Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While serving in the Navy 1968-1970, Simmons experienced feelings of depression and homesickness. A VA physician diagnosed Simmons with situational depression but no permanent disability. Another VA physician diagnosed him with immature personality disorder and recommended he be discharged. In 1972, the VA awarded Simmons a non-service-connected pension on his polyarthritis claim. In 1974, Simmons sought additional compensation, asserting that his arthritis was service-connected and that he also had a nervous condition that justified compensation. The VA denied the claim. In 2005, after receiving a total disability rating for an unrelated asbestosis-based claim, Simmons claimed that there was clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the 1974 decision, with respect to the denial of service connection, citing the presumptions of soundness and service connection in 38 U.S.C. 105(a) and 1111.The Board found that Simmons’s current psychiatric disorder was due to his non-service-connected arthritis and that the presumptions did not apply. The Veterans Court affirmed, finding that although the Board erred in analyzing the presumptions, that error was harmless because Simmons’s current disability was not causally related to his in-service condition. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a failure to apply an evidentiary presumption is per se prejudicial. A per se rule of prejudice for failure to apply the presumptions would undo any proper VA finding that the claimant had failed to establish a causal nexus. View "Simmons v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

While serving in the Navy, 1972-1073, Merritt sustained a concussion in an automobile accident. In 2006, a VA psychologist prepared a note. stating that Merritt had “[s]ymptoms of bipolar disorder[, which] first began ... on active duty,” and that Merritt’s “work performance began to suffer” after the in-service accident. In 2010, Merritt sought disability benefits for bipolar disorder, anxiety, and personality disorders. The Board determined that Merritt’s psychiatric disorders were not service-connected, relying solely on an independent medical expert opinion. On remand, the Board again denied Merritt’s claim, stating that the VA psychology note was entitled to little probative weight, apparently because there was no evidence that the VA psychologist had access to Merritt’s records, and there was a discrepancy between that note and Merritt’s treatment records as to the length of time that Merritt was unconscious following the automobile accident. The Veterans Court affirmed, finding the Board’s error in not following the remand order harmless because the VA note “described no symptoms that . . . supported . . . a retrospective diagnosis” of bipolar disorder, and “there [was] no possibility that the Board could have awarded service connection based on [the note].”Merritt died; Mrs. Merritt was allowed to substitute herself as the surviving spouse. The Federal Circuit subsequently dismissed her appeal as moot. Mrs. Merritt did not preserve her claim by filing a formal claim with the VA within one year of Merritt’s death as required. View "Merritt v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

The 850 patent discloses a self-anchoring beverage container that prevents spills by anchoring the container to a surface. An International Trade Commission complaint, against several respondents (including Mayborn) alleged infringement of the patent and sought a general exclusion order (GEO) barring importation of infringing goods by any party. An ALJ determined that remaining respondents—those with whom the Complainants had not settled—were in default and infringed claim 1 of the patent. The defaulting respondents did not raise invalidity challenges. The ALJ recommended a GEO because it was difficult to gain information about entities selling the containers, and numerous entities were importing the containers, making it “nearly impossible to identify the sources.” The Commission issued the GEO in 2018. Mayborn took no action during the proceedings.In 2019, the Complainants notified Mayborn and its retail partners that Mayborn’s products infringed the patent in violation of the GEO. Mayborn petitioned the Commission to rescind its GEO under 19 U.S.C. 1337(k)(1), which allows the Commission to rescind or modify an order if “the conditions which led to such ... order no longer exist.” Mayborn argued that this requirement was satisfied because claim 1 of the patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. 102, 103. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s denial of Mayborn’s petition. The asserted discovery of invalidating prior art after the issuance of a GEO is not a changed condition. View "Mayborn Group, Ltd. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

