Justia U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tam, the “front man” for Asian-American rock band, The Slants, sought to register the mark THE SLANTS and attached specimens featuring the name set against Asian motifs. The examining attorney found the mark disparaging to people of Asian descent (15 U.S.C. 1052(a)) and denied registration. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dismissed for failure to file a brief. Tam filed another application, seeking to register the mark THE SLANTS for identical services and claiming use of the mark since 2006. Attached specimens did not contain Asian motifs. The examining attorney again found the mark disparaging and declined to register it. The Board affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the Federal Circuit vacated, finding Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act unconstitutional. The government may not penalize private speech merely because it disapproves of the message, even when the government’s message-discriminatory penalty is less than a prohibition. “Courts have been slow to appreciate the expressive power of trademarks. Words—even a single word—can be powerful. With his band name, Tam conveys more about our society than many volumes of undisputedly protected speech.” The regulation at issue amounts to viewpoint discrimination; under strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny review, the disparagement proscription is unconstitutional, because the government has offered no legitimate interests to justify it. View "In Re:Tam" on Justia Law

Wolfskin applied to the Patent and Trademark Office to register a design mark consisting of an angled paw print for use with its clothing, footwear, and accessory products. New Millennium opposed the registration on the ground that Wolfskin’s mark would likely create confusion with its own registered mark. In response, Wolfskin filed a counterclaim for cancellation, alleging that New Millennium had abandoned its registered mark. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board rejected Wolfskin’s cancellation counterclaim and sustained the opposition, refusing to register Wolfskin’s mark. The Federal Circuit agreed that New Millennium did not abandon its registered mark, but held that the Board incorrectly found a likelihood of confusion between the two marks because the Board failed to properly compare New Millennium’s mark as a whole to Wolfskin’s mark and failed to recognize, in light of the significant evidence of paw prints appearing in third-party registrations and usage for clothing, the relatively narrow scope of protection afforded to marks involving paw prints. View "Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung fur Draussen GmbH & Co., KGAA, v. New Millenium Sports, S.L.U." on Justia Law

Louisiana Fish Fry filed a use-based application with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for the mark LOUISIANA FISH FRY PRODUCTS BRING THE TASTE OF LOUISIANA HOME!, and a design, identifying the following goods for the mark: “Marinade; Sauce mixes, namely barbecue shrimp sauce mix; Remoulade dressing; Cocktail sauce, Seafood sauce; Tartar sauce; Gumbo file; and Cayenne pepper.” The Examining Attorney refused to register the mark absent a disclaimer of FISH FRY PRODUCTS on the basis that the term is not independently registrable. Louisiana Fish Fry argued that a disclaimer of FISH FRY PRODUCTS was not necessary because the term was not generic and had acquired distinctiveness. It submitted evidence that Louisiana Fish Fry had been using LOUISIANA FISH FRY PRODUCTS for at least 30 years. Citing numerous articles and recipes, the Examining Attorney asserted that the relevant public understands “fish fry” to identify fried fish meals and that FISH FRY PRODUCTS is, at least, “highly descriptive.” The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board agreed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Louisiana Fish Fry has not established that FISH FRY PRODUCTS has acquired distinctiveness. View "In re: Louisiana Fish Fry Prods., Ltd." on Justia Law

Juice Generation, which operates New York City juice bars, applied to the Patent and Trademark Office to register a mark consisting of “PEACE LOVE AND JUICE,” 15 U.S.C. 1051(b), and a design for use with its juice bar services. GS Enterprises opposed the application on the ground that the mark was likely to cause confusion with its own family of marks, all of which contain the phrase “PEACE & LOVE” and are registered for use with restaurant services. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board sustained the opposition and refused to register Juice Generation’s mark. The Federal Circuit remanded, finding that the Board did not adequately assess the weakness of GS’s marks and did not properly consider the three-word combination of Juice Generation’s mark as a whole in comparing it to the two-word combination in GS’s marks. View "Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Berger manufactures, imports, and sells watches, clocks, and personal care products. It filed an intent-to-use application at the Patent and Trademark Office, to register the mark “iWatch” for 30 different goods in the general categories: watches, clocks, and goods related to watches or clocks. Berger declared “a bona fide intention to use or use through [Berger’s] related company or licensee the mark in commerce on or in connection with the identified goods and/or services.” The PTO approved the application for publication. Swatch filed an opposition, claiming that “iWatch” is confusingly similar to its mark, “Swatch,” and that Berger lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce (15 U.S.C. 1051(b)(1)). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board considered the testimony of Berger’s owner and CEO that he did not expect the iWatch mark to be used for clocks and personal care products. His paralegal testified that she was told that the list was intended to “leave all doors open.” The Board concluded that Berger lacked intent to use the mark on clocks and related goods and lacked a genuine plan to commercialize the mark on watches, but only intended to reserve a right in the mark. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the conclusion supported by substantial evidence. View "M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc. v. Swtch AG" on Justia Law

