Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Myco began marketing “the AB Max,” a device for treating blepharitis, at a New Orleans trade show. Blepharitis is a chronic inflammatory disease of the eyelids. A month later, BlephEx filed an application that would become the 087 patent, issued in October 2019, and entitled “Instrument for Treating an Ocular Disorder.” BlephEx sued Myco, alleging that the AB Max infringed the 087 patent.The district court enjoined Myco and those acting on its behalf from selling, distributing, or offering to sell or distribute the AB Max. The court found that Myco had not presented a substantial question of anticipation based on prior art. Myco’s obviousness argument was “unsupported with any expert evidence demonstrating that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to attach a swab” to a hand-held device and Myco failed “to explain how one of ordinary skill in the art would have addressed the safety concerns of attaching a swab that is soaked in an abrasive.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, clearly err in its underlying factual findings, or abuse its discretion in setting the scope of the preliminary injunction. View "BlephEx, LLC v. Myco Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Vox is the domain registry operator for the ".SUCKS" generic top-level domain (gTLD) for Internet websites. Vox’s 941 trademark application sought registration of the standard character mark .SUCKS in Class 42 (computer and scientific services) for “[d]omain registry operator services related to the gTLD in the mark” and in Class 45 (personal and legal services) for “[d]omain name registration services featuring the gTLD in the mark” plus “registration of domain names for identification of users on a global computer network featuring the gTLD in the mark.” Vox’s 215 application sought to register the stylized form of .SUCKS, which appears as a retro, pixelated font that resembles letters on early LED screens in Class 42. The examining attorney refused both applications finding that, when used in connection with the identified services, “each fails to function as a mark” and “submitted evidence [for the 215 application] does not establish that the mark functions as a source identifier.”The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to the 215 application. The standard character mark .SUCKS “will not be perceived as a source identifier” and instead “will be perceived merely as one of many gTLDs that are used in domain names.” Stylized lettering or design element in the mark did not create a separate commercial impression and “is not sufficiently distinctive to ‘carry’ the overall mark into registrability.” View "In Re Vox Populi Registry Ltd." on Justia Law

Qualcomm’s patent is directed to integrated circuit devices with power detection circuits for systems with multiple supply voltages. Apple filed two petitions for inter partes review (IPR), challenging different sets of claims in the patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found several claims unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 103. The Board relied on a ground raised by Apple that relied in part on applicant-admitted prior art (AAPA)—statements in the challenged patent acknowledging that most of the limitations of the patent’s claims were already known—and a prior art patent. Qualcomm argued that 35 U.S.C. 311(b) limits an IPR petitioner to challenge claims as unpatentable “only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board erred in concluding that AAPA constitutes “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications” under section 311(b). On remand, the Board must determine whether Apple’s petition nonetheless raises its section 103 challenge “on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” AAPA is not categorically excluded from IPR; in this case, the AAPA was not contained in a document that is a prior art patent or prior art printed publication. View "Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

Canadian Solar produces and exports certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells from China. The U.S. Department of Commerce, after an investigation, issued an order imposing a duty to counteract subsidies Canadian Solar received from the government of China. During its fourth administrative review of that countervailing duty order, Commerce determined that Canadian Solar received regionally specific electricity subsidies subject to countervailing duties under 19 U.S.C. 1677(5A)(D)(iv); Commerce identified electricity price variation across the different provinces and applied adverse facts available—due to the central government of China’s failure to cooperate in Commerce’s investigation—to conclude that the central government sets variable electricity pricing that is region-specific for development purposes.The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. The record supports Commerce’s conclusions. Commerce sufficiently and reasonably explained that it lacked key information because the government of China failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with requests for information. As a result, Commerce was forced to fill informational gaps and properly relied on adverse inferences to find that Canadian Solar received a regionally specific electricity subsidy that must be countervailed. View "Canadian Solar, Inc. v United States" on Justia Law

NSS’s patents are entitled “Method for Immediate Boolean Operations Using Geometric Facets” and relate to methods of packaging computer-aided data for three-dimensional objects. NSS brought suit for infringement against Autodesk. The district court held a claim construction (Markman) hearing and ruled the claims invalid on the ground of claim indefiniteness, 35 U.S.C. 112(b).The Federal Circuit reversed. The district court erred on the legal standard for claim indefiniteness, and on the correct standard, the claims are not indefinite. Claim language, "standing alone” is not the correct standard of law, and is contrary to uniform precedent. Patent claims are viewed and understood in light of the specification, the prosecution history, and other relevant evidence, as “would have allowed a skilled artisan to know the scope of the claimed invention with reasonable certainty.” The district court did not apply that standard protocol for analyzing claim definiteness, and did not construe the claims but instead held that questions raised by Autodesk must be answered and that the answers must be in the claims. View "Nature Simulation Systems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2017, Kyocera filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission, alleging Koki was violating 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing gas spring nailer products that infringe or were made using methods that infringe, certain claims in five patents. Those patents generally relate to linear fastener driving tools, like portable tools that drive staples, nails, or other linearly driven fasteners. The Commission held that Koki induced infringement.The Federal Circuit vacated. The ALJ erred in admitting certain expert testimony. The court upheld claim construction with respect to “driven position” and “main storage chamber” but rejected the construction of “lifter member.” The “safety contact element” and “fastener driving mechanism” should have been construed as separate components. View "Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools Inc.v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