In 2015, AK Steel filed a petition with the Department of Commerce, seeking an antidumping duty investigation, 19 U.S.C. 1673, covering corrosion-resistant steel products (CORE) from Taiwan. Commerce instituted an investigation and selected as mandatory respondents the two largest exporters of CORE from Taiwan, Prosperity and Yieh. Those entities disclosed that they were affiliated with a third company, Synn. Commerce decided to “collapse” all three entities The purpose of collapsing multiple entities into a single entity is to prevent affiliated entities from circumventing antidumping duties by “channel[ing] production of subject merchandise through the affiliate with the lowest potential dumping margin.” Under 19 C.F.R. 351.401(f) the entities must be “affiliated” and must have “production facilities for similar or identical products that would not require substantial retooling of either facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities”; and Commerce must find “a significant potential for the manipulation of price or production.” Commerce found significant potential for manipulation between Prosperity and Synn.The Federal Circuit vacated Commerce's decision. Commerce acted contrary to law when it collapsed Prosperity, Yieh, and Synn without considering section 351.401(f)'s factors as between the relationships of Prosperity and Yieh or between Prosperity and Yieh/Synn. Commerce must consider the “totality of the circumstances” between all entities. View "Prosperity Tieh Enterprise Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Hardy owns land in Newton County, Georgia, through which CGA operated a rail line. CGA’s predecessor acquired interests in Hardy’s parcels through various deeds. In 2013, CGA applied for authority to abandon a portion of its rail line by filing a notice of exemption from formal abandonment proceedings with the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The Foundation requested interim trail use under the National Trail Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU). In 2016, CGA notified the STB that the map attached to CGA’s notice of exemption was inaccurate and attached a corrected map. The STB accepted CGA’s revised map and modified 2013 NITU “effective on its date of service.” Hardy filed suit, alleging that the 2013 NITU caused takings by preventing CGA’s abandonment of sections of the rail line running through Hardy’s parcels.The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that Hardy has a cognizable property interest; the deeds conveyed easements rather than fee simple estates. The court vacated a holding that the NITU caused a temporary taking of parcels that were erroneously included in the description of the land. In a rails-to-trails case, a taking occurs when a “NITU is issued and state law reversionary interests that would otherwise take effect pursuant to normal abandonment proceedings are forestalled.” The court remanded for determinations of whether or when the Railroad would have abandoned the easements absent the NITU. View "Hardy v. United States" on Justia Law

Sellers served in the Navy in 1964-1968, and in the Army, 1981-1996. He suffers from major depressive disorder (MDD). Sellers has a 2009 effective date for his disability benefits. He seeks an effective date of March 1996, the date of his formal claim seeking compensation for specific injuries to his leg, knee, back, finger, and ears. On his application, under “Remarks,” Sellers wrote “Request for s/c [service connection] for disabilities occurring during active duty service.” Sellers contends that the law in effect in 1996 requires his remarks to be understood as a claim for compensation for his MDD, although his claim in no way refers to MDD. The Veterans Court agreed with Sellers. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs challenged that decision.The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Sellers is not entitled to an earlier effective date. A legally sufficient formal claim must identify, at least at a high level of generality, the current condition upon which the veteran’s claim is based. The Secretary’s duty to assist begins upon receipt of a formal claim that identifies the medical condition for which benefits are sought, which triggers the Secretary’s duty to obtain the veteran’s medical records, 38 U.S.C. 5103A(c)(1)(A), and then to fully develop the stated claim. Until the Secretary comprehends the condition on which the claim is based, the Secretary does not know where to begin to develop the claim. View "Sellers v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

