Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a group of companies, sought refunds for H-1B visa petitions they filed on behalf of their foreign national employees who were already in the United States under a different nonimmigrant classification. They argued that the enhanced fees imposed by the government for these petitions were not applicable to change of status petitions, which involve nonimmigrants already in the U.S.The United States Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument. The court found that the statutory language did not exclude change of status petitions from the enhanced fees. The court interpreted the phrase "application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], including an application for an extension of such status" to include change of status petitions, as these petitions are a sub-category of initial grant petitions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the statutory language "an application for admission as a nonimmigrant under [H-1B], including an application for an extension of such status" does not exclude change of status petitions. The court reasoned that a strict application of the statutory definitions would render part of the statute meaningless and that the ordinary meaning of the phrase includes change of status petitions. The court also noted that this interpretation aligns with longstanding USCIS practice and the legislative intent behind the statute. As a result, the plaintiffs' claim for a refund was denied, and the government's imposition of the enhanced fees was upheld. View "Itserve Alliance, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. and CarnaudMetalbox Engineering Ltd. (collectively, “Crown”) sued Belvac Production Machinery, Inc. (“Belvac”) for infringing claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,308,570, 9,968,982, and 10,751,784, which relate to necking machines used in manufacturing metal beverage cans. Belvac argued that the patents were invalid under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because a necking machine embodying the invention was on sale in the U.S. before the critical date. Both parties sought summary judgment on this issue.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted summary judgment to Crown, ruling that the patents were not invalid under the on-sale bar, and denied Belvac’s motion. After a jury trial, the court entered a judgment that the asserted claims were not invalid and not infringed. Crown appealed the noninfringement judgment, and Belvac appealed the no invalidity judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the letter sent by Crown to Complete Packaging Machinery constituted a commercial offer for sale in the U.S. before the critical date, thus invalidating the patents under § 102(b). The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Crown and remanded for entry of judgment in Belvac’s favor. The court did not address the issue of infringement due to the invalidity finding. View "Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. v. Belvac Production Machinery, Inc." on Justia Law

Risen Energy Co., Ltd. (Risen), a Chinese exporter of solar cells, was subject to an antidumping order by the Department of Commerce (Commerce). In the Sixth Administrative Review, Commerce used surrogate values from Malaysia to calculate normal values for Risen's products. Risen challenged Commerce's surrogate value calculations for its backsheet and ethyl vinyl acetate (EVA) inputs, as well as the overhead ratio calculation.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) initially found Commerce's surrogate value calculations for Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter for further explanation. Commerce then provided additional evidence from ASTM standards to support its choice of HTS categories for these inputs, which the Trade Court sustained. However, the Trade Court upheld Commerce's surrogate financial ratio calculation for overhead despite some reservations about Commerce's rationale.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Commerce's use of the HTS categories for "sheet" to value Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found Commerce's surrogate overhead ratio calculation unsupported by substantial evidence. The court noted that Commerce's reliance on the Hanwha financial statement and the IFRS standard was unclear and speculative.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision regarding the surrogate value calculations for backsheet and EVA inputs but vacated the decision on the surrogate overhead ratio calculation. The case was remanded to Commerce for further proceedings to provide substantial evidence for its overhead calculation. View "Risen Energy Co., LTD. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of ambulance service providers, challenged the validity of a final rule promulgated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The rule, titled "Change in Rates VA Pays for Special Modes of Transportation," amended how the VA pays for noncontract ground and air ambulance transports for eligible beneficiaries. The rule stipulated that the VA would pay the lesser of the actual charge or the Medicare fee schedule amount for these services, rather than the actual costs. Petitioners argued that this rule exceeded the VA's statutory authority under 38 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3)(C).The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court examined whether the VA had the authority to implement the rule under the cited statute. The court noted that while 38 U.S.C. § 111(a) allows the VA to pay for travel expenses to or from a "Department facility or other place," § 111(b)(3)(C) specifically limits the VA's payment discretion to ambulance transports to or from a "Department facility" only. The court found that the VA's rule improperly extended this payment methodology to transports to or from places other than Department facilities, which was not authorized by the statute.The Federal Circuit held that the VA's final rule exceeded the statutory authority granted by Congress under 38 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3)(C). Consequently, the court granted the petition and set aside the final rule. The court did not address other arguments raised by the petitioners, as the decision on the statutory authority was sufficient to resolve the case. The petitioners' motion to stay the rule pending judicial review was denied as moot, given the court's decision on the merits. View "Metropolitan Area EMS Authority v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In July 2009, veteran John H. Casey filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) with the VA challenging the denial of service connection for disabilities. In June 2010, Robert Goss entered into a contingent fee agreement with Casey, agreeing to represent him in his pursuit of benefits from the VA and receive twenty percent of any past-due benefits awarded. Goss filed the necessary forms with the VA, and in January 2011, Casey terminated their attorney-client relationship. Despite this, the VA awarded past-due benefits to Casey in September 2011 and February 2012, and paid Goss twenty percent of these benefits. Casey challenged the payment of fees to Goss, arguing that Goss did not perform any work on his case.The VA issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) denying Casey’s challenge, and Casey appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board). The Board remanded the case to the VA Regional Office (RO) three times, instructing the RO to request an itemized account of Goss’s work to determine the reasonableness of the fees. Goss refused to provide this information, and the RO repeatedly denied Casey’s claim without providing full reasons and bases. In November 2020, the Board found the twenty percent fee unreasonable, as Goss had not contributed significantly to the case, and Casey’s NOD was filed before Goss’s appointment.Goss appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the reasonableness of the fee award. The VA initially opposed but later conceded this point. The Veterans Court accepted the VA’s concession, vacated the Board’s decision on reasonableness, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Goss then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s decision, holding that the Board did have jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the fee award. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination. View "Goss v. McDonough" on Justia Law