A jury found that Samsung smartphones infringed and diluted Apple’s patents and trade dresses amd awarded Apple $290,456,793. The Federal Circuit affirmed the verdict on the design patent infringements, the validity of two utility patent claims, and the damages awarded for the design and utility patent infringements, but reversed findings that the asserted trade dresses are protectable. Apple claimed elements from its iPhone 3G and 3GS products to define an asserted unregistered trade dress: a rectangular product with four evenly rounded corners; a flat, clear surface covering the front of the product; a display screen under the clear surface; substantial black borders above and below the display screen and narrower black borders on either side of the screen; and when the device is on, a row of small dots on the display screen, a matrix of colorful square icons with evenly rounded corners within the display screen, and an unchanging bottom dock of colorful square icons with evenly rounded corners set off from the display’s other icons. The registered trade dress claims the design details in each of the 16 icons on the iPhone’s home screen framed by the iPhone’s rounded-rectangular shape with silver edges and a black background. View "Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

PV applied to register PRETZEL CRISPS in standard character format for “pretzels” on an intent-to-use basis under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051. The trademark examiner refused registration on the Principal Register, finding the proposed mark merely descriptive. PV: amended its identification of goods to “pretzel crackers;” disclaimed the exclusive right to use “pretzel” apart from the mark as a whole; and obtained registration on the Supplemental Register. Years later, PV again sought to register PRETZEL CRISPS on the Principal Register, identifying October, 2004 as its first use of the mark in commerce, disclaiming the exclusive right to use the term “pretzel” apart from the mark as shown, and claiming acquired distinctiveness in the mark as a whole. Frito-Lay filed opposition, arguing that the term PRETZEL CRISPS is generic for pretzel crackers and not registrable and that PRETZEL CRISPS is highly descriptive of a type of cracker product and has not acquired distinctiveness. Frito-Lay also moved to cancel the supplemental registration. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board granted the petition for cancellation, finding that “pretzel crisps” was a compound term, not a phrase, and was generic. The Federal Circuit vacated: the Board overlooked or disregarded a genericness survey as to which it apparently found no flaw and applied the incorrect legal standard in assessing whether the term was generic. View "Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay of N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Tam, the “front man” for Asian-American dance rock band The Slants, filed the 263 application, seeking to register the mark THE SLANTS for “Entertainment, namely, live performances by a musical band.” Tam attached specimens featuring the band name set against Asian motifs. The examining attorney found the mark disparaging to people of Asian descent under 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) and refused to register it. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dismissed for failure to file a brief and the application was deemed abandoned. Tam then filed the 044 application, seeking to register the mark THE SLANTS for identical services as in the 263 application. In the 044 application, Tam claims use of the mark since 2006. Specimens attached to the 044 application do not contain Asian motifs. The examining attorney again found the mark THE SLANTS disparaging and declined to register it. The Board affirmed, stating that “it is abundantly clear from the record not only that THE SLANTS . . . would have the ‘likely meaning’ of people of Asian descent but also that such meaning has been so perceived and has prompted significant responses by prospective attendees or hosts of the band’s performances.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "In re: Tam" on Justia Law

TriVita filed trademark application Serial No. 77/658,158 to register the mark NOPALEA on the Principal Register for dietary and nutritional supplements “containing, in whole or in substantial part, nopal juice.” The examiner rejected the application under section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act as “descriptive of a feature of applicant’s goods on the grounds that applicant’s products contain nopal which is derived from an [ex]tract of the nopalea plant.” The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that “nopalea plant” is not a term used in the food industry, and that the term is not descriptive because TriVita’s products contain extracts from the Opunti genus of nopal cactus, not the Nopalea genus. Various websites show Nopalea as the name of a genus of cactus used in food and supplements. Some of TriVita’s affiliates explicitly state on their website that TriVita’s products were derived from the Nopalea cactus. Consumers may well assume, as do some of TriVita’s affiliates, that, as a characteristic of nopal juice, TriVita’s goods derive from genus nopalea. View "In re: Trivita, Inc." on Justia Law

In May 2008, Couture applied to register the service mark PLAYDOM under Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051(a), submitting a “[s]creen capture of [a] website offering Entertainment Services in commerce.” His website, www.playdominc.com, then included only a single page, stating: “[w]elcome to PlaydomInc.com. We are proud to offer writing and production services for motion picture film, television, and new media. Please feel free to contact us if you are interested: playdominc@gmail.com,” with the notice: “Website Under Construction.” No services under the mark were provided until 2010. The PLAYDOM mark was registered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in January 2009. On February 9, 2009, Playdom, Inc. applied to register the identical mark. The registered mark was cited as a ground for rejecting the application. Playdom, Inc. sought to cancel the registration of Couture’s mark as void ab initio because Couturehad not used the mark in commerce as of the date of the application. The Board granted cancellation, stating that Couture “had not rendered his services as of the filing date of his application” because he had “merely posted a website advertising his readiness, willingness and ability to render said services.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Couture v. Playdom, Inc." on Justia Law