Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Erik Brunetti applied to register the word “FUCK” as a trademark for various goods and services, including sunglasses, jewelry, bags, and retail store services. After initial refusals based on the mark being “immoral or scandalous”—a ground later found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti—the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reexamined the applications. The PTO’s examining attorney refused registration, finding that the term was a widely used, commonplace word that failed to function as a trademark because consumers would not perceive it as identifying the source of the goods or services.The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the refusals, concluding that the mark did not serve as a source indicator. The Board reasoned that “FUCK” is an “all-purpose word” with many recognized meanings and is commonly used on similar goods by various sources, so it would not be seen by consumers as distinguishing Brunetti’s products from others. The Board also rejected Brunetti’s constitutional arguments and his reliance on other registered marks, stating that each application must be considered on its own merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court rejected most of Brunetti’s arguments but found that the Board failed to articulate a clear and rational standard for when an “all-purpose word” like “FUCK” can or cannot function as a trademark, especially given the existence of similar registered marks. The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the Board must provide a satisfactory explanation and coherent guidance for its actions. View "In Re BRUNETTI " on Justia Law

In this case, a group of pensioners from a multiemployer retirement fund governed by ERISA challenged the reduction of their pension benefits following the enactment of the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 (MPRA). The MPRA allowed plan administrators to reduce benefits for current and future beneficiaries in order to prevent plan insolvency, subject to certain procedural safeguards and approval by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The plaintiffs, who had vested rights to their pension benefits, argued that these reductions constituted an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Claims Court found that while the plaintiffs had a cognizable property interest in their vested pension benefits, the reduction of those benefits did not amount to a physical taking. Instead, the court analyzed the claim as a regulatory taking under the Penn Central framework and concluded that the economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action did not support a finding of a taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the MPRA’s reduction of pension benefits was not a physical taking because the plaintiffs had only a contractual right to payment, not a property interest in the plan’s assets, and the government did not appropriate any specific property for itself or a third party. The court further held that, under the Penn Central test, the reduction did not constitute a regulatory taking, as the economic impact was not severe, the plaintiffs’ expectations were not unduly interfered with given the heavily regulated nature of pension plans, and the government action served a substantial public purpose. The judgment for the government was affirmed. View "KING v. US " on Justia Law

Several landowners in Colorado owned property subject to a railroad easement held by Great Western Railway of Colorado, LLC. The railroad line, originally used for transporting sugar beets, had fallen into disuse except for railcar storage. In 2008, Great Western sought permission from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the line. The STB granted this request and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) to allow negotiations for possible interim recreational trail use. Negotiations failed, and the NITU expired. Instead of abandoning the line, Great Western repeatedly extended its abandonment authority and ultimately decided not to abandon the line, continuing to use it for storage and making some improvements.The landowners sued the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the issuance of the NITU constituted a temporary taking under the Fifth Amendment. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Claims Court granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the NITU caused a taking. Specifically, the court determined that Great Western would not have abandoned the line at the time of the NITU, so the NITU did not delay the vesting of the landowners’ reversionary interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Claims Court’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that to establish a compensable taking in a rails-to-trails case, plaintiffs must show that the issuance of the NITU caused a delay in abandonment that would have otherwise occurred, thereby postponing the vesting of their property interests. The court found that the evidence showed Great Western would not have abandoned the line regardless of the NITU, so causation was not established. The court also rejected arguments that state law abandonment or mere issuance of a NITU alone could establish a taking. The judgment for the government was affirmed. View "SAUER WEST LLC v. US " on Justia Law