The Landowners own parcels of land adjacent to a 2.45-mile strip of a Union Pacific railroad line in McLennan County, Texas. Union Pacific’s predecessor in interest, Texas Central originally acquired the Line in 1902 through multiple deeds executed by the Landowners’ predecessors in interest. The Landowners sued, seeking compensation based on a theory that their predecessors in interest had conferred only easements to Texas Central, and that the Surface Transportation Board (STB) enforcement of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241, by “railbanking” amounted to a “taking” of their property. Railbanking involves the transition of unused railroad corridors into recreational hiking and biking trails, generally by a transfer of an interest in the use of a rail corridor to a third-party entity. The Claims Court interpreted the deeds as having conveyed fee simple estates, not easements.The Federal Circuit affirmed. No takings from the Landowners occurred when the government later authorized conversion of the railroad line to a recreation trail; the granting clauses of the subject deeds unambiguously conveyed fee simple interests in the land and not easements despite contradictory language elsewhere in the deeds. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Gurley served in the Army, 1972-1974 (a period of war) and the National Guard, 1975-1982. As of 1997, VA was paying him service-connected disability compensation benefits at the 100 percent disability level based on individual unemployability. In 2011, Gurley was convicted of a felony and was incarcerated for nearly six months. When a veteran is incarcerated for a felony conviction, the veteran “shall not be paid” the full amount of awarded compensation benefits “for the period beginning on the sixty-first day of such incarceration and ending on the day such incarceration ends,” 38 U.S.C. 5313(a)(1). Gurley’s payment should have been reduced to the 10% disability level. Gurley, however, received his full benefits because VA did not learn of his incarceration until six days after his release.The VA notified Gurley that he had been overpaid by $10,461 and that it would reduce its payment of Gurley’s current benefits “until the amount . . . overpaid is recouped.” Gurley unsuccessfully requested a waiver under 38 U.S.C. 5302 and disputed the debt. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals, Veterans Court, and Federal Circuit affirmed. The retroactive benefit reduction and recoupment of the overpayment through the withholding of continuing benefit payments were proper. View "Gurley v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Nicely served in active duty in the Marine Corps (USMC) for more than 10 years. Between Nicely’s 2010 DUI arrest and his 2011 discharge, the state court dismissed the DUI charge but Nicely wrote a letter to his Commanding General admitting to having driven under the influence. After the Board of Inquiry proceedings began but before they ended, Nicely filed a reprisal complaint under the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), 10 U.S.C. 1034. Nicely’s complaint was dismissed in 2012. Nicely unsuccessfully petitioned the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) to correct his military record.Nicely filed suit in the Claims Court, alleging that some BCNR members were not statutorily authorized to serve. The BCNR rejected his claim that retired military officers are precluded from sitting on military correction boards under 10 U.S.C. 1552(a), reasoning that neither BCNR’s authorizing statute nor governing regulations expressly define "civilian" and do not expressly exclude retired military members from those civilians who may serve as Board members. The Claims Court then dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Claims Court correctly concluded that Nicely’s claim arose under the MWPA and not the Military Pay Act and that it, therefore, lacked jurisdiction. The use of the term “civilian” throughout Title 10 to include former and retired members of the military is consistent with the ordinary meaning of “civilians”—that is, a person who is “not serving on active duty in the military View "Nicely v. United States" on Justia Law

Dr. Smolinski is a Supervisory Physician in the Traumatic Brain Injury Clinic of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC), an Army hospital in Germany. He was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army and occasionally saw patients at LRMC as a visiting provider. The Army purportedly changed the salary Smolinski was offered and delayed his move to a new position. Smolinski’s subsequent complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221, alleged those actions were retaliation for his wife’s 2017 patient complaint, his 2018 testimony in an investigation into an officer, and his 2019 Office of Special Counsel (OSC) complaints.The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his complaint, citing lack of jurisdiction because Smolinski failed to establish that those activities were protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Smolinski failed to allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim that his wife’s patient complaint was a protected disclosure, and did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim of retaliation for his OSC complaints. With respect to Smolinski’s claims alleging retaliation for his 2018 testimony, however, the court reversed the dismissal and remanded for the Board to consider those claims on the merits. View "Smolinski v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law