DDR Holdings, LLC (DDR) sued Priceline.com LLC and Booking.com B.V. (collectively, Priceline.com) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,818,399 (’399 patent). The ’399 patent relates to generating a composite web page that combines visual elements of a “host” website with content from a third-party “merchant.” The dispute centered on the construction of the claim terms “merchants” and “commerce object.” DDR argued that “merchants” should include purveyors of both goods and services, while Priceline.com contended it should be limited to purveyors of goods alone.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware construed “merchants” as “producers, distributors, or resellers of the goods to be sold” and “commerce object” to exclude services. Following this construction, the parties stipulated to non-infringement, agreeing that the accused instrumentalities did not infringe the asserted claims of the ’399 patent under the court’s claim constructions. The district court entered final judgment in favor of Priceline.com, and DDR appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s construction of “merchants” as purveyors of goods, not services, noting the significant deletion of any reference to services in the final specification of the ’399 patent compared to the provisional application. The court also affirmed the construction of “commerce object” as “a product, a product category, a catalog, or an indication that a product, product category, or catalog should be chosen dynamically,” consistent with the construction of “merchants.”The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court correctly construed the disputed terms and affirmed the judgment of non-infringement in favor of Priceline.com. View "DDR Holdings, LLC v. Priceline.com LLC" on Justia Law

Galderma Laboratories, L.P. and TCD Royalty Sub LP (collectively, Galderma) own and market Oracea®, a doxycycline-based treatment for rosacea. They hold U.S. Patent Nos. 7,749,532 and 8,206,740 (the Asserted Patents), which cover a specific formulation of doxycycline. Lupin Inc. and Lupin Ltd. (collectively, Lupin) filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to market a generic version of Oracea®, claiming bioequivalence. Galderma sued Lupin for patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act, asserting that Lupin’s product infringed the Asserted Patents.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware held a three-day bench trial and found that Lupin’s ANDA product did not infringe the Asserted Patents. The court concluded that Galderma failed to prove that Lupin’s product met the specific formulation requirements of the Asserted Patents, particularly the immediate release (IR) and delayed release (DR) portions of doxycycline. The court also found that Galderma did not demonstrate infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Galderma argued that the district court erred in disregarding dissolution test data from Lupin’s ANDA, admitting evidence from a rebuttal batch, imposing additional claim limitations, and not finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s findings. It held that the district court correctly determined that the two-stage dissolution test did not represent in vivo behavior and that Galderma did not prove its theory of infringement. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the rebuttal batch evidence and no imposition of additional claim limitations. Finally, the court upheld the district court’s finding that Galderma did not prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that Lupin’s ANDA product did not infringe the Asserted Patents. View "Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Lupin, Inc." on Justia Law

Julien P. Champagne, a veteran who served from December 1953 to December 1956, filed a claim in September 1987 for benefits related to his cerebellar degenerative disorder (CDD) using VA Form 21-526. The VA regional office (RO) interpreted this as a pension claim and awarded a disability pension in December 1987. In 1999, Champagne sought service connection compensation for malaria and any residual illnesses, including CDD. The RO granted service connection for malaria at 0% in 2002 but did not grant compensation for CDD. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement in 2003, and after multiple proceedings, he was granted compensation for CDD at 100%, effective February 3, 2005. This effective date was later changed to July 14, 2003, but Champagne sought an earlier date, arguing it should be from 1987.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an earlier effective date in October 2020, finding no indication in the 1987 application that Champagne intended to claim service connection compensation. Champagne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision in July 2022. The Veterans Court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the VA may consider a pension claim as a compensation claim but is not required to do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) is permissive, allowing but not requiring the VA to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim. The court also found no merit in Champagne’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding, as the court had merely determined that any findings by the RO would not bind the Board. View "Champagne v. McDonough" on Justia Law

PS Products, Inc. and Billy Pennington (collectively, PSP) own a U.S. Design Patent for a long-spiked electrode for a stun device. They filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Arkansas against Panther Trading Company, Inc. (Panther) for patent infringement. Panther responded with a Rule 11 letter and a motion to dismiss, arguing the infringement claims were frivolous and the venue was improper. PSP did not respond to these communications and later moved to voluntarily dismiss the case with prejudice. Panther then sought attorney fees and sanctions, claiming the lawsuit was frivolous.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the case with prejudice and awarded Panther attorney fees and costs under 35 U.S.C. § 285, deeming the case exceptional. The court also imposed $25,000 in deterrence sanctions on PSP under its inherent power, citing PSP's history of filing meritless lawsuits. PSP filed a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. PSP appealed the $25,000 sanctions, arguing the district court lacked authority to impose them in addition to attorney fees and that the court applied the wrong legal standard. The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in imposing sanctions under its inherent power, even after awarding attorney fees under § 285. The court found that PSP's conduct, including filing a meritless lawsuit and citing the wrong venue statute, justified the sanctions. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and declined Panther's request for attorney fees for the appeal, determining the appeal was not frivolous as argued. View "PS Products, Inc. v. Panther Trading Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Mirror Worlds Technologies, LLC owns three patents related to methods for storing, organizing, and presenting data in time-ordered streams on a computer system. In 2017, Mirror Worlds sued Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) for patent infringement, alleging that Facebook's features, such as News Feed, Timeline, and Activity Log, infringed on these patents. Facebook moved for summary judgment of non-infringement, which the district court granted, concluding that Facebook did not infringe the patents as a matter of law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that Facebook's systems did not meet the "main stream" or "main collection" limitations of the patents, as the evidence showed that not all data units received or generated by Facebook's systems were stored in the accused main streams. The court also rejected Facebook's defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101 but granted summary judgment of non-infringement on several grounds, including that the accused systems did not display a "glance view" as required by the '538 and '439 patents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's summary judgment of non-infringement. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's construction of "data unit" and found that the evidence supported the conclusion that Facebook's systems received data units not stored in the accused main streams. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain evidence presented by Mirror Worlds and found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the "glance view" limitation. Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of non-infringement and dismissed Facebook's cross-appeal regarding the invalidity defense. View "MIRROR WORLDS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. META PLATFORMS, INC. " on Justia Law