The case concerns two patents related to methods for preparing DNA samples for sequencing, owned by Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, Labcorp Genetics, Inc., and The General Hospital Corporation. The patents describe techniques for enriching specific regions of DNA to make sequencing more efficient, using various types of primers and adaptors. The dispute centers on whether certain DNA preparation kits sold by Qiagen and its affiliates infringe these patents, specifically regarding the design and function of the primers used in Qiagen’s kits.After the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging infringement of both patents, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that Qiagen willfully infringed the asserted claims of both patents—under the doctrine of equivalents for one patent and literally for the other—and awarded the plaintiffs approximately $4.7 million in damages. The district court denied Qiagen’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on non-infringement, invalidity, and damages, and also denied Qiagen’s alternative request for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL de novo. The Federal Circuit held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of infringement for either patent. The court determined that the district court erred in allowing the jury to interpret the claim term “identical” as “identical to a portion,” and found that the evidence did not support infringement under the doctrine of equivalents or literal infringement as required by the patent claims and their constructions. As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL of non-infringement for both patents, and remanded with instructions to grant JMOL of non-infringement. View "LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v. QIAGEN SCIENCES, LLC " on Justia Law

Shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, acting derivatively on behalf of these entities, challenged the federal government’s actions following the 2008 financial crisis. After the housing market collapse, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), creating the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorizing it to act as conservator for the Enterprises. The FHFA placed both entities into conservatorship, and the U.S. Treasury entered into agreements to provide financial support in exchange for senior preferred stock and other rights. In 2012, a “net worth sweep” was implemented, redirecting nearly all profits from the Enterprises to the Treasury, effectively eliminating dividends for other shareholders. The plaintiffs, as preferred shareholders, alleged that this arrangement constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims previously reviewed the case and granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The Claims Court relied on the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, which held that, under HERA, the Enterprises lost any cognizable property interest necessary to support a takings claim because the FHFA, as conservator, had broad authority over the Enterprises’ assets. The Claims Court found the plaintiffs’ claims indistinguishable from those in Fairholme and dismissed them accordingly.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the Claims Court’s decision, holding that claim preclusion barred the plaintiffs’ derivative takings claims because the issues had already been litigated in Fairholme. The court rejected arguments that the prior representation was inadequate or that the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County fundamentally changed takings law. The Federal Circuit concluded that Fairholme remained binding precedent and affirmed the dismissal. View "FISHER v. US " on Justia Law

Valeo North America imported T-series aluminum sheets from China and sought a determination from the U.S. Department of Commerce as to whether these products were subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on common alloy aluminum sheet from China. The dispute centered on whether Valeo’s T-series sheets, which have a manganese-based core but are not registered with the Aluminum Association, fell within the scope of the orders, which cover certain aluminum sheets “as designated by the Aluminum Association.” Valeo argued that only registered alloys were covered and that its heat-treated T-series sheets should be excluded.The United States Department of Commerce initially ruled that Valeo’s T-series sheets were within the scope of the orders, interpreting the language to include unregistered alloys with the relevant chemical composition. Valeo challenged this determination at the United States Court of International Trade, which found the scope language ambiguous and remanded the case for further explanation, particularly regarding the treatment of unregistered alloys and the impact of heat treatment. On remand, Commerce again found the scope language ambiguous, considered additional regulatory factors, and reaffirmed that Valeo’s products were covered. The Trade Court sustained this remand determination, and Valeo appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the language “as designated by the Aluminum Association” in the orders was ambiguous and did not unambiguously exclude unregistered alloys. The court found that Commerce’s analysis under the regulatory framework was supported by substantial evidence and that Valeo’s arguments regarding heat treatment and the timing of Customs instructions were unpersuasive. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision, upholding Commerce’s determination that Valeo’s T-series sheets are within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. View "VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a patent for a system that automates the adjustment of selectorized dumbbells using an electric motor. The patent describes a dumbbell with stacks of weight plates on each side, a handle, and a movable selector that, when positioned, couples different numbers of plates to the handle. The innovation lies in using an electric motor, operatively connected to the selector, to move it into the desired position based on user input, thereby automating the weight selection process and addressing safety and convenience issues present in prior manual systems.The United States District Court for the District of Utah reviewed the case after the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the asserted patent claims were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court applied the Supreme Court’s two-step framework for patent eligibility and determined that all but one claim (claim 19) were directed to an abstract idea and implemented using generic components, thus failing the eligibility test. The court granted the motion to dismiss as to claims 1–18 and 20, but denied it for claim 19, finding that the parties had not sufficiently addressed its eligibility.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit held that the relevant claims were not directed to an abstract idea but instead to a specific mechanical improvement in selectorized dumbbells. The court found that the claims recited a sufficiently specific structure and method, including the use of an electric motor to automate weight selection, and thus did not preempt all forms of automated weight adjustment. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of claims 1–18 and 20 and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS, INC. v. IFIT, INC. " on Justia Law

The dispute centers on allegations by Mondis Technology Ltd. and related entities that LG Electronics Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary infringed claims 14 and 15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180. The patent describes a display unit, such as a computer monitor, that stores identification numbers in memory to control access by external devices. The key issue was whether the patent’s written description supported a claim limitation requiring an “identification number for identifying at least a type of said display unit,” as opposed to identifying a specific unit.After Mondis filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and stayed for patent reexamination. When some claims survived, litigation resumed on claims 14 and 15. A jury found the claims not invalid and infringed, awarding damages to Mondis. The district court denied LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on invalidity, relying on the presumption of validity and the jury’s ability to weigh expert testimony. The court vacated the initial damages award and ordered a retrial, after which a reduced damages award was entered. Both parties appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL. The appellate court held that no reasonable jury could find the patent’s written description adequately supported the claim limitation requiring identification of a type of display unit. The court found that the patent only disclosed identification of specific units, not types, and that neither expert testimony nor the prosecution history provided substantial evidence to the contrary. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, held claims 14 and 15 invalid for lack of written description, and ordered judgment for LG. All other issues were deemed moot. View "Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Tau-Ken Temir LLP, JSC NMC Tau-Ken Samruk, and the Ministry of Trade and Integration of the Republic of Kazakhstan (collectively, "Tau-Ken") appealing a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade. The U.S. Department of Commerce had determined that the Republic of Kazakhstan subsidized Tau-Ken’s production of silicon metal, warranting a countervailable subsidy rate of 160%. This determination was based on Commerce rejecting a Tau-Ken submission that was filed 1 hour and 41 minutes past the deadline.The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s decision, finding that Commerce did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the late submission and applying an adverse inference when selecting from facts otherwise available. The Trade Court likened the case to Dongtai Peak Honey Industries Co. v. United States, where Commerce had similarly rejected untimely submissions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce abused its discretion in rejecting Tau-Ken’s submission. The court noted that the rejection significantly impeded the goal of determining an accurate countervailable subsidy rate and that accepting the late submission would not have burdened Commerce or implicated finality concerns. The court also found that Tau-Ken had made diligent efforts to comply with the deadlines and that the technical issues encountered were legitimate.The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions for Commerce to accept the September 16 submission and proceed with the countervailing duty investigation accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of determining subsidy rates as accurately as possible and found that Commerce’s rejection of the submission was a clear error of judgment. View "TAU-KEN TEMIR LLP v. US " on Justia Law

Rodney Wright, a totally disabled veteran, sought additional compensation for his adult daughter, B.W., under 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F) after she elected to receive benefits from the Survivors’ and Dependents’ Educational Assistance (DEA) program. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) ceased paying Wright additional compensation for B.W. once she began receiving DEA benefits, citing 38 U.S.C. § 3562(2), which bars increased rates or additional amounts of compensation when a dependent elects DEA benefits.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Wright’s request for additional compensation, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision. The Veterans Court held that section 3562 permanently barred Wright from receiving additional compensation under section 1115 once B.W. elected to receive DEA benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the nonduplication provision of section 3562 bars a disabled veteran from receiving additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child begins receiving DEA benefits. The court also determined that this bar is permanent and does not lift after the exhaustion of DEA benefits. The court rejected Wright’s argument that the bar should only apply to concurrent receipt of benefits, finding no statutory basis for such an interpretation. The court concluded that section 3562 imposes a permanent bar on a veteran’s receipt of additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child elects to receive DEA benefits. View "WRIGHT v. COLLINS " on Justia Law