applied. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s decision denying compensation. View "WHITE v. HHS " on Justia Law

Global Health Solutions LLC and Marc Selner each filed patent applications in August 2017 for a method of preparing a wound treatment ointment containing nanodroplets of an aqueous biocide suspended in petrolatum jelly without emulsifiers. Selner filed his application four days before GHS, making him the first-filer under the America Invents Act (AIA) “first-inventor-to-file” system. GHS alleged that its founder, Bradley Burnam, conceived the invention and communicated it to Selner, who then derived the invention and filed first. Both parties agreed that their applications claimed the same invention, and the dispute centered on who conceived the invention and when.The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) instituted a derivation proceeding. After reviewing evidence, including contemporaneous emails, the Board found that Burnam communicated the invention to Selner by 4:04 p.m. on February 14, 2014, but also found that Selner had independently conceived the invention earlier that same day, by 12:55 p.m. The Board determined that Selner did not derive the invention from Burnam and ruled in favor of Selner. GHS appealed, arguing that the Board erred in its evidentiary rulings, burden of proof allocation, and failure to require reduction to practice for conception, and also requested that Burnam be named a co-inventor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that the Board’s focus on “first-to-invent” was harmless error, as Selner’s independent conception was dispositive under the AIA. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s evidentiary rulings, burden allocation, or treatment of reduction to practice. The court also held that GHS failed to properly preserve its request for correction of inventorship. The Board’s judgment for Selner was affirmed. View "GLOBAL HEALTH SOLUTIONS LLC v. SELNER " on Justia Law