Jones served on active duty with the Army in 1967-1974 and in the Army National Guard in 1987-1990. In 1994, he sought disability benefits for a nervous disorder and a leg wound. A VA regional office granted service connection for a leg scar but found that disability non-compensable and denied the claim for a nervous condition. Jones did not appeal. In 2002, Jones filed a request to reopen his claim, asserting that he was assaulted by muggers while stationed in Germany, which resulted in his developing PTSD. The regional office denied his request. In 2008, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted the request to reopen, directing the regional office to obtain additional information from two individuals with knowledge of the assault. In 2010, the regional office granted Jones service connection for PTSD and a schizoaffective disorder, with a 100% disability rating effective from October 2002, when he sought to reopen his claim. Jones sought to have the effective date made retroactive to 1994. In 2016, after Jones’s death, the Board held that the effective date was 2002. The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit affirmed, citing 38 C.F.R. 3.156(c); the decision in Jones’s favor was based on evidence created in 2003 and 2008, which did not exist in 1994. View "Jones v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

Packet’s patents teach a method for monitoring packets exchanged over a computer network. A stream of packets between two computers is called a connection flow. Monitoring connection flows cannot account for disjointed sequences of the same flow in a network. The specifications explain that it is more useful to identify and classify “conversational flows,” defined as “the sequence of packets that are exchanged in any direction as a result of an activity.” Conversational flows provide application-specific views of network traffic and can be used to generate helpful analytics to understand network load and usage. The 789 patent recites apparatus claims’ the 725 and 751 patents recite method claims.Packet asserted claims against NetScout’s products under 35 U.S.C. 102. The jury found all claims willfully infringed, rejected NetScout’s invalidity defenses, and awarded pre-suit ($3.5 million) and post-suit ($2.25 million) damages. The court issued findings, rejecting NetScout’s section 101 invalidity defense, enhanced damages by $2.8 million, and awarded an ongoing royalty for post-verdict infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and vacated the award of enhanced damages. The district court erred in denying NetScout’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on pre-suit damages. Packet is barred from recovering damages for pre-suit sales of the NetScout products because it failed to comply with the marking requirement. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Packet Intelligence LLC v. NetScout Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Each patent at issue claims a method of treating cancer by administering antibodies targeting specific receptor-ligand interactions on T cells, which are responsible for processing information to develop an immune response in the body using receptors on their surfaces. The named inventor Dr. Honjo, a professor at Kyoto University, had shared information with Drs. Wood and Freeman until about 2001. In 2002, Honjo filed his patent application in Japan. Each patent at issue case claims priority from that patent application; none include Freeman and Wood as inventors.The Federal Circuit affirmed that Drs. Freeman and Wood should be deemed inventors of the subject matter of the patents alongside Dr. Honjo, 35 U.S.C. 116(a). The inventorship of a complex invention may depend on partial contributions to conception over time, and there is no principled reason to discount genuine contributions made by collaborators because portions of that work were published prior to conception for the benefit of the public. Earlier publication of an invention is obviously a potential hazard to patentability, but the publication of a portion of a complex invention does not necessarily defeat joint inventorship of that invention. View "Dana-Farber Cancer Institute v. Ono Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Uniloc filed patent infringement actions against Apple, which moved to dismiss, arguing that Uniloc had granted its creditor a license with the right to sublicense in the event of a Uniloc default. According to Apple, Uniloc had defaulted and “lacked the right to exclude Apple from using the patents.” Apple’s motion referenced material that Uniloc had designated as highly confidential. Uniloc asked the court to seal most of the materials in the parties’ filings, including citations to case law, quotations from published opinions, and 23 entire exhibits, including matters of public record. The court denied that motion. Uniloc sought reconsideration, stating that it was willing to make public more than 90 percent of the material it had originally sought to shield; it submitted a declaration including individual grounds for redacting or sealing the remaining materials and declarations from third-party licensees that disclosure would cause them significant competitive harm. The court denied Uniloc’s motion.The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to Uniloc’s requests to seal its purportedly confidential information and that of its related entities and vacated with respect to licensees. In denying Uniloc’s “sweeping motion,” the court sent a strong message that litigants should submit narrow, well-supported sealing requests and “took seriously the presumption of public access.” The court failed to make sufficient findings on balancing the public’s right of access against the interests of the third parties in shielding their financial and licensing information from public view. View "